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 Introducing Online Vitriol
Sara Polak and Daniel Trottier
In ‘How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life’ (New York Times 
Magazine, 12 February 2015) Welsh journalist Jon Ronson investigated the 
effect on victims of public shaming through social media platforms and 
compared it to the history of public shaming as a form of punishment. Such 
punishments (the stocks, the pillory, the whipping pole) have gone out of 
practice, in part because they were considered too humiliating and socially 
annihilating for the person undergoing the punishment. Ronson finds a clear 
parallel in the effects of online public shaming in the victims of the present. 
He both interviewed victims, including Justine Sacco (famous for being 
shamed online by thousands of people as a racist by the malicious retweet 
of her ‘funny’ joke tweeted just before going offline on an intercontinental 
f light in 2013), and people who had been important in setting off such pro-
cesses, like Sam Biddle, who initially retweeted Sacco’s tweet and posted 
it on Valleywag, with the hashtag 
#hasjustinelandedyet. Biddle was 
unapologetic in his interview with 
Ronson about the harm done to 
Sacco as a result of the Twitter 
storm (she was let go from her job, 
received numerous death threats, 
was socially isolated, and trauma-
tized by the ordeal – all effects that 
have come to be seen as fairly typical for public shaming).1 However, Biddle 
later became victim of such a shitstorm himself, and a year after the initial 
denunciation publicly apologized to Sacco.
Ronson reflects how he himself was initially a keen actor in such processes:
1 For more research on these ‘typical’ effects of online shaming see e.g. Jackson et al., ‘#Girls-
LikeUs; Vaidhyanathan, Anti-Social Media; Losh and Wernimont, Bodies of Information; Lovink, 
Social Media Abyss.
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In the early days of Twitter, I was a keen shamer. When newspaper 
columnists made racist or homophobic statements, I joined the pile-on. 
[…] It felt as if hierarchies were being dismantled, as if justice were being 
democratized. As time passed, though, I watched these shame campaigns 
multiply, to the point that they targeted not just powerful institutions 
and public f igures but really anyone perceived to have done something 
offensive. I also began to marvel at the disconnect between the severity 
of the crime and the gleeful savagery of the punishment. It almost felt 
as if shamings were now happening for their own sake, as if they were 
following a script.2
Sacco herself worked in PR, and Ronson and Biddle too are both journalists, 
writers and people who are professionally involved in communication online. 
Yet even as professionals they are clearly as little in control of the ‘gleeful 
savagery’ of online shaming as anyone else. At most they may be said to 
have a bit more agency or influence than others,3 which only underscores 
how unprepared and outmatched other targets might be when facing an 
angered online mob.4
Events like this have become very common in recent years and they raise 
many questions. For instance, do trolling, ‘doxxing’ (publicizing someone’s 
personal details such as home address and phone number without consent), 
or contributing to public shaming as in the above cases constitute a form of 
violence? Who are its victims? And how are victims, bystanders, societies 
and platform owners to deal with it? Is it something that can be controlled, 
and if so by whom? And what is the genealogy of online vitriol? How, does 
it interact with embodied violence offline? While online and offline worlds 
seem separated, the consequences of online media expressions also occur 
off line, and many online dynamics have off line equivalents in past and 
present. Beyond comparisons to the pillory, there are many other ways in 
which this phenomenon resembles the online equivalent of age-old enact-
ments of violence. Ronson, for instance, reports getting one jarring response 
to having set off a shaming campaign on Twitter (‘amid the hundreds of 
congratulatory messages I received’) – a question: ‘Were you a bully at 
school?’.
2 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-
saccos-life.html. Accessed 21 February 2020.
3 As in Biddle’s case because he had a larger platform; or as in Sacco’s case because she should 
presumably have been better able to estimate the potential consequences of making a joke that 
could be understood as racist on a public platform.
4 Lovink, Social Media Abyss.
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The link between bullying and trolling on social media has often been 
made, for one thing because a great deal of bullying in the context of school 
nowadays also occurs online, but also because the setting in which trolling 
happens is similar to that of bullying.5 If we consider trolling to mean ‘sowing 
discord on the internet by starting quarrels or upsetting people, by posting 
inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic messages in an online community 
with the intent of provoking readers into an emotional response or of 
otherwise disrupting normal, on-topic discussion’, some of the intentions 
and effects are obviously similar to those of bullying. In terms of social 
psychology the aim of either is to disrupt the communication of real or 
randomly selected ‘enemies’, in order to strengthen a sense of power within 
one’s own group. Social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook or Reddit 
are especially fertile environments for this, because conversation there, 
even if it seems to be between two people, is really also a performance for 
the benefit of perhaps very many invisible onlookers, who may or may not 
express themselves through likes, retweets, or by adding comments.6 Thus, 
such a conversation, which might have been entirely civil if it happened 
face to face between two people, or even in a series of one-on-one direct 
messages, can easily become like a schoolyard f ight. The function most 
of the comments serve is rather to show off one’s acerbic wit or cool to 
people on one’s own side, rather than to arrive at mutual understanding or 
appreciation. As in offline bullying then, the function of such ‘debates’ is 
often rather to strengthen one’s own ‘ingroup’ by means of excluding and 
humiliating the opponent. Thus, the ‘normal on-topic discussion’ is often 
less the logical function of social media exchanges, than the disruption itself, 
which may have a range of secondary purposes, such as entertainment, 
silencing political opposition, a sense of power for those doing the targeting, 
or of safety for those not targeted.
Many social media platforms through their design – the publicness of 
communication, the possibility to share, like, and comment on earlier 
statements, the imposed brevity of such statements – facilitate processes 
of group formation through bullying and exclusion more easily than they 
facilitate conversation that brings insight into the content of what is being 
discussed. This is also why two factions clashing on social media platforms 
can often both come away from the exchange feeling that they are being 
trolled by the others. Similarly, there are various cases where the person who 
5 Wright (ed), A Social-ecological Approach to Cyberbullying; Horowitz and Bollinger, 
Cyberbullying.
6 Settle, Frenemies.
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(is perceived to have) started the public shaming of someone, is later targeted 
in the same way and with the same effects by anonymous wrath. And 
while this wrath seems volatile, and online abuse may happen to anyone, 
there is ample evidence that misogyny and other forms of vitriol aimed at 
minorities thrive online both in terms of quantity and sheer bluntness of 
such utterances.
This book is motivated by a series of urgent questions surrounding online 
vitriol. Even in a deeply polarized political climate, one common experi-
ence across the spectrum is the sense of simultaneous empowerment and 
powerlessness in response to prolif ic and persistent digitally mediated 
communications. We are wondering how to evaluate, and what to do with, 
the overwhelming amount of such activity, much of which can be considered 
violent. What is online vitriol, as we have termed it throughout the book? 
What does it mean? What is its intent? In what ways is this phenomenon 
new compared to forms of violence or vitriolic texts in the broadest sense 
from the past? How productive, in this context, is the dichotomy of online 
and offline? And how can individuals, organizations, (media) companies 
and governments respond to it?7
These important and urgent questions bring together scholars in the 
social sciences and humanities, as well as activists and media professionals 
who through their work are regularly confronted with online vitriol. Their 
discussions are ref lected in this book, which seeks to bridge academic 
research and everyday practice. We take this approach since online vitriol 
arguably has an impact on all of us, even those who choose not to participate 
in online social networking. And many professionals, for instance in journal-
ism, communications or politics, no longer have the luxury of being able to 
avoid social media altogether.
The notion of online vitriol is a complicated one. When can online social-
ity be considered as violence, and to what extent can this be determined 
objectively? Whitney Phillips and Ryan Milner in their book The Ambivalent 
Internet explicitly embrace the notion of ambivalence here, arguing that 
what can be offensive to one reader is funny to another.8 Of course this is 
true, and their appreciation of the ambivalence and the sliding scale of what 
is possible or acceptable is an essential element of a great deal of online 
sociality. However, we position ourselves on the side of those negatively 
affected by online expressions in a way that can be construed as violent. In 
7 Several strategies for doing this are discussed in Sunstein, #Republic and in Caplan et al., 
‘Algorithmic Accountability’.
8 Phillips and Milner, The Ambivalent Internet.
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other words, our primary focus is precarity and relative powerlessness in 
the face of online vitriol, which characterizes the experience for instance 
of a trans activist whose home address and/ phone number are publicized 
online, or of the female critics who were victimized by GeenStijl (a Dutch 
online news website that posted photos of critical columnists, asking their 
readers to respond in the comments to the question ‘Would you do her?’). 
However, the business models driving such sites’ editors and the affective 
or political motivations of their anonymous posters are also considered.
The f irst question to answer is how we should read potentially violent 
messages on social media. Throughout its chapters this book is committed 
to showing that these are speech acts, in the sense that they are in various 
ways performative. By saying or showing something, they do something. 
This is not new to social media networks: a threat exists only in words, yet 
it can profoundly alter the reality of safety of the person threatened. This 
is true whether the threat is uttered on Twitter or a handwritten letter, but 
the difference is that on social media, users are typically less inhibited by 
social norms and practical viability to utter threats, which to them may 
seem silly or trivial, but not to the receiver, in the characteristic ambivalence 
that Phillips and Milner analyze. Nonetheless, a threat, however ephemeral 
in the eyes of the sender, remains performative in J.L. Austin’s sense of the 
term:9 like speech acts such as ‘I promise’, it changes the reality. Online 
speech acts can also be performative in a considerably more aggressive way, 
for instance, when they serve to retweet or otherwise spread nude photos 
without the consent of the (often famous) person photographed. A share or 
retweet may seem inconsequential enough to the user clicking the button, 
but it is precisely the massive spread of such images that actually constitutes 
and continues the abuse implicit in the non-consensual spread of the image.
What is online vitriol?
Various terms are in use to describe violent, bullying, demeaning, or oth-
erwise antagonistic expressions on social media platforms. Hate speech 
is common, but also not limited to the online world. While it does signal 
that these expressions are speech acts, and therefore, as we maintain, 
performative, the reference to ‘hate’ does not always seem justif ied. While 
many different motivations and affects can be involved, and hatred on 
the part of the sender is surely one of them, other motivations exist too 
9 Austin, How To Do Things With Words.
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(as considered for instance in chapters two, three and seven). The term is 
thus both too broad and too narrow in its seeming attribution of motives. 
Feminist scholar Emma Jane has introduced the term ‘e-bile’, which is 
useful, but particularly designed for the specif ic category of misogynist 
and objectifying comments addressed to women online.10 We propose 
online vitriol as a term to think about this phenomenon, because it stresses 
both the violent and the uncontrollable aspects of the phenomenon and its 
typical excesses, such as shitstorms, and speech acts that silence, threaten, 
or harm others.
Etymologically vitriol derives from the Latin ‘vitriolum’ which means 
sulphuric acid, and is akin to the Latin word ‘vitrum’, glass. In common usage 
it means bitter or abusive speech or malice. Vitriol does tend to be acidic 
and acerbic, and the metaphor of splintering glass is apt in this context. 
Moreover, vitriol is a word as well as a phenomenon with long cultural 
roots in the Western world. Vitriol has been expressed and documented 
in historical contexts, as Frans-Willem Korsten and Ewelina Pepiak show 
in Section Two.
Online vitriol seems to be a particular product of the Web 2.0, the ‘partici-
patory’ or ‘social web’ that has evolved since the early twenty-f irst century, 
and that revolves around ‘user-generated content’ and conceives of the web 
as a space of interaction, rather than a collection of static sites where one can 
read information. The term ‘Web 2.0’ was coined in 1999 by Darcy DiNucci 
in an article prophetically titled ‘Fragmented Future’.11 Fragmentation 
does indeed seem to be one of the key aims and effects of online vitriol 
enabled by the interactive structure of social media platforms. In recent years 
particularly, online vitriol has come to serve political powerplay, with actors 
often operating from a stance of victimhood and supposed powerlessness, 
while at the same time attracting considerable attention, visibility and 
influence. This becomes manifest for instance in the context of political 
strife, between political actors, but also between political and press actors 
(Donald Trump’s lashing out at mainstream media networks comes to mind 
as an obvious example). These are well-documented instances of vitriolic 
exchanges between public f igures. We may consider whether these shape 
individuals’ understandings of what is possible and what is appropriate in 
public discourse, though social platforms and mobile devices users can also 
reproduce and exceed the kinds of vitriol they encounter in public.
10 Jane, ‘‘Your a Ugly, Whorish, Slut…’’.
11 DiNucci, ‘Fragmented Future’.
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Vitriol is a fruitful and troubling term to invoke when discussing the 
problematics of contemporary communication practices. Seemingly, the 
purpose is not only to cause offence or harm towards the interlocutor. 
Whether discussing a spat between political rivals or a heated exchange 
between cultural influencers on Twitter, the intention is simultaneously 
to communicate a disregard for that target – as well as the categories and 
communities to which they may belong – to a wider audience. Contemporary 
mediated vitriol is always a public affair that is usually meant to chal-
lenge the social standing of the other, and to reassert one’s own. The cases 
considered in this book vary in terms of political, cultural and historical 
contexts. Yet throughout them we may consider some common tendencies 
that provide insight about the harms and other consequences of vitriolic 
practices.
Online vitriol is weaponized: vitriol is deliberately leveraged to target 
political opponents, or groups that may face categorical and systemic forms 
of oppression. It is thus possible to consider vitriol as purpose driven: as a 
form of expression in which the speaker/author seeks to harm or assert one’s 
self over someone else. This can but does not necessarily stand in contrast 
to an understanding of vitriol as primarily affect-driven.12 While the author 
of vitriolic content may be fuelled by their own disgust or hatred, perhaps of 
greater concern is their ability, and apparent desire, to foster and mobilize 
the disgust and hatred of their audience. This may be evident when assessing 
polarized political landscapes, but can also be observed within subcultures 
such as among authors and fans of young adult literature.13
Online vitriol is also prominent: the intention and effect of vitriolic 
statements is often to grab attention, to get clicks, to direct media focus 
towards oneself, and/or a target. Social media platforms are often complicit in 
this, as their business models depend on a steady flurry of user engagements 
and disclosures. The purpose is not simply to speak to the person deemed 
worthy of vitriol, but rather to make that denunciation visible and legible 
to a broad audience. In other words, vitriol is directed towards a target, 
but is also keenly aware of the broader public it is attempting to influence. 
This extends from the weaponized nature of vitriol: it’s not just that the 
words cause harm on their own, but rather harm is yielded in making 
those words so visibly linked to the reputation of a targeted victim. Online 
vitriol can often be mobilized at remarkable speed, and thus can spread 
12 Gregg, ‘On Friday Night Drinks’.
13 https://www.vulture.com/2017/08/the-toxic-drama-of-ya-twitter.html. Accessed 21 February 
2020.
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far and wide in little time. This does not only intensify the harm caused, 
but simultaneously divides responsibility for this harm among so many, 
often anonymous, participants, that it becomes very diff icult to attribute 
responsibility to individuals.
Finally, online vitriol is retained: by operating through social media 
platforms it forms a kind of public record that may lead to unanticipated 
consequences. Vitriolic statements are uttered in particular contexts, and 
despite their seeming ubiquity, are not necessarily meant to transcend 
and endure beyond these contexts. Yet as digital content, vitriol can 
potentially (and following default settings on platforms, by default) be 
retained indef initely. Produced and retained in such conditions, they 
will surely leak beyond their intended audience, and new standards of 
acceptability may inform how they are received by temporally and spatially 
dispersed publics. For this reason, researchers and other professionals must 
remain attentive to prominent and routinized forms of vitriol, especially 
as these become acceptable practices both within and beyond particular 
contexts.
Purpose of the book and overview of the sections and chapters
This book considers online vitriol in a context of signif icant mediatiza-
tion in a new and rapidly changing media ecosystem, in which data are 
collected and processed in ways that are diff icult for individual users to 
oversee, but also diff icult for lawmakers to regulate and enforce. This book 
brings together disciplines, such as digital media studies, cultural history, 
and literary studies. It both uses the tools and analytical apparatus from 
older disciplines to understand new developments in their historical and 
cultural context, and it offers new terminology and case studies to think 
through the ways in which online vitriol functions in ways fundamentally 
different from older structures and dynamics of vitriol. This book also brings 
together perspectives and contributions that go beyond a purely scholarly 
interest, including activist and journalistic engagements. This contributes 
in particular to a consideration of vitriol’s societal importance, and steps 
that readers can take when encountering it. We hope that this book is also, 
or perhaps primarily, of interest to people who do not necessarily study 
online vitriol, but who are in their daily work and life confronted with its 
practices.
This book is comprised of four sections, each providing various perspec-
tives on one of the book’s guiding questions. The f irst part on the dynamics 
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of online vitriol concerns the question how online vitriol works in ontological 
and medial terms. How do social media networks lend themselves to digital 
vigilantism, or to the spreading of ‘scares’, and how should one respond to 
trolls? The second section is dedicated to the historical precursors of online 
vitriol and to the online life of cultural memory. Where in the offline past 
does online vitriol f ind its roots? And how is it new? The third section is 
dedicated to the affects of online vitriol. How does online sociality and 
vitriol incite waves of strong affective responses? How does this ‘economy’ 
of affect work for and in online platforms and carry over into traditional 
tabloid media? What sensibilities drive online activism from the Alt-Right? 
And to what extent must online vitriol be considered ‘onlife’ in the sense 
that it has tangible effects in the offline world? The final section is dedicated 
to activism, and is written by activists, with academic backgrounds, who 
explain how they personally and collaboratively deal with the vitriol aimed 
at them in response to their work, what initiatives exist to protect users, 
by users themselves, governments, platforms, and other organizations and 
collectives. This section clearly shows the inextricability of the online and 
the offline.
How are social dynamics in the public sphere different if that public 
sphere is largely moved to an online environment? The opening chapter by 
Trottier, Gabdulhakov and Huang discusses the issues of citizens’ vigilantism 
(watching and calling out each other’s real and perceived impolite or uncivil 
behaviour in public space) when this happens in the online world. The 
chapter addresses case studies in three different countries (the UK, Russia, 
and China), showing how these are each culturally specif ic yet escalate the 
impact for those who are at the receiving end of this ‘digilantism’.
Tom Clucas’s chapter addresses practices of YouTube users calling each 
other out in the comments for racist or trolling behaviours. The chapter 
gives historical and philosophical context to the longstanding dilemma 
whether one should ‘feed the trolls’ or not. While the common wisdom is 
not to give attention to trolling – because attention is exactly what trolls 
presumably want – Clucas argues that many trolling comments do merit 
clearly denunciatory responses, and providing these is a kind of labour that 
the online public sphere needs.
In the third chapter Sara Polak zooms in on the early formation of political 
constituencies online. Some such groups, formed and mobilized through 
online platforms, started to become politically active well before they were 
easily visible a such to a larger public. The case study developed in the chapter 
is that of Donald Trump’s and others’ alarmist tweeting about the Ebola 
epidemic in West Africa (2013-2015) which was one of the moments Trump 
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and online constituencies around him came into their own as a group and 
learned to hone and employ massive influence through Twitter and other 
online platforms that later came in handy for the formation of collectives 
such as Trolls for Trump (active in the 2016 Presidential campaign).
The fourth chapter, by Frans-Willem Korsten, opens the section on the 
histories of online vitriol, and thus attends mainly to offline dynamics and 
characteristics of vitriol, locating the god Momus and his daughter Rumor as 
European cultural forebears. Korsten makes clear that the speed with which 
online vitriol can spread, creates a kind of surplus value usually directed 
towards disrupting the process of political agonism. Thus, he argues, using 
the example of rapidly mass-printed pamphlets in the Dutch Republic in 
the 17th century, as well as ‘Alt-Right’ memes of more recent date, have a 
crucial role in f iring up political escalations beyond what is manageable 
in a democratic context.
Ewelina Pepiak’s chapter focuses on the history of the visual rhetoric 
used in nationalist and racist memes employed to frame the attacks on 
women in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016-7 as a reason to exclude and 
criminalize refugees and non-white men in general. The chapter shows 
that such ‘memes’, although they are image-text hybrids of a kind specif ic 
to social media contexts, come out of a long tradition of visual culture 
with stock f igures and tropes to stress the danger of the colonial other as 
a sexualized threat to white femininity.
The sixth chapter, by Gerlov van Engelenhoven, focuses also on the 
presence of colonial inheritances, but rather the other way around: it studies 
how social media communities (Facebook groups and online fora), respond 
to a documentary f ilm that has effectively become a site of memory for 
postcolonial trauma. Perhaps counterintuitively, Van Engelenhoven notes 
that the documentary allows for more nuance and a broader variety of 
perspectives than the social media discourse following it. Social media, 
despite their interactive nature, seem to allow more easily for an echo 
chamber of congealed memories than for actively working through a 
contested past.
Part three, on the affects of online vitriol, opens with Greta Olson’s 
introduction to affect theory in general, explaining its genealogy as a pre-
verbal visceral response, followed by her analysis of the functions of vitriolic 
misogyny in certain US American ‘meninist’ circles. Olson analyzes the 
meanings and implications of misogynist social media vernacular such as 
‘basic bitch’ and concludes that this does not indicate a genuine hatred for 
women, so much as a collective sense of nostalgia and loyalty among men. 
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The more Trump, for instance, is criticized the more fervent his supporters 
become in their defence of him, because he reflects their own affective 
experience of being beleaguered.
Ann-Marie Riesner’s chapter, then, traces the affects, turning into 
full-blown shitstorms, that Austrian author Stefanie Sargnagel arouses 
through her provocative blogposts. Riesner analyzes how Sargnagel as part 
of her artwork manipulates her readers to expose the affective networks of 
vitriolic hatred that span both the online and the offline world. The analysis 
uses methods originating in literary studies to untangle the dynamics of 
online vitriol and elucidate the functioning mechanisms of online hate 
speech.
This notion of affect ‘f lowing’ between the online and off line world 
and destabilizing any dichotomy between the two that may or may not 
have existed in the past, is then further explored in Katleen Gabriels 
and Marjolein Lanzing’s chapter on ‘onlife’ vitriol. This chapter explores 
three case studies from different contexts in which online bullying and 
vigilantism have very tangible effects on people’s lives (including suicide 
and being forced to move homes). Gabriels and Lanzing make a clear case 
that online and off line practices and sociality are so intertwined and 
interdependent that the online/offline binary really collapses and should 
be considered an ‘onlife’ dynamic, rejecting any notion that online vitriol 
can be dismissed as something limited to a specif ically virtual sphere that 
is voluntarily entered.
The f inal two chapters are dedicated to activism and practice. They 
essentially each offer experiences and advice from activists. The f irst is 
Sophie Schwarz’s reflection on her project at Justus Liebig Universität Giessen 
‘Why I Need Feminism’ – unlike the original project that inspired this one, 
a specif ically off line invitation to people in the university to leave their 
thoughts about why they need feminism. This drew serious reactions but also 
attracted a considerable deal of abuse, online as well as offline, surprising 
perhaps if one considers the offline design of the project.
In the last chapter, Penelope Kemekenidou discusses her extensive experi-
ence with online and offline feminist activism, and particularly the ways 
in which she and her peers protect themselves against threats and sexist 
violence directed against them. While this contains a wealth of rules of 
thumb for individual and collective self-care on social media, it also dissects 
how and why the corporations who own the platforms are uninterested in 
making them safer by setting and policing clearer boundaries of what is 
acceptable.
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Dynamics of Online Vitriol

1 Mediated Visibility as Making Vitriol 
Meaningful
Daniel Trottier, Qian Huang and Rashid Gabdulhakov
Abstract
When engaged in vitriol through digital media, users harm their peers not 
only through the caustic nature of their words, but also by the way in which 
they can make their targets visible to public scrutiny. Social platforms 
and mobile devices enable individuals to author commentary about their 
targets, but also compel other types of actors to join in (or to contest, 
appropriate or derail) malicious exchanges. By focusing on highly visible 
yet comparatively mundane forms of denunciation in China, Russia and 
the United Kingdom, this chapter considers how vitriol can be manifest 
as a form of civic engagement. These cases provide insight about a more 
prevalent form of vigilantism that may be located at the margins of what 
is considered acceptable in their respective social contexts.
Keywords: vigilantism, denunciation, digital media, social media, public 
space
Situating vigilantism and visibility in relation to the study of vitriol
When engaged in vitriol online, users harm their peers not only through 
the caustic nature of their words, but also by the way in which they can 
make their targets visible to public scrutiny. In addition to denunciatory 
and hateful language, it is important to consider the conditions in which 
these utterances are produced and circulated, especially in determining 
the severity of their social impact. Mediated visibility, notably the strategic 
and multi-actor manipulation of a targeted individual’s visibility features 
prominently in vitriolic practices.
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Contemporary vitriol is primarily expressed through digital media. Social 
platforms and mobile devices enable individuals to author commentary 
about their targets, but also to compel other types of actors to join in (or to 
contest, appropriate, or derail) malicious exchanges. These other users, who 
we can tentatively consider as an audience, may simply view the content in 
question, a seemingly passive act that will be registered by the platform as a 
popularity metric, in turn contributing to the broader imagined community 
of judging onlookers. Technical features of social platforms and mobile 
devices, such as the ability to ‘share’ or ‘retweet’, as well as algorithms that 
sort and re-arrange volumes of user-generated content, extend the scope 
and range of vitriolic practices. Though some platforms might have been 
designed with particular professional or demographic contexts in mind, they 
can be adopted for any number of purposes, especially if these purposes 
end up serving the platform’s business model of commanding attention and 
collecting personal information. As such, many sites have become gathering 
points for populist interventions. For example, in the context of Brexit, 
Facebook groups such as South East Alliance and Pie & Mash Squad serve as 
venues for nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiment.1 This involves posting 
news articles and links to other extremist websites, as well as publishing 
vitriolic comments about targeted politicians, criminal suspects as well as 
entire categories of individuals in and beyond the United Kingdom. Such 
activities go far beyond Facebook’s original and long-abandoned purpose 
of socialization among Ivy-league university students. While Facebook has 
expressed its commitment to removing such content, the platform remains 
one of several means for denunciatory and vitriolic coordination.2
Alongside more coordinated and politicized gatherings social media 
also offer citizens the opportunity to express frustration about everyday 
concerns, for example in the context of shared public spaces. In response 
to incivilities witnessed on a train, a bystander may digitally intervene by 
uploading evidence of the offending act, along with denunciatory words 
that capture their dismay. Such denunciations may be spontaneous, and 
one can imagine that they may be driven by civic motivations (for example, 
the desire for a safe and orderly daily commute) as opposed to furthering 
struggles between hegemonic and subaltern communities. Yet other users 
with diverging intentions can join in such denunciations by adding their 
own comments, sharing the footage with their social networks, and even 
supplementing it with additional details about the targeted individual or 
1 Poulter, ‘The Far Right Are Uniting’.
2 Thompson, ‘How Facebook Checks Facts’.
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broader community. As a result, such denunciations can be co-opted for other 
purposes. They can also have a lasting impact on the lives of those targeted, 
as well as those belonging to the same (often disadvantaged) communities.
This kind of crowdsourced vitriol is a global phenomenon. Silicon Valley 
platforms such as Reddit and Twitter play a far-reaching role in denunciations 
and harassment in countless non-Western countries. Yet mediated vitriol 
is equally a local and nationalized phenomenon, with users in countries 
like China and Russia making either exclusive (in the case of the former) 
or preferred (in the case of the latter) use of national-origin platforms. In 
addition to national divergences, there are also instances of parallel online 
communities emerging along ideological lines. As conventional social media 
platforms have begun to monitor and curtail hate speech, ideologically 
bespoke platforms such as Voat and Gab have each gained prominence as 
Alt-Right equivalents to Reddit and Twitter, while Hatreon emerged as an 
alternative to the fundraising site Patreon.3
By focusing on highly visible forms of denunciation, this chapter considers 
how vitriol can be manifest as a form of civic engagement. These cases may 
amount to a reassertion of moral boundaries, which typically also carry 
identity-based dimensions. For this reason civic-led denunciations can 
become discriminatory and exclusionary, especially when this becomes 
a crowdsourced effort (which they are designed to be). Fleeting and situ-
ated moments of frustration may lead to a singular moment of mediated 
denunciation, which in turn may culminate into something much more 
impactful. Vitriolic words may – knowingly or otherwise – mobilize journal-
ists, populist organizations, and politicians along with their respective 
followers. This chapter considers a particular form of digitally mediated 
harassment that relies on the denunciation and sustained visibility of others. 
In the cases considered below, the image of the target is made accessible to 
an amorphous and volatile audience. By editorializing an event, users invoke 
a moral compass that can garner further attention and harm. Moreover 
seemingly ‘online’ interactions are not distinct from offline consequences, 
but rather are intimately connected, and can create and exacerbate problems 
in embodied contexts.
Previous scholarship considers online mobilizations from the lens of 
(digital) vigilantism.4 This refers to instances in which digital media users 
are offended (or feign being offended) by the words or actions of others, 
and seek to make both the offence and the targeted individual visible for 
3 Roose, ‘The Alt-Right’.
4 Trottier, ‘Digital Vigilantism’.
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punitive measures. Recent cases vary greatly in terms of offending acts, 
ranging from minor incivilities to criminal acts that capture public atten-
tion such as child exploitation and participating in riots. Likewise, public 
sentiment about the appropriateness of these denunciations may also vary 
signif icantly. A common feature in such cases is the inclusion of vitriolic 
discourse, which can be observed both in the initial denunciations, as well 
as in the ensuing commentary by a wider audience. However, the caustic 
nature of these words cannot be assessed in isolation. Rather, social harm 
is brought about through the manner in which these statements are seam-
lessly joined together with description of someone (including images and 
audio-visual footage) and their associations (including family, workplace, 
and communities to which they belong). An amplif ication of the target’s 
visibility leads to an amplif ication of any potential abuse.
Such developments speak to the ambivalence many users share about 
being visible online. On the one hand, digitally mediated visibility is partially 
self-asserted, and can be understood as a reasonably accessible form of 
self-expression and self-actualization. After all, in the vast majority of 
cases users knowingly decide to upload information about themselves 
to social media platforms. Even from a surveillance-studies perspective, 
being under the watchful eye of others can be understood as participatory 
and even empowering.5 Yet the sharing and subsequent circulation of that 
content may exceed the target’s expectations. In cases where digital media 
users denounce and coordinate against a target in response to statement or 
photograph that the target uploaded themselves, we may imagine that they 
were willingly engaging in some kind of self-expression, for example, to a 
group of peers. This speaks to how digitally mediated visibility is a collabora-
tive and decentralized endeavour, with several types of actors sharing no 
institutional or ideological alignment recirculate content originally posted 
to a social media account. Vitriolic discourses also act as a mobilizing force 
that invokes a broader audience either in support or against the denunciation. 
Yet either way it prompts a reaction, and ensures further visibility of the 
target and the initial message. Such efforts typically culminate in a targeted 
individual being rendered excessively visible as an object of discussion, 
without a reasonable opportunity to provide a response.
Unless the digital vigilante chooses to remain anonymous, their exposure 
and denunciation of a target can lead to themselves becoming the target 
of a potential counter-denunciation. This possibility reflects the fact that 
acceptable norms about f ilming and denouncing others are still being 
5 Albrechtslund, ‘Online Social Networking’.
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negotiated in the mediated public sphere. It bears noting that cases of 
digital vigilantism cover a moral gamut, and as such include offending 
acts that trigger widespread condemnation (such as the sexual abuse of 
children), as well as actions not necessarily considered objectionable by a 
broader audience (such as eating on public transit). Even in cases of widely 
condemned offences, public opinion may not support such interventions. For 
these reasons, scholarship must continue to focus on the public shaping of 
the perceived acceptability of digital vigilantism. Of particular concern here 
is the role of the state. By definition it remains excluded from participation 
in vigilante activities. Yet states may endorse or even f inancially support 
citizen-led initiatives, and make use of media channels to attempt to shape 
public perception of such movements.
The following sections provide an overview of contemporary vitriolic and 
vigilante landscapes in three national contexts: the United Kingdom, China 
and Russia. For each country we consider a recent case, and make use of 
press representations as well as other publicly available data about the event. 
In contrast to immediate responses to high-profile criminal acts that have 
been covered in other research, these cases are centred on comparatively 
banal incidents occurring in public spaces.6 These cases provide insight 
about a more prevalent form of vigilantism, one that may be located at 
the margins of what is considered acceptable in their respective social 
contexts. The purpose in juxtaposing them is not purely comparative, but 
rather to identify commonalities and divergences as topics for subsequent 
in-depth analysis.
United Kingdom: Disability and disregarded train seat 
reservations
While it would be impossible to provide an exhaustive account of UK-based 
mediated shaming and vigilantism in this chapter, what follows is a case 
study that provides both recent developments as well as historic antecedents. 
As such, we do not seek to establish causal links between any single media 
format, and user activity. Although online shaming may be considered as a 
product of digital media cultures, a cursory overview of punitive technologies 
in the UK reveals an array of embodied devices such as the pillory or the 
scold’s bridle, which restrained the targeted individual’s movement as well 
as speech. These served not only to punish transgressions, but in particular 
6 Nhan et al., ‘Digilantism’; Schneider and Trottier, ‘Social Media’.
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to do so in a public manner that disciplined both the target as well as those 
belonging to the same category, such as ‘quarrelsome women’ in the case 
of the scold’s bridle.7 Likewise, citizen-led interventions such as charivari 
and rough music had a distinctly public and performative character, in 
that they served to convey to a broad array of actors both the nature and 
the consequence of a transgressive act.8 The emergence and establishment 
of tabloid press furthered the scope and visibility of such denunciatory 
acts. In particular, these facilitated the circulation of imagery of a target 
of scorn, as well as vitriolic accounts of the target that had a broader and 
more lasting public reach.
We might think of digitally mediated shaming and its co-construction 
with British tabloids as a recent development. Yet as far back as 1998 the 
articles described how ‘[c]omputer hackers’ were ‘becoming cyber vigilantes’ 
in order to combat paedophilia, a social problem that received substantial 
media coverage at the time.9 Such anti-paedophile vigilantes have consist-
ently been presented in public discourse, often in conjunction with legal 
mechanisms. For example, Sarah’s law sought to enable the UK public ‘to 
f ind out if an individual in contact with a child has a record of child sexual 
offences’ through formal legal means.10 Other prominent cases include 
responses to animal abuse, such as the outrage that a Coventry woman 
received in 2010 when placing a cat into a garbage bin. Women have also 
been on the receiving end of online scrutiny for a range of other reasons 
in the UK, such as eating on public transit.11 In such cases, the press and 
tabloid media in particular served as prominent accounts of developments. 
In recent years there have been a number of cases in which digital media 
users have witnessed antisocial behaviour in public settings, and have 
uploaded photographs and their own accounts to their personal social 
media profiles. We consider one such case below.
In September 2016, a woman took a rush hour train from London to her 
hometown. She had a seating reservation in order to cope with a disability 
that left her in great discomfort if left to stand. Upon arriving at her seats 
(one of which was reserved for her caretaker), she encountered two men 
who occupied them and refused to move. She took a photograph of the 
men, and uploaded it to Facebook with her description of what transpired. 
7 Dobash and Dobash, ‘Community Response’, p. 567.
8 Johnson, ‘Charivari/Shivaree’.
9 Blackstock, ‘Hackers Make War’, p. 10.
10 Sarah’s Law.
11 Sanghani, ‘Why This Man Takes Photos’.
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Several aspects of this post are worth noting. First, she identif ies herself as 
a disabled passenger, explaining the additional necessity of the reserved 
seat, and further explaining why the offence in question is so actionable. 
She also includes the train time as well as destination, making the incident 
not only legible but also locatable to an undetermined audience, which may 
include journalists as well as representatives from the rail company. While 
avoiding explicitly vitriolic language, she makes extensive use of sarcasm, 
referring to the targets as ‘gentlemen’ and ‘charming fellows’, noting that 
their ‘wives and mothers would be proud.’ The latter is especially relevant, 
as through these words this statement not only appears to invoke a broader 
social network to bear witness to this offence, but in particular names the 
female members of the targets’ families for additional scrutiny and shaming 
(potentially of and by these women). Further categories are invoked in 
this denunciation, as the author notes that the two men were discussing 
luxury holidays. This, combined with the business attire that both men 
are wearing in the accompanying photograph, characterized the targets 
as socially aloof businessmen.
The f irst news articles reporting this incident were published the follow-
ing day, mostly in national and regional tabloids. These articles provided 
coverage of both the offending act as well as the mediated denunciation. 
Indeed, these initial reports relied heavily on the Facebook post and photo-
graph, often quoting its text in article titles as well as throughout the copy. 
Previously invoked categories such as ‘disabled woman’ and ‘businessmen’ 
also featured prominently. These journalists take some steps to distance 
their reporting from the initial denunciation, for example, through the 
use of quotation marks and terms such as ‘it is claimed’.12 Yet this press 
coverage largely serves to reproduce the discourse of the Facebook post. In 
the following days, subsequent articles provided additional perspectives of 
the incident on the train. This included one of the targets along with his 
father, as well as a friend of the disabled woman. Full names were often 
included, though reports also indicated when people (such as one of the 
two targets) wished to remain unnamed. These additional perspectives 
provided some nuance to the original incident, for example, by revealing 
that seat reservations had allegedly been cancelled on the train, and that the 
two targets claimed that they did not know the woman in question had a 
disability. These perspectives also served to extend coverage of the incident 
by an additional two days. Later articles also featured quotes from spokes-
people of the rail network, who provided insight regarding the company’s 
12 Chandler, ‘Disabled Woman Posts Facebook Photos’.
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reservation policies. Articles appeared in these newspapers the following 
week that made passing reference to the incident. They included comments 
from readers either supporting or condemning the initial denunciation, as 
well as journalists’ own editorializing. Here, authors often scaled up their 
denunciation to target broader societal conditions such as entitlement 
culture and ‘the nature of our violent society’.13
This reporting provides a pattern that can be found in other UK-based 
cases, in which a citizen uploads a denunciatory post on social media, and 
the press pick up on it over the course of the following days. In doing so 
the press call further attention to the cases, and the people implicated in 
them. Their framing of these cases may also shape public perception of 
the offending incident and response. As the original posts may be deleted 
or hidden through privacy settings, press coverage allows for a wider and 
more enduring audience. This audience may provide vitriolic comments 
when speaking to journalists, commenting online, or sharing links of these 
articles on their own social media accounts.
‘Unqualified as a mother and teacher’: Vitriol against a female 
passenger on a high-speed train in China
In Chinese history, policing has been conducted by the state through non-
physical coercion in addition to physical violence. This combined method 
is partly due to the influence of Confucian philosophy that the best way 
to maintain order is to establish intrinsic morality instead of strict rule, 
regulations and laws. The self-policing that is required by such a principle 
was practiced by people in a form of ‘village pacts’ in the Zhou Dynasty and 
became prevalent in the Song Dynasty.14 The village pact was essentially a 
form of neighbourhood surveillance and mutual warnings in response to 
breaches and transgressions that were regarded as harmful for the public 
welfare. The punishment to such breaches and transgressions were mostly 
non-physical spectacle of the dishonoured family, such as posters on the door, 
social isolation, expulsion from the pact and the registration of evil deeds.15
In contemporary China, vitriol is used as a tool of self-policing as well. 
On social media platforms, such punitive policing follows the exposure 
of illegal behaviours of various severities, from minor violations of traff ic 
13 Dowle, ‘Why We Must Not Stand’.
14 Dutton, ‘Policing and Punishment’.
15 Ibid.
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regulations, physical conflicts between individuals, to child abuse and 
paedophilia. Citizens also express their disappointment with the current 
Chinese legal system for not being comprehensive enough to govern the 
wide range of social activities. These issues are mostly immoral but legal or 
legally unclear, such as animal abuse, marital disputes and incivilities on 
public transportation. There are also denunciations reflecting an emerging 
online nationalism, which support state narratives and discipline those who 
challenge the state by rendering them visible online and shaming them 
with vitriolic statements.
Participants typically initiate vigilantism on private-owned social media 
platforms, such as Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba, Douban, Tianya, among others.16 
After its establishment in 2009, Sina Weibo in particular has become the 
major platform where most influential online incidents take place, including 
vigilantism.17 Government accounts (including local police agencies and 
state ministries) post their own content and interact with net-citizens (neti-
zens) on a daily basis according to a 2017 statistical report.18 State-controlled 
and commercial media are highly active on Sina Weibo. Individual users, 
including civilians, celebrities and public opinion leaders also routinely 
produce, consume, and disseminate information on this platform.
Mass media and state institutions perpetuate the mediated visibility of 
vitriol. In China, state-owned and commercial media have different roles, 
characteristics and relations with the state. Commercial media are private 
companies and enjoy a relatively greater degree of freedom in terms of 
topic choices and editing.19 Some commercial media, such as Pengpai News 
Agency, Xinjingbao, Caixin, and Phoenix benefit from the reputation of keep-
ing up with trending societal issues. They report on and provide dedicated 
columns for hotly debated incidents. On the contrary, state-owned media 
started as part of the state propaganda apparatus from the establishment 
of People’s Republic of China to the Opening and Reform in 1978, and their 
administrative and staff ing issues are still directly controlled by the state 
even though they enjoy relative freedom in terms of their daily operation. 
16 Sina Weibo is a microblogging platform, usually regarded as the ‘Chinese Twitter’. Baidu 
Tieba is a bulletin board system established in 2003 that aims to provide a platform where 
people with the same interests can f ind each other by keyword searching. Douban is a website 
established in 2005 that provides user generated content of f ilms, music, books etc. Tianya is 
a social networking site established in 1999 that focuses on life and emotions in forms of user 
generated forums and blogs.
17 Sullivan, ‘A Tale of Two Microblogs’.
18 CNNIC, ‘2016 China Statistical Report’.
19 Winf ield and Peng, ‘Market or Party Controls?’.
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In addition, reports from state-owned media usually feature government 
announcements and responses. When an incident is regarded as a threat 
to social stability, however, state-owned media also produce articles of 
greater length to analyze the issue and provide a state-desired perspective 
and conclusion. In addition to state-owned media, the government has 
furthered the involvement of law enforcement in online matters. From 
2015, Internet Police in f ifty cities started their own Weibo, WeChat, and 
Baidu BBS accounts, in order to deter and stop cybercrime, harmful speech 
and behaviours, and to act on netizens’ reports about illegal behaviours 
on the Internet.20 The Internet Police is a state police division that is solely 
responsible for policing various Internet crimes, including online threats, 
spamming, pornography, terrorism, hacking and fraud. While the Internet 
Police encourages citizens to provide information in order to f ight crimes, 
the exposure of individuals’ personal information acquired illegally is 
outlawed. The establishment of such systems encourages citizens’ online 
self-policing. For this reason, Chinese citizens engage in vigilantism on 
even minor transgressions with f irm denunciations. Facilitated by a widely 
networked platform – Sina Weibo – and perpetuated by the broader media 
landscape, such visibility and vitriol tend to amplify and prolong the impact 
on individuals. We may consider a recent case about a minor transgression 
on public transportation.
In January 2018, a woman impeded a train’s departure because her 
husband was denied entry at the boarding gate. A passenger recorded and 
shared the conflict and the video went viral. The woman was given a penalty 
of 2,000 yuan (roughly 300 USD/255 Euro) and later suspended from her job 
as a deputy dean in a primary school. She appeared in two interview videos 
before and after the punishment was announced. In the f irst interview for a 
privately-owned short-video streaming website, she insisted that it was just 
a matter of ten seconds so that her husband could make it to the train and 
wondered why her behaviour was so poorly regarded. In the second interview 
on the CCTV (China Central Television) News Channel, she admitted that 
she was overreacting and caused troubles for both the railway staff and 
passengers, and wished to apologize, hoping that netizens would forgive her.
In the video that shows the transgression, the person behind camera 
constantly reminds the woman of the illegality of her behaviour: ‘Do you 
know it is illegal to do so?’ The shared video on Weibo provoked netizens’ 
denunciation with vitriol against the woman. There are between 4000 and 
7000 comments under each post from five major media Weibo accounts. Four 
20 Chinese Ministry of Public Security, ‘Jianli Wangjing’.
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types of vitriolic utterances can be observed among the above-mentioned 
comments. The f irst type is normative evaluations of her behaviour. She 
is regarded as a person who ‘has no respect of punctuality’, ‘has a horrible 
public manner’, ‘is unreasonable and making a scene’, and ‘endangers others’ 
safety’, which are concerning the qualities that a good citizen should have. In 
addition to direct negative evaluation of her behaviour, there are comments 
referring to her identity and social roles, including teacher, mother, and 
woman. Netizens show disgust by expressing concerns about her students 
and daughter: ‘I can’t imagine what kind of people/person her students/
daughter will become’. She is regarded as ‘unqualif ied as a teacher/mother’, 
and having ‘tarnished the occupation/the title ‘mother’’. She also received 
gender-specif ic vitriol such as ‘shrew’, and comments that emphasize her 
gender with terms like ‘as a woman…’. These utterances imply that a higher 
moral standard should be required for teachers, mothers, and women. 
Insulting and vulgar language are also observed in comments, such as 
calling the woman ‘psycho’, ‘trash’, regarding her as ‘despicable’, ‘disgusting’, 
asking her to ‘fuck off’, and wishing for her to suffer in the future through 
‘getting a divorce’, ‘being beaten up’, and ‘losing her job forever’. Sarcasm is 
a common strategy. For example, ‘dear teacher, … you taught us a valuable 
lesson that anything can be sacrif iced for our own good…’ is an instance 
of vitriol disguised in praise. Netizens’ responses target law enforcement 
for being too soft when forcing out the woman and giving her a penalty: 
‘The law enforcements treat their own rules as shit; no wonder people keep 
breaking it.’
The woman’s apology also attracts vitriol later. Netizens regard her 
apology as insincere because ‘She kept f inding excuses for her behaviour’ 
and conclude that ‘she’s only apologizing because her life was ruined’. They 
accuse her of lying in order to gain sympathy: ‘she has her ID card in her 
hand on the video (she claimed her husband had her ID card in the apology 
video). How dare she lie about such obvious thing! Does she think that all 
the netizens are retarded and have no common sense?’. They decide that 
they would not forgive her: ‘she deserves it!’ ‘NEVER!’ ‘We won’t need police 
if apology works’. These responses reveal an intention to socially exclude an 
individual who has misbehaved. User-led policing through vigilantism and 
can greatly harm a targets’ social standing, perhaps more so than through 
other policing mechanisms because an opportunity for rehabilitation is 
not provided. Instead, social exclusion for an undetermined period of time 
appears to be the desired outcome.
Commercial media play an essential role in perpetuating such long lasting 
visibility. Most commercial media provide the offender’s name or last name, 
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her job, and the school that she works for in their coverage. By mentioning the 
target’s occupation, commercial media implicitly echo netizens’ assumption 
of a higher moral standard for teachers. While state-owned media refer the 
target as ‘a female passenger’ most commercial media and social media 
articles refer the target as ‘a female teacher’.21 Some commercial media 
divert discussion in order to focus on the occupation. A journalist posted 
a special column entitled ‘How can directors of discipline avoid becoming 
monsters who stop the high-speed train’ on Tencent News, in which he 
emphasizes that teachers and other authority f igures are easily ‘alienated 
by the power they have at schools’.22
The majority of commercial media reports reproduce netizen vitriol in 
criticizing the offender’s lack of citizenship. They point out the potentially 
severe outcome of the offender’s behaviour, stressing that any disruption of 
train schedules might affect the dispatching of trains in different routes, and 
conclude that the offender lacks awareness of regulations and laws. There 
are also commercial media such as Xinjingbao, which have a reputation of 
reporting from different perspectives, giving the offender an opportunity to 
explain herself and questioning the punishment and online vitriol. However, 
netizens denounce the newspaper’s editors and reporters for ‘trying too 
hard for attention’. In contrast, state-owned media comment mainly on the 
general social implications of this incident. Beijing Daily emphasizes the 
necessity of citizenship training in terms of respecting the rule of law and 
the contract spirit. Guangming Daily criticizes the commercial media and 
some netizens for putting occupational labels on the offender, diverting 
the discussion and fanning the flame.23
Smile douchebag—you are on camera: Collectively mediated 
vitriol in Russia
It can be argued that current digitally mediated cases of collective denuncia-
tion and vitriol in Russia are largely influenced by the country’s Soviet past, 
where the public’s involvement in exercising justice over fellow comrades 
was a prevalent and encouraged practice.24 In cases of minor mischief, the 
delinquent was confronted through a system of comrades’ courts where 
21 Beijing Daily, ‘Lan Gaotie Shijian’.
22 Li, ‘How Can Directors of Discipline’.
23 Guangming Web Critic, ‘Weiguan’.
24 Gabdulhakov, ‘Citizen-led Justice’.
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judge and jury were comprised of colleagues and neighbours. The severity 
of the shameful impact of such collective justice could be amplif ied through 
display of the target’s portrait on special boards of shame and through 
exposure in the local paper.25 Nowadays, mediated vigilantism in Russia 
still principally takes place as an encouraged, organized and systematic 
practice with an issue-specif ic retaliatory focus.
This section of the chapter seeks to provide a general overview of cases 
and trends related to mediated vitriol in contemporary Russia. From a 
seemingly universal practice of exposing alleged paedophiles to rather 
unique engagements with drivers and merchants, active citizens in Russia 
have been f inding offence in fellow citizens, retaliating, and exposing 
them across global and domestic social media platforms. Soviet boards 
of shame have been replaced with YouTube, Facebook, and VKontakte;26 
while traditional media outlets continue to widely report on ‘loud’ cases, 
rendering additional layers of visibility and exposure.
In Russia, organized acts of retaliation by citizens against fellow citizens 
share a common scenario where targets are confronted over offences while 
the process is f ilmed and the footage is spread widely. Vigilantes across 
the country have formed movements focused on specif ic offences. Some 
of these formations turn into recognizable brands. Among such brand-
like vigilante groups are StopXam [Stop a Douchebag] and Hrushi Protiv 
[Piglets Against],27 specializing in combating traff ic violations and exposing 
‘unscrupulous’ merchants respectively. Founded in 2010 by members of 
Russia’s state-organized youth movement Nashi [Ours],28 both formations 
were endorsed29 and funded by the government.30 Given this unique scenario 
where the state encourages an etymologically citizen-organized practice 
of vigilantism, it is important to consider, among other factors, the motives 
behind both organization and participation.
In widely available videos that have been viewed by millions, StopXam 
members approach the drivers and ask them to re-park their cars. If the 
driver does not comply, a sticker that reads ‘I Spit on Everyone I Drive Where 
I Want’31 is placed on the windshield of the vehicle, usually sparking hostility 
25 Ibid., p. 328.
26 Russia’s domestic prototype of Facebook and most popular social network.
27 English equivalents of group titles are taken from the off icial websites and social media 
accounts of the groups.
28 Kurochkin and Nikoforov, ‘Civic Initiatives’.
29 Kremlin, ‘Extended Meeting’.
30 Kurochkin and Nikoforov, ‘Civic Initiatives’.
31 Original translation orthography used by StopHam is preserved.
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as well as verbal and physical confrontations between participants and 
targets. The shameful signs are diff icult to remove and are intended to serve 
a ‘disciplinary purpose, as the driver should think about their behaviour 
while scratching off the sticker’.32 Some drivers receive several stickers 
during a single confrontation, which will impede their ability to drive off 
due to their restricted visibility.
Dressed in full-body piglet costumes, Hrushi Protiv target allegedly 
unscrupulous merchants and expose them online. Participants raid markets 
and grocery stores with the aim of disclosing expired products. Seeing 
a dozen ‘piglets’ browsing the aisles, the personnel confronts the self-
proclaimed auditors, sparking verbal and physical assaults between both 
parties. All raids are f ilmed, and edited footage is spread across social media. 
Content analysis of video material produced by Hrushi Protiv reveals a bias 
against merchants of non-Russian descent. The group frames people from 
the Caucasus33 and labour migrants from the former-Soviet Central Asian 
republics as responsible for expired produce on the shelves of Russia’s stores. 
In 2014, Hrushi Protiv called on its audience to sign petitions to ‘condemn 
migrants from working in retail’.34 Though it received marginal online 
support, this call for action is suggestive of a political stance of the group. 
Along with proportionality of retaliation, questions concerning political 
instrumentalization of digital vigilantes inevitably arise.
Virtually every video produced by StopXam and Hrushi Protiv contains 
cases of violent verbal or physical confrontations and shaming of the drivers 
and the merchants. These confrontations and mediated public shaming 
serve as both entertainment and disciplinary show for the passer-by, for 
the online audience, and for traditional media consumers when featured 
on TV and in newspapers. Both groups publish several videos per month 
and possess editorial powers, which grant them the ability to frame the 
target and the process of retaliation.35 Unless they are famous people with 
a large social media following, targets have limited options to generate a 
counter-narrative. If a digital vigilante group has an audience of millions, 
their target with a few hundred friends on social networks cannot compete 
with such social outreach.36
32 Interview with former StopXam member, April 2018.
33 Some Republics in the Caucasus are part of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, due to 
ethnic biases, Russian citizens from the Caucasus are sometimes perceived as alien migrants 
not only by Russian nationalists, but also by immigration and law enforcement off icers.
34 Russia’s Public Initiative, ‘Call for a legislative ban’.
35 Gabdulhakov, ‘Citizen-led Justice’, p. 327.
36 Gabdulhakov, ‘In the Bullseye of Vigilantes’, p. 233.
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Videos produced by vigilantes are actively commented on by the viewers. 
While some viewers question the acts of participants, the majority express 
solidarity and condemn targets in a biased fashion. Videos where drivers and 
merchants are framed as non-Russians are commented on in the following 
manner: ‘this is a zoo, not a store’, or ‘as always, the mountain folk is acting 
like animals’, ‘they are used to riding donkeys in their villages, and here 
they have to abide the rules’. Comments also bring up speculations about 
the targets’ legal status in Russia: ‘they are afraid of cameras because they 
do not have a registration’, ‘why is every other Central Asian so afraid of 
cameras? Are they illegals? I suggest our immigration forces look closely 
at this group’.
While traditional media could theoretically serve as a platform for targets 
to deliver their side of the story, media analysis reveals that Russia’s main-
stream broadcasters rely on participants’ footage as evidence, which is an 
explicitly subjective representation of events. Traditional media coverage 
leads to greater exposure of targets and profile raising of vigilantes, mak-
ing the latter appear as an omnipresent eye of the public. Words such as 
‘activists’, ‘youth’, ‘public movement’, and ‘volunteers’ have been used by 
Russia’s mainstream media outlets to define StopXam and Hrushi Protiv. In 
reference to the targets, media reports tend to use phrases such as ‘aggressive’ 
and ‘inadequate’. A number of media reports make direct references to the 
targets’ ethnic and national backgrounds through use of othering wording 
such as ‘the Chechens’, or ‘people from the Caucasus’, or ‘the Tajiks’, thus 
copying vigilantes’ biases and prioritizing ethnic origins and nationality 
as identity markers for the ‘bellicose’ targets.
What is distinguishable in digital vigilantism is the severity and longev-
ity of retaliation. For instance, for grocery stores, an inspection by state 
consumer protection services could lead to investigations and any short-
comings would end in f ines for the concerned retailor, without the public 
necessarily getting involved in mob justice, chanting and pointing out the 
ethnic origin of the manager or other employees. In current practices of 
mediated vitriol and exposure, the concerned retailer’s reputation can be 
severely damaged without any legal investigation, but by means of edited 
video reports produced by self-proclaimed auditors. These circumstances 
grant peculiar powers to participants, as, theoretically, they can be hired 
by competitor stores as ‘reputation assassins’. Some large retailers in Russia 
even went as far as signing special collaboration agreements with Hrushi 
Protiv,37 which grants further legitimacy to otherwise unsanctioned raids.
37 Vigilantes, ‘Hrushi Protiv’.
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Social media platforms play a unique role as providers of a stage for 
vigilante practices. This role is not a passive one, as terms of use as well 
as state legislation in which platforms operate govern harmful and inap-
propriate content. Platforms can rate certain videos as 18+, remove them, 
f ilter commentary, and otherwise censor users. Arrests over ‘likes’ and 
‘shares’ on social media have sprawled across Russia in recent years.38 
However, sometimes no action is taken against users.39 YouTube, in this 
regard, is successfully instrumentalized by both StopXam and Hrushi Protiv, 
with millions of viewers and income generated through advertisements. 
Videos with obscene content freely circulate the web, which reflects the 
default involvement of platforms in disseminating vitriolic confrontations 
and exposure of targets. Global circulation of videos grants recognition to 
participants far beyond their local communities. Both StopXam and Hrushi 
Protiv have branches in other former Soviet republics and in the case of the 
former, even on other continents.40
The combination of social justice practices and political agendas repro-
duces a convoluted dynamic between the state, participants, targets, media 
platforms (both traditional and social), as well as the audience.41 In such a 
setting, the boundaries of power division are blurred, proportionality and 
legality of retaliation become questionable, and citizen-on-citizen retaliation 
takes on a totalitarian and pervasive mode.
Discussion
While these three examples of mediated vigilantism concern different 
political and cultural contexts, some common features stand out. Each 
case is a response to incivilities that take place in (quasi-)public spaces such 
as grocery stores, shared roadways and train carriages. We can imagine 
these to be contested terrains due to external factors such as the edacity of 
markets, a scarcity of seating/parking, or a surfeit of passengers or vehicles. 
In addition to witnessing laws and regulations being violated, we may 
38 Bevza, ‘To Fabricate a Case’.
39 Although StopXam was off icially liquidated in 2018, Ministry of Justice of Russia made 
the decision over the group’s violation of accounting procedures, and not over video content or 
vigilante practices.
40 StopXam prototype Mal Estacionado [Bad Parking] was opened in Lima, Peru, upon approval 
of the original group in Moscow.
41 Manifested through a hierarchy of power, from the highest ranks of policymakers to police 
off icers on the ground and other state entities whose functions are performed by digital vigilantes.
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also speculate whether a sense of entitlement to these spaces may further 
compel citizens to denounce those who are deemed to breach a moral 
order. Furthermore, we can speculate whether such a sense of moral order 
may also be sought in quasi-public digital spaces when vigilantes retaliate 
against online incivilities.
These cases also raise the question of who is entitled to speak out against 
their peers. In order to succeed in openly denouncing someone, digital media 
users depend not only on an audience for support, but also on the press 
to provide further coverage of the incident. In all three cases we see that 
mediated vitriol is above all else a collaborative effort. In turn, newspapers 
source quotes from online posts, reach out to friends and family of those who 
are implicated, and invite readers to comment and share reports as well. This 
is partly out of necessity, in order for journalists to produce a news-story 
out of what often begins as a social media post. Yet it also demonstrates one 
manner in which media assemblages work: through temporary partnerships 
and collaborations with a range of actors. As such, even toxic and anti-social 
discourse may become a core component of routine news cycles.
A further commonality to these cases is that even when a single in-
dividual is being targeted, the denunciation itself also mobilizes social 
categories. Offensive conduct in trains and on streets is rhetorically coupled 
to broader representatives of a particular ethnic group or nationality, 
groups like the wealthy, as well as professions such as teachers, with all 
the social expectations that are bundled with such a position. Shaming 
and vitriol are typically gendered as well, with denunciations serving as 
an opportunity for citizens to air grievances against ‘shrews’ and those 
deemed to be unf it mothers.
All three cases demonstrate how vitriol and mediated visibility are 
related: afforded by digital platforms, denunciation accompanied by vitriolic 
discourse makes individuals visible online, which provokes further translocal 
denunciations against them. Such vitriol and visibility are most likely to be 
amplif ied by traditional media, which adds to the layered harm inflicted on 
individuals. Therefore, the contemporary study of vitriol in media needs to 
consider how targets are rendered visible. Mediated visibility may serve as a 
kind of force multiplier for leveraging harm against a target or a community. 
In particular, these mechanisms further serve to persecute and marginalize 
women and members of disadvantaged communities. Religious, ethnic, 
gender, and other prejudices come to surface in cases of citizens’ collective 
response to perceived infraction committed by target. In a recent incident 
in Russia surrounding a public discussion of sexual assault the common 
narrative in response to the female victim of sexual violence is ‘you should 
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not have seduced the man’ and ‘what were you doing at a party anyhow’.42 
This narrative is backed with legislation decriminalizing some domestic 
violence and softening punishment for f irst offence in sexual assault.43 
In many cases, targets of digital vigilantism are limited in their options 
of seeking justice. Going public with the case can lead to an ever-greater 
exposure, shaming, and societal condemnation. Gender, sexual, national, 
ethnic, religious and other flaws and biases set ground for layers of vulner-
abilities among some members of the society.44 In the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks in Russia’s major cities, the promptly identif ied suspects tend to be 
‘Muslim-looking’ males from the Caucasus. In one such instance the wrongly 
accused target reported themselves to police, in order to prove their own 
innocence and restore a damaged reputation. While police confirmed the 
person’s innocence, the mediated exposure turned out to be diff icult to 
revert. When attempting to travel back to his hometown, the target was 
forced off the plane by other passengers and faced perpetuated instances 
of questioning by police and short-term arrests.45
It is therefore important to take a scholarly and societal approach 
towards mediated harassment that recognizes that while potentially 
anybody can be targeted by collective scorn and denunciation, these medi-
ated practices typically reproduce and even aggravate existing disparities. 
In terms of directions for subsequent research, scholars should further 
consider links between media studies and criminological accounts of vitriol 
in denunciatory contexts. In particular, they should consider vitriolic 
denunciation as a chain of mediated events, rendered meaningful through 
networks of decentralized actors. The above cases suggest that press 
coverage of denunciations may signif icantly contribute to the exposure 
and harassment of a targeted individual, and this is a topic scholars should 
continue to examine. Yet we should also be mindful of our own potential 
contribution to mediated exposure and shaming through our analysis 
of prominent as well as relatively obscure cases. We can take steps to 
attempt to protect the identities of those involved, yet our reliance on 
press coverage may still render them identif iable. And while the readership 
of an academic text may pale in comparison to a viral social media post 
or tabloid article, it may remain archived and potentially accessible to a 
wider audience.
42 Kupfer, ‘How Russia Turned on a Teenage Rape Victim’.
43 BBC, ‘Russian MPs Pass Bill’.
44 Gabdulhakov, ‘In the Bullseye of Vigilantes’.
45 Russia Today, ‘Leave Me Alone!’.
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When searching for remedies to online vitriol, one cannot simply mute 
the so-called ‘court of public opinion’.46 From a practical standpoint, media-
savvy audiences can take advantage of multiple platforms, and spill out into 
the comments sections of any online newspaper, or the reply function of any 
social platform. The fact that such visible opinions (in the forms of comments 
and replies) can either be fuelled by strategically constructed (fake) news, 
or itself the product of a Twitter bot, remains a pressing concern. As well, 
self-erasure or self-censorship is neither sufficient to prevent receiving online 
vitriol, nor is it a desirable state of existence for potential targets. As the 
examples above demonstrate, other individuals and institutions make use of 
one’s social visibility. Remedies for specific instances of vitriolic harassment, 
as well as more general strategies for prevention, need to prioritize the 
autonomy of the person being targeted.
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2 ‘Don’t Feed the Trolls’
Social Media and the Limits of Free Speech
Tom Clucas
Abstract
This chapter examines ‘comment culture’ using examples from social media 
platforms and the tabloid press. It explores the shift from a model of free 
speech as a collective responsibility to one that presents it as an absolute 
individual right. The chapter examines the consequences of this shift by 
analyzing a series of vitriolic exchanges on its chosen platforms. Three 
main trends emerge: f irst, social media have developed a unique comment 
culture focussed on combat, disinhibition and the contest for popularity. 
Second, online platforms are governed by their own distinctive ‘thread 
logic’, which disdains rational argument in favour of passionate display. 
Third, the conventional rules of conversation and argumentation have 
been disapplied, with consequences for communities both on- and offline.
Keywords: online vitriol, social media, free speech, comment culture, 
public sphere
This chapter examines ‘comment culture’ using examples drawn from the 
comment sections on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, as well as in the 
British tabloid press. These comment sections aim to make the websites 
more interactive by enabling individuals to post comments on other users’ 
content (e.g. YouTube videos, tweets, Facebook posts, or news articles). The 
comments are generally gathered beneath the original post in a thread 
that often also allows users to respond to one another’s comments. The 
chapter argues that these comment sections develop their own particular 
cultures – sets of generally established rules and practices about the content, 
tone, and format of comments – which are tacitly agreed between the com-
munity of users on the platform. However, there is also a tendency for certain 
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
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individuals to flout these conventions by posting deliberately provocative, 
aggressive, or hate-f illed material. As a result, the comment sections are 
often particularly rife with examples of online vitriol, as individuals take 
advantage of anonymous posting options and/or disguised user names to post 
vitriolic comments that would not be tolerated in face-to-face conversation.
The chapter begins by briefly surveying modern debates about free speech, 
from John Milton’s Areopagitica to Timothy Garton Ash’s Free Speech. In the 
process, it posits a recent shift from a model of free speech as a collective 
responsibility to one that presents it as an absolute individual right. This 
strong model of free speech, coupled with users’ ability to post anonymously 
online, helps to shape the cultures that evolve in the comment sections 
of various online platforms. Although each platform has its own unique 
community of users and set of rules governing the comments section, three 
broad trends can be seen to emerge. First, social media have developed a 
unique ‘comment culture’, in which largely self-regulating communities 
of users reach a consensus about what forms of expression are or are not 
available. Recent research by Jude P. Mikal and others suggests that:
As individuals learn the generally accepted rules of conduct associated 
with the site, their online interactions will shift to reflect their social – 
rather than individual – identities. The result will be a common voice 
emanating from the website: a generally cohesive tone, characterized by 
overall consistent responses, and overt behaviour correction.1
Partly, this comment culture is established by the host of the site, through 
moderation and rules governing the site’s usage. However, the culture is also 
the product of communities of users responding to one another’s posts with 
praise or blame. Often, it is the site’s users who decide whether or not to 
report a particular comment to the moderators. As a result, the community 
of users has a large say over the extent to which hate speech and online 
vitriol are tolerated.
The second trend is that online platforms are governed by their own 
distinctive ‘thread logic’, in which traditional models of debate are sup-
plemented by appeals to humour and the popular phenomenon of ‘trolling’. 
In his study of this phenomenon, Whitney Phillips observes that:
Engaging in racism or sexism or homophobia, disrupting a forum with 
stupid questions, or generally being annoying does not automatically make 
1 Mikal et al., ‘Common Voice’, p. 506.
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one a subcultural troll. Trolling in the subcultural sense is something a 
self-identifying troll sets out to do, as an expression of his or her online 
identity.2
Real trolling aims to disrupt accepted practices of online debate and con-
versation for the sake of ‘lulz’, which Phillips defines as ‘a particular kind of 
unsympathetic, ambiguous laughter’.3 As discussed below, the phenomenon 
of trolling is problematic because internet users often conflate it with hate 
speech. When forms of online vitriol (including those that relate to racism, 
sexism, or homophobia) are mislabelled as ‘trolling’, there is a tendency for 
users to downplay or ignore them.
The third trend is that the conventional rules of conversation and human 
interaction are often modified online, with some users being more willing to 
resort to insult and abuse when they have the ability to appear anonymously. 
This is reinforced by the fact that online users are often hesitant to ‘feed the 
trolls’ by calling out examples of hate speech or online vitriol: such displays 
of aggression are often mislabelled as trolling and allowed to remain on 
the site without being censured or removed. The chapter concludes by 
considering the implications that these recent developments might have 
for offline modes of communication.
The effects of online vitriol were powerfully demonstrated during the 
2017 General Election campaign in the UK. During this campaign, the 
Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott Member of Parliament (MP) was 
subjected to extensive scrutiny by the mass media and the electorate. Abbott 
became the f irst black woman elected as a UK MP when she won her seat in 
1987. However, in an article published in The Guardian on 14 February 2017, 
she revealed that her role had become harder in recent years due to the 
daily racist and sexist abuse she receives online. Abbott wrote that ‘I have 
received rape threats, death threats, and am referred to routinely as a 
***** and/or ******, and am sent horrible images on Twitter.’ The death 
threats include an English Defence League-aff iliated account with the tag 
‘burn Diane Abbott’.4 It is likely that some of these comments constitute 
hate speech and can be reported under the UK hate speech laws in Part 3 
of the Public Order Act 1986. However, the sheer scale of hate speech on 
the internet makes it impractical to place the burden solely on victims to 
report each incident. On a cultural level, it is important to understand the 
2 Phillips, This Is Why, p. 24.
3 Ibid.
4 Abbott, ‘I Fought Racism’.
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possible causes of this epidemic of online vitriol. This chapter proposes 
two interrelated factors: f irst, a strong model of free speech as an absolute, 
individual right and second, a rapid rebalancing of the equilibrium between 
the private and public spheres encapsulated by YouTube’s catchphrase: 
‘Broadcast Yourself ’.
The right to hate
Recently, there has been a shift from a model of free speech as a collective 
responsibility to one that presents it as an absolute individual right. This 
marks a signif icant departure from the model of free speech that prevailed 
from the early modern period into the twentieth century. In an often-quoted 
formulation from his prose polemic Areopagitica; A Speech […] for the Liberty 
of Unlicenc’d Printing (1644), the poet John Milton exclaimed: ‘Give me 
the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, 
above all liberties.’5 What is remarkable in this quotation is its emphasis on 
‘conscience’. Milton stresses that the right to speak freely comes with the 
attendant burden of accountability for what is said. Similarly, John Locke 
argued in ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’ (1690) that:
[N]o private person has the right to attack or diminish another person’s 
civil goods in any way because he professes a religion or ritual differing 
from his own; all of that person’s human rights as well as his civil rights 
are to be scrupulously observed.6
Locke wrote his ‘Letter’ centuries before the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights came into force in 1953 and before the US enacted the Civil Rights 
Act in 1964. His conceptions of ‘human rights’ and ‘civil rights’ inevitably 
differ from those in the present, yet they remain expansive in encompassing 
‘life, liberty, physical integrity, and freedom from pain, as well as external 
possessions, such as land, money, the necessities of everyday life, and so 
on’.7 What unites these two early texts is their interpretation of free speech 
as a collective responsibility as well as an individual right. In order for free 
speech to function, Milton and Locke contend that it must be moderated 
by individuals respecting one another’s mutual rights.
5 Milton, Areopagitica.
6 Locke, ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’, pp. 12-13.
7 Ibid., p. 7.
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In principle, this model of free speech as a collective responsibility 
remains inscribed in European law. Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which governs ‘freedom of expression’, provides that 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression’, but that the
exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsi-
bilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society.8
With the advent of the internet and the growth of the tabloid press, how-
ever, the popular conception of free speech appears to have departed from 
this model. Tracing the western history of free speech since the French 
Revolution, Elizabeth Powers argues that the debates foreshadowed in 
the eighteenth century have intensif ied since the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989.9 One reason for this, she argues, is that the ‘western liberal order 
would seem to have become a victim of its own success, so long without 
competition that it has forgotten the source of the freedoms it enjoys’.10 As 
a result, arguments for free speech in western societies have tended to be 
expressed in stronger terms in recent years, giving rise to the strong model 
of free speech on which this chapter focuses.
In his 2016 book Free Speech: Ten Principles for a Connected World, the 
journalist and academic Timothy Garton Ash argues that ‘free speech 
has never meant unlimited speech – everyone spouting whatever comes 
into his or her head, global logorrhea’.11 Despite this, the ten principles 
that Ash proceeds to outline adopt a relatively laissez-faire approach to 
free speech. The second principle states that ‘we neither make threats 
of violence nor accept violent intimidation’, but under the f ifth heading 
Ash argues that ‘mature democracies should move beyond hate speech 
laws’. Rather than simply abandoning laws, Ash implies the need to 
replace them with more robust social mechanisms for dealing with hate 
speech. However, the examples of online comment sections show that 
communities of users are often peculiarly hesitant or reticent to deal 
with hate speech, due to the belief that calling it out will only escalate 
the conflict and exacerbate the problem. As a result, it is unclear how the 
8 European Convention on Human Rights, Art 10.
9 Powers, Freedom of Speech, p. 10.
10 Ibid.
11 Ash, Free Speech, p. 4.
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racist, sexist, and body-shaming abuse described by Diane Abbott could 
be regulated in Ash’s system, particularly where it does not constitute 
a direct ‘threat of violence’. Its vitriolic force appears to nestle safely in 
the realms of opinion. In a study of racist hate speech, Caroline West 
notes that ‘[s]ome liberals have argued that the regulation of hate speech 
should be resisted as a matter of principle because our commitment 
to free speech must be absolute’.12 Yet, as West observes, this model of 
unregulated free speech is not sustainable, because the ‘visceral hostility’ 
of racist hate speech ‘forecloses’ the possibility of further discussion: ‘In 
the immediate aftermath of a verbal attack, it is rare that victims are able 
to produce words at all, let alone to gather themselves together to offer 
a clear-headed and balanced response.’13 As a result, the strong model of 
free speech struggles to deal with the problem that one person’s unlimited 
free speech can effectively silence another’s.
Despite this, some netizens have defended their ‘right to free speech’ in 
absolutist terms. When Katie Hopkins was f ired by the LBC radio station for 
tweeting that ‘We need a f inal solution’ after the Manchester terror attack 
on 22 May 2017, the libertarian commentator Brendan O’Neill defended her 
in a piece entitled ‘The Mob Claims Another Scalp’. Despite suggesting that 
Hopkins’s tweet knowingly echoed one of the most harrowing slogans of 
the Holocaust, O’Neill argues that:
[I]t’s one thing to be offended by something (you can be offended by 
whatever you like) – it’s quite another to mobilise your feelings of offence 
to the end of getting someone sacked, and by extension warning everyone 
else in public life that if they say anything like this, if they venture too 
far from the realm of Acceptable Thought, then they too will face fury, 
punishment, and potentially the loss of their livelihood.14
This argument implies that those who are ‘offended’ by what O’Neill himself 
suggests was a call for genocide are exercising the privilege of oversensitivity, 
while Hopkins’s freedom to issue this call stands as an indefatigable right. 
One might argue that this comment embodies an extreme position in the 
free speech debate. However, the absolutist approach to free speech has 
rapidly entered the mainstream.
12 West, ‘Words That Silence?’, p. 246.
13 Ibid., pp. 235-236.
14 O’Neill, ‘Katie Hopkins’ Sacking’.
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‘Broadcast yourself’: The expanding public sphere
In addition to the strong model of free speech outlined above, online 
platforms have been influential in dissolving the traditional boundary 
between the public and private spheres. With the rise of social media, the 
distinction between what one would say and do in private and in public 
has become more porous. The benefits of this development are expressed 
in the mission statements of various prominent social media platforms, for 
example YouTube (‘Our mission is to give everyone a voice and show them 
the world’),15 Twitter (‘Our mission: Give everyone the power to create and 
share ideas and information instantly, without barriers’),16 and Facebook 
(‘Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to build community and 
bring the world closer together’).17 Social media platforms like these have 
proved important in democratizing the access to information and the right 
to self-expression around the world. However, the expansion of the public 
sphere into the realms of formerly private opinion has also given rise to an 
increased potential for the clash of beliefs and the uncensored expression 
of prejudices online. This section examines how the expanded capacity 
for instantaneous communication inevitably increases the potential for 
conflict, as well as how prominent online platforms have attempted to the 
regulate the resulting phenomenon of online vitriol.
In arguing for the transformative power of social expression, social media 
platforms rely on a model of free speech as a civilizing force which emerged 
during the Enlightenment. Since the eighteenth century, it has often been 
suggested that speech should be allowed to function as a free market. In this 
vein, the eighteenth-century philosopher the Earl of Shaftesbury argued that:
All politeness is owing to liberty. We polish one another and rub off our 
corners and rough sides by a sort of amicable collision. To restrain this is 
inevitably to bring a rust upon men’s understandings. It is a destroying 
of civility, good breeding and even charity itself, under the pretence of 
maintaining it.18
Shaftesbury’s metaphor of ‘amicable collision’ implies that social values 
can only be developed by individuals participating in the conversation of 
15 YouTube, ‘About’.
16 Twitter, ‘About’.
17 Facebook, ‘Investor Relations’.
18 Cooper, Characteristics of Men, p. 31.
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culture. In other words, there is a need for individuals to air and discuss 
their private opinions in public, so that the members of a community can 
arrive at a consensus through mutual critique and discussion. This model 
of amicable collision continues to be upheld in a modif ied form by social 
media platforms, for example Twitter, which reminds its users that ‘as a 
policy, we do not mediate content or intervene in disputes between users.’19 
Along similar lines to Shaftesbury, the current Twitter policy treats conflict 
as a potentially productive process in which users regulate one another’s 
posts and arrive at a consensus about what can or cannot be expressed.
However, the hugely increased capability which these platforms offer 
their users – the opportunity to ‘create and share ideas and information 
instantly, without barriers’20 – has also led to an increased capacity for 
conflict. Hate speech like that aimed at Diane Abbott, including rape threats, 
death threats, and the Twitter hashtag ‘burn Diane Abbott’,21 shows that 
the deregulation of speech on the internet does not necessarily lead to 
‘politeness’ and ‘amicable collision’. In this respect, it is important to consider 
the fundamental shift that has occurred with the rise of the internet in the 
equilibrium between the private and public spheres. In his seminal text The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas argued 
that the ‘model of the bourgeois public sphere presupposed strict separa-
tion of the public from the private realm’.22 Though Habermas recognized 
that the boundary between these spheres was porous, the rise of social 
media has almost erased this boundary by encouraging individuals to share 
their private thoughts and emotions in the public sphere with virtually no 
mediation. Users of these platforms are invited to project every aspect of 
their mental experience into the public debate. This approach is illustrated 
by YouTube’s slogan – ’Broadcast Yourself’ – which imagines the possibility 
of superimposing every individual’s stream of consciousness in the public 
sphere. One consequence of this is that public abuse is more likely to occur 
in this context than in Shaftesbury’s model of ‘civility’, which was developed 
in a culture where social groups were much smaller and even access to print 
media was limited.
Like any major cultural change, the rebalancing of the private and public 
spheres carries both advantages and disadvantages, which will take years if 
not decades to understand. Writing just before the rise of Twitter, Facebook, 
19 Twitter, ‘About Offensive Content’.
20 Twitter, ‘About’.
21 Abbott, ‘I Fought Racism and Misogyny to Become an MP’.
22 Habermas, The Structural Transformation, pp. 175-176.
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and YouTube, Luke Goode contended that the internet could contribute to 
greater reflexivity in the public sphere:
[I]n the Habermasian model, the public sphere and its reflexive context 
must be mutually reinforcing: the public sphere takes on the role of a 
kind of exemplary space for the considered, deliberative and, as far as 
possible, egalitarian weighing of competing claims, an ethic that can at 
least rub off on – though by no means colonise – the more unruly and 
visceral micro-practices and discourses of everyday life.23
To some extent, this prediction has come true, with social media platforms 
allowing their users to criticize celebrities and those in the public eye for 
displaying prejudice. This occurred, for example, when the musician Ten 
Walls posted homophobic comments on his Facebook page in 2015 and 
was rapidly criticized by fans and dropped by sponsors.24 Subsequently, a 
number of other artists, including UK grime artist Stormzy, have apologized 
for homophobic posts and tweets made in the past.25 While this may hold 
true for public f igures, the proliferation of online content has also made it 
possible for private individuals, such as the owner of the English Defence 
League-aff iliated hate account aimed at Diane Abbott, to project what 
Goode calls ‘the more unruly and visceral micro-practices and discourses of 
everyday life’ into the public sphere without censorship. While social media 
platforms can make the public sphere more reflexive of democratic ideals, 
they also risk transforming areas of the public sphere into an unregulated 
space where unjustif ied prejudice and legitimate, reasoned opinion become 
interchangeable. To this extent, the traditional model of the public sphere 
as a space in which communities come together to negotiate that shared 
cultural practices and public opinions becomes less tenable online.
Unruly spaces: The problems of enforcement
The phenomenon of online vitriol is arguably exacerbated by the sheer scale 
of online content, which necessitates the relatively non-interventionist and 
reactive approach to moderation adopted by many online platforms. On its 
support page, YouTube prohibits ‘content that promotes violence or hatred 
23 Goode, Jürgen Habermas, p. 120.
24 Channel 4, ‘Ten Walls Dropped’.
25 BBC Newsbeat, ‘Stormzy Apologises for Homophobic Tweets’.
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against individuals or groups based on certain attributes, such as: race or 
ethnic origin, religion, disability, gender, age, veteran status, and sexual 
orientation/gender identity’.26 However, the site also instructs its users to 
‘keep in mind that not everything that’s mean or insulting is hate speech’, 
adding: ‘If you’re upset by content that a specif ic person is posting, you may 
wish to consider blocking the user.’27 Arguably, it is not feasible for platforms 
like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter to moderate comments in real-time. 
However, the reliance on individual blocking and reporting mechanisms 
once again places the burden on the victims of abuse and risks denigrat-
ing their reactions as hypersensitive. Not only does this mean that many 
instances of online vitriol go unreported, but it also presents the victims 
of online abuse with the task of deciding whether the comments they have 
received are severe enough to qualify as ‘abuse’, ‘harassment’, or ‘bullying’.
Even when the identification of hate speech is unequivocal, there remains 
a problem of enforcement. On a video of a subway performer covering 
Fleetwood Mac’s song ‘Landslide’, one person commented: ‘As soon as she 
started singing I got chills, damn’.28 Another user, responded: ‘Write a 
***** book about it. You ******.’ At this point, the conversation escalated 
until a user with a pseudonymous and deliberately offensive name made 
a comment about slavery. When a fellow commenter expressed outrage at 
this post, they were reprimanded by a third user, who commented: ‘Why 
people try and argue with trolls on this I’ll never understand. They just want 
everyone to be as mad and ignorant as they are! Save your energy bud ;)’.29
This exchange exemplif ies the problem referred to above, where forms 
online vitriol and actual hate speech are mislabelled as ‘trolling’, with the 
result that users agree to ignore rather than denounce them. The sentiment 
embodied in the phrase ‘don’t feed the trolls’ is now widespread on social 
media platforms. The problem with this approach is that even if the other 
users do not sanction such racist and dehumanizing language, they are 
pressured (as in the example above) into overlooking it. Meanwhile, the 
perpetrators feel empowered to post sentiments online which they often 
would not expect to be able to express in person. Furthermore, even if 
such comments are removed and the users’ accounts are suspended, the 
individual concerned can simply create another pseudonymous account 
and continue posting.
26 YouTube Help, ‘Hate Speech’.
27 Ibid.
28 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x--yddOolRQ. Accessed 23 June 2017.
29 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x--yddOolRQ. Accessed 11 March 2018.
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Arguably, there are limits to the steps that platforms like Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter can take to tackle the epidemic of online vitriol. 
Following the recent media scrutiny of cyberbullying, these platforms have 
taken steps to make their stances on online abuse and harassment more 
robust.30 Nonetheless, there is still a dearth of concrete solutions to tackle 
the scale of the problem. In a recent study of online misogyny, Emma A. Jane 
observes that ‘cyber-harassment such as rape threats and sexualized vitriol 
[…] have become part of the everyday experience for many women online’.31 
Not only this, but ‘the discourse involved is more rhetorically noxious and is 
occurring in far broader communities than earlier iterations of gender-based 
harassment’.32 The current case-by-case approach to regulation cannot help 
but leave many instances of online vitriol unreported. In addition, it can 
appear punitive when some individuals are policed more strictly than others. 
An example of this came in 2017, when Rose McGowan was suspended from 
Twitter for remarks she made in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein abuse 
scandal. Believing that McGowan had been unfairly targeted in a draconian 
instance of enforcement, many women boycotted the platform for a day using 
the hashtag ‘#WomenBoycottTwitter’.33 Though potentially effective, this 
form of protest also involved women removing themselves from the social 
platform and therefore renouncing this channel of self-expression. Given 
the limitations of regulation and enforcement when dealing with online 
vitriol, there is a strong case for analyzing the conditions which enable it 
to prevail in the f irst place.
As discussed in the previous section, social media platforms encourage 
the expansion of the public sphere into a public hypersphere, in which 
individuals are invited to share their immediate, emotional responses to 
every event. This, coupled with the sites’ non-interventionist approach to 
free speech, has enabled the development of a unique comment culture 
focussed on combat, disinhibition, and the contest for popularity. In the 
process, the conventional rules of conversation, argumentation, and mutual 
respect have been disapplied. Between them, these factors make the public 
hypersphere a revolutionary but vitriolic space, which has far-reaching 
consequences for language, logic, and the constitution of societies. In the 
absence of active enforcement by users, online platforms can be governed 
by the ‘unruly and visceral micro-practices’ that Goode hoped would be 
30 Twitter, ‘Clarifying the Twitter Rules’.
31 Jane, ‘Online Misogyny and Feminist Digilantism’.
32 Ibid.
33 Griff in, ‘Boycott Twitter’.
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transformed in a more reflexive public sphere.34 Unless users are willing to 
enforce the social rules of debate and politeness as they would in an offline 
space, online platforms develop their own ‘thread logic’, governed not only 
by attempts to shock and troll other users, but also in some cases by very 
real attempts to threaten and intimidate.
Limitless free speech?
The alternative to ignoring online vitriol and hate speech is for users to 
call it out by denouncing the content and/or blaming those who post such 
comments. However, this raises the problem that those who condemn 
online vitriol risk being accused of being vitriolic themselves, or of at-
tempting to stifle free speech. In this case, perpetrators of hate speech can 
quickly be transformed to be presented as victims. On 17 April 2015, Katie 
Hopkins published an article in The Sun in which she referred to migrants as 
‘cockroaches’ and proposed using gunships to prevent them from reaching 
British shores. At the time, there was widespread condemnation of this 
article on Twitter and other social media platforms, but the press regulator 
Ipso found on 1 May 2015 that Hopkins’s comments were not discriminatory 
because they did not refer to a specif ic individual. This f inding arguably 
reveals the shortfalls of relying on national defamation and libel laws to 
shoulder the burden of regulating free speech. Clearly, hate speech can be 
targeted at groups as well as individuals, and it appears signif icant that 
the British press regulator in 2015 was not equipped to deal with that fact. 
Equally signif icant was the willingness of numerous individuals to defend 
Hopkins’s comments in the name of free speech.
In a blog published by The Spectator on 20 April 2015, Brendan O’Neill 
argued that ‘she’s wrong, but Katie Hopkins has a right to call migrants 
‘cockroaches’’.35 The problem of the strong model of free speech, based on 
the fallacy that one person’s freedom of expression cannot harm another’s, 
has already been considered. However, O’Neill raised a second point when 
he described the ‘Twitterstorm’ which followed Hopkins’s remarks:
She’s a fascist, they said. She’s a Nazi. She’s indistinguishable from the 
authors of the Rwandan genocide. Her comments would have made Hitler 
blush, said an Independent journalist. Congratulations! You win the war 
34 Goode, Jürgen Habermas, p.120.
35 O’Neill, ‘She’s Wrong’.
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of hyperbole, the thesaurus-bombing competition to see who can hate 
Hopkins the most.36
What is significant is O’Neill’s recognition that hate speech is often countered 
with hate on the internet. This raises the question of how to distinguish hate 
from denunciation: whereas denunciation involves a reasoned rejection of 
hateful comments, hate involves a more aggressive and/or abusive response 
to the poster as an individual. Increasingly, those interacting in the public 
sphere respond to online vitriol in its own vituperative terms, with scorn 
and vitriol. As O’Neill observes, this leads to a ‘war of hyperbole’, as the 
internecine internet hosts a perpetual escalation of anger and resentment.
The contemporary manifestation of anger as a form of critique has a 
long heritage. No one has done more to understand this heritage than the 
philosopher Hannah Arendt. In her essay On Revolution, Arendt traced the 
progress of political violence from Rome to her own time, arguing that:
since the days of the French Revolution, it has been the boundlessness 
of their sentiments that made revolutionaries so curiously insensitive to 
reality in general and to the reality of persons in particular, whom they 
felt no compunctions in sacrif icing to their ‘principles,’ or to the course 
of history, or to the cause of revolution as such.37
Though the reaction to Katie Hopkins’s comments on Twitter did not occur 
in a revolutionary context, it is signif icant that Hopkins’s critics continue 
to pride themselves on the ‘boundlessness of their sentiments’. Due to their 
vehemence, writers like O’Neill are ultimately able to portray Hopkins as 
a victim of the debacle, since so many terms of abuse have been levelled at 
her for exercizing what he and others perceive as her absolute right to free 
speech. In the process, some of the accusers have become like their target 
in adopting the same language and logic. In the context of the May 1968 
events in France, Arendt argued in her essay On Violence that ‘loss of power 
becomes a temptation to substitute violence for power’.38 Arguably, one 
reason that online posters increasingly adopt anger and vitriol as a means 
of critique is that they no longer possess the power to set the terms of the 
debate. As the principles of rationality and compassion lose their hold 
over the public hypersphere, vitriol begins to seem like the only means 
36 Ibid.
37 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 85.
38 Arendt, On Violence, p. 54.
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of expression. Arendt argues that: ‘Where violence rules absolutely […] 
not only the laws […] but everything and everybody must fall silent.’39 In 
adopting anger as a mode of critique, and joining the ‘war of hyperbole’, 
those who wish to defend against online vitriol and denounce hate speech 
risk abandoning the principles of reason and compassion that they seek to 
uphold. No doubt, there are highly articulate and compassionate forms of 
anger, but it is important for opponents of social injustice to retain these, 
rather than surrendering to an expressive but incoherent vitriol.
Conclusion
This brief survey of ‘comment culture’ on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook, 
as well as in the British tabloid press, has examined how the phenomenon 
of online vitriol has developed and, to some extent, been regulated on social 
media. In particular, it suggests that the development of a strong model of 
free speech, coupled with the expansion of the public sphere into the realm 
of private and opinion and belief, helps to shape the cultures that evolve in 
the comment sections of various online platforms. Although each platform 
has its own unique culture, three broad trends can be seen to emerge. First, 
social media have developed a unique ‘comment culture’, in which largely 
self-regulating communities of users reach a consensus about what forms of 
expression are or are not available. Second, online platforms are governed 
by their own distinctive ‘thread logic’, in which traditional models of debate 
and conversation are undermined by the phenomenon of trolling and by 
the confusion of this with more problematic forms of online vitriol and hate 
speech. Third, the conventional rules of conversation and human interaction 
are often modif ied online, with some users being more willing to resort to 
insult and abuse when they have the ability to appear anonymously and 
shelter behind other users’ unwillingness to ‘feed the trolls’.
Ultimately, this chapter considers how the phenomenon of online vitriol 
begins to influence offline behaviour, as the displays of anger and aggression 
commonly tolerated and accepted online begin to permeate public life. While 
it remains diff icult for the providers of social media platforms to police every 
post, the onus of moderation falls on the users of these platforms, who are 
able to negate and report extreme instances of abuse and prejudice online. 
In the absence of a consensus and a concerted democratic effort to uphold 
the principles of debate and mutual respect, the comments sections on even 
39 Arendt, On Revolution, p. 9.
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the most highly-respected online platforms risk becoming unruly spaces, 
where the public sphere – rather than becoming a democratic market of 
opinion – is colonized by ‘the more unruly and visceral micro-practices and 
discourses of everyday life’.40 The problem for users and operators of these 
sites is developing a response to online vitriol and hate speech which f inds 
a middle ground between simply ignoring these posts and responding to 
them in similarly vitriolic terms. A more robust culture of denunciation 
needs to develop, in which users respond to vitriol with a reasoned rejection 
of its content rather than with abuse and outrage. Without this, it does not 
seem possible to realize Ash’s ideal that ‘mature democracies should move 
beyond hate speech laws’.
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3 ‘#Unpresidented’
The Making of The First Twitter President
Sara Polak
Abstract
This chapter examines the dynamics of US American Twitter responses 
to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa of 2013-5. Particularly, it focuses 
on Donald Trump’s role in the ‘Ebola scare’ – he tweeted more than a 
hundred times about Ebola late in 2014 and early in 2015 – in order to 
gauge how Trump found his feet as a social media agitator. The chapter 
argues that Trump and activists/social media marketeers around him 
learned from the Birther movement and the Ebola scare how to act as 
‘superspreaders’ of viral content by employing the racialized contagions 
they were virtually engaging with.
Keywords: Ebola, Donald Trump, Twitter, contagion metaphors, Ebola 
scare, Patient Zero
The retweetable inarticulacy of Trump’s language
On December 17, 2016, just over a month after his general election victory, 
and briefly before being inaugurated as 45th president of the United States, 
Donald Trump made a spelling error in a tweet that immediately went viral. 
In what could be read as a Freudian slip betraying his unconscious, and mil-
lions of people’s not-so-unconscious desires, he wrote of an ‘unpresidented’ 
act (referring to China’s capture of a US drone).1 Although the tweet was 
quickly deleted, the hashtag #unpresidented continued to linger on social 
1 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/shortcuts/2016/dec/19/trump-spelling-error-act-
joycean-virtuosity-carelessness. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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media, and The Guardian adopted it as ‘the word of the year’.2 It is an apt 
example of the oft-noted fact that Donald Trump himself is the one who 
forges the language for his opponents to resist him with. Other examples 
are the many varieties of Trump’s campaign slogan ‘Make America Great 
Again’ (‘Make America Sane Again’, ‘Make America Gay Again’) and ‘grab 
them by the pussy’ from the Hollywood Access tapes (‘pussy grabs back’).3
Donald Trump’s tweets have become a specif ic, unique and rapidly 
expanding body of literature. The media, particularly the ‘traditional’ media, 
in the US and elsewhere, have had a hard time deciding how to deal with 
them. There are numerous pro- and anti-Trump responses to controversial 
Trump tweets on the platform itself and on other social media platforms, 
but mass media such as television news and newspapers also report and 
respond to most of his tweets, which are regularly front-page news inside and 
outside of the United States. Trump himself has often stressed that he uses 
Twitter to be able to address Americans directly, without the ‘interference’ 
of media networks, which he deeply mistrusts and systematically tries to 
delegitimize. At the same time Trump, also explicitly, often uses Twitter to 
divert the attention of the mainstream media, away from other politically 
perhaps more important topics, by tweeting.4
Journalists have a hard time measuring their responses to Trump’s tweets. 
They cannot be ignored because they are messages from the President. 
Although of course these are not laws or executive orders or memos, Trump 
himself often seems to believe they have that status, and in a sense they 
have that effect. For instance, on 26 July 2017 Trump sent three tweets 
in which he ‘banned’ transgender people from the military.5 While the 




resistance-rhetoric. Accessed 1 March 2020.
4 E.g. on 1 July 2017 Trump tweeted: ‘The FAKE & FRAUDULENT NEWS MEDIA is working 
hard to convince Republicans and others I should not use social media – but remember, I won 
the 2016 election with interviews, speeches and social media. I had to beat #FakeNews, and did. 
We will continue to WIN’ https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881271748280365056. 
Accessed 1 March 2020.
5 ‘After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United 
States Government will not accept or allow Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in 
the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot 
be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military 
would entail. Thank you.’ https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864. 
Accessed 1 March 2020.
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memo which did – the tweets were the real bombshell that sparked a huge 
amount of confusion and discussion in the media, to some extent as a result 
of their unclarity. They could not be ignored, yet coming at a time when 
Trump clearly felt the heat of the investigation into Russian interference in 
the elections, many journalists expressed a worry that this was a diverting 
manoeuvre from a President who is perhaps in the f irst place a talented 
show master, highly adept at redirecting the public’s attention.6
Similarly, although the now-deleted tweet ‘Despite the constant negative 
press cofveve’ (31 May 2017) was obviously unintentional, the ‘affair’ was 
hilarious news for days in a fashion that was hardly at Trump’s expense. 
Indeed, later the same day he tweeted ‘Who can figure out the true meaning 
of ‘covfefe’ ??? Enjoy!’7 Clearly, he or his team realized that the hilarity 
about the typo worked in his favour. Even his most fanatical opponents 
had a relatively harmless laugh about it, and many adopted the word, to 
the extent that it became not just a popular hashtag, but a word, denoting a 
tongue-in-cheek version of ‘coffee’, ‘coverage’, ‘kerfuffle’ or the newly coined 
word for the concept of ‘sending a text or publishing a tweet prematurely 
and with egregious spelling errors’.8 Even more than the ‘Unpresidented’ 
tweet, this tweet generated a kind of cult of using, usually in benevolent 
jest, a vocabulary introduced in Trump tweets, that arguably extended 
his control over the public discourse. What these cases share, is the way 
in which they weaponize Trump’s disarming inarticulacy to contribute 
to a discourse that would not be legitimate if it were not so vague. That 
such Trumpian discourse works disarmingly is not to say that it succeeds 
in getting opponents´ political support, but it does work to acquire their 
linguistic support. Any joke – even if it is at Trump’s expense – that employs 
this discourse helps to establish his position of seeming sheepishness. This is 
a purely cultural ‘soft’ power, that does not begin to address equally relevant 
related questions, such as what Twitter’s responsibility as a company is in 
policing expressions on the platform, and whether it matters legally if a 
tweet comes from Trump’s personal account (@realdonaldtrump) or from 
the off icial White House presidential account (@POTUS).
Although ‘unpresidented’ and ‘covfefe’ were presumably not intentionally 
coined, both have the apparently irresistible attraction of so many of his 
expressions – irresistible even to those who set out to do just that. This 
chapter interrogates why so many Trump tweets are so irresistible. What 
6 E.g. Kendzior, ‘First They Came for Trans Americans, Who Will Be Next?’.
7 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/869858333477523458. Accessed 1 March 2020.
8 https://www.urbandictionary.com/def ine.php?term=covfefe. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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makes Twitter so peculiarly conducive to Donald Trump’s messages? How 
does it make his inarticulacy a peculiar strength? How does it spread them, 
and how have Trump and his supporters learned to employ the contagious 
nature of both language and medium?
History of Trump as a Twitter president
There is a long history of symbioses between presidents and their favourite 
media. What radio was for Franklin D. Roosevelt and television for John F. 
Kennedy is what Twitter is for Donald Trump. In virtually none of these 
cases was the particular president actually the f irst president to employ 
that medium. Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover were broadcast over 
the radio before Franklin Roosevelt developed his famous intimate radio 
style for the Fireside Chats; Dwight Eisenhower appeared on television well 
before John Kennedy became famous as the f irst president to master the 
medium.9 Barack Obama’s electoral success in 2008 was largely ascribed 
to his campaign’s astute use of social media – Facebook, mainly – in acquir-
ing large-scale popular support and a record-breaking number of small 
donations.10 Donald Trump, however, was an avid Twitter user years before 
Barack Obama became a personal Twitter user as president. (‘Hello, Twitter! 
It’s Barack. Really! Six years in, they’re f inally giving me my own account.’ 
18 May 2015).11 While Obama has always remained a sparse tweeter, Trump 
has tweeted using the @realdonaldtrump handle over 37,000 times between 
his registration in March 2009 and March 2018. Moreover, Trump has used 
the medium to conduct large-scale campaigns for – and against – a number 
of issues, mostly in direct or indirect criticism of President Obama.
The best-known example is perhaps the cluster of conspiracy theories 
around Barack Obama’s American citizenship, promoted intensely by a group 
which later came to be called the Birther Movement. This group of right-wing 
activists, in which Trump had a prominent role, claimed or suggested that 
President Obama was not a ‘natural-born’ citizen of the United States, and 
therefore, under Article Two of the Constitution, had no right to serve as 
US President, in order to delegitimize Obama’s presidency. In an interview 
with Ashleigh Banfield on Good Morning America he both expressed his 
seriousness about running for president himself, and his concurrence with 
9 Buhite and Levy, FDR’s Fireside Chats, p. xv.
10 Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez, ‘From Networked Nominee’, p. 189.
11 https://twitter.com/POTUS44/status/600324682190053376. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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the Birther Movement’s doubts about Obama’s Americanness.12 When, a 
month later, Obama released his long-form birth certif icate in response to 
the pressure, Trump credited himself for having forced the President’s hand, 
but did not drop the accusation. Early in 2016, with the Republican primary 
in which he himself was a candidate underway, Trump used the same tactic 
against Ted Cruz, another candidate for the Republican nomination, for 
example in a tweet on 12 February 2016: ‘If @TedCruz doesn’t clean up his 
act, stop cheating, & doing negative ads, I have standing to sue him for not 
being a natural born citizen.’13 In this case particularly, the formulation 
‘I have standing to sue him for not being a natural born citizen’, suggests 
that not being born in the United States is in itself a crime, which is then 
compounded by lying about it, as Trump falsely alleges. There were actual 
court cases about Obama’s country of origin, which the birthers lost, but 
the real power of these narratives lies in their attractiveness for the media, 
particularly social media.
More than ever, the 2016 US General Elections seem to have been de-
cided in the realm of online social media. Hillary Clinton’s ‘ground game’ 
– campaigning in the offline world, through flyers, canvassing, grass roots 
organizing and other traditional means – which was widely acclaimed and 
understood as far superior to Donald Trump’s, by pollsters and analysts of 
both political leanings, appears not to have mattered as much as Trump’s big 
campaign rallies, rabid tweets, and the online trolling and alleged cybercrime 
committed in support of his candidacy. Some of the key characteristics of 
Twitter as a medium – the brevity, the habitual omission of reference to 
sources – seem to have been particularly important for the Trump campaign, 
because they are well-suited to his style of communication and intentions. 
To a large extent, Trump and his circle of supporters benefit not only from 
the algorithmic characteristics and implications of the medium, but also 
from its reputation of being unfiltered, democratic, and to-the-point. I will 
argue that Trump learned to use the tactics to undercut opponents and take 
charge of the discourse which he used in the campaign and employs as 
president through social media during earlier social media storms such as the 
Birther Movement. I will specif ically unpack the discourse and metaphors 
developed during the US American Ebola Scare on Twitter in which Trump 
was also a key player.
12 Good Morning America ABC, 17 March 2011, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-
president-trump-weighs-sheen-palin-obama/story?id=13154163. Accessed 1 March 2020.
13 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/698231571594276866. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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The contagiousness of the Ebola scare
Between September 2014 and April 2015 hundreds of millions of tweets in 
English have used the word ‘Ebola’; most of these are US American.14 It is 
not always possible to determine the geographical origin of a tweet, but if 
the subsection of ‘Ebola’-tweets that does have geographical metadata is 
representative, the majority of the Anglophone tweets that mention Ebola 
originate from the US. Many are from non-governmental organizations, news 
networks, or from the various involved American federal agencies, but a 
large subsection is from individuals who are seemingly not directly involved. 
Neither do they have clear links with Ebola-affected people or areas, nor 
are they engaged in the effort to combat the disease. A large number of 
these tweets bespeak genuine or pretend outrage at the risks involved in 
addressing the outbreak, and fear of the virus infecting Americans in the 
United States. This fear was ref lected in mainstream American media 
around the same time, particularly after the discovery of a Liberian patient 
(on 30 September 2014), and three more cases in the course of October 2014, 
and later after the discovery of a medical doctor who had contracted the 
virus in New York.15 While some of the mainstream media reports about 
the disease threat to Americans was def initely alarmist,16 the scare took 
on its own life on social media, where it ‘went viral’ in a far more aggressive 
manner.
This case is revealing for several reasons: f irst of all because it is rich in 
racist ‘lulz’ (social media parlance for jokes) and fascinations that often draw 
on pre-existing narratives and conceptual metaphors regarding disease and 
(West) Africa. Whether or not actual fear was involved, objectif ication of 
victims who are fascinating because they are scary and abject offers a perfect 
vehicle for individual users to become cliques and organized collectives. 
Donald Trump, then still a business tycoon and reality star, but not yet 
president or candidate – although he did have well-known ambitions to 
become that – happened to be a very active participant in this process on 
Twitter. In so doing, I argue, he laid some of the groundwork, both for his 
later campaign and for under-the-radar groups, who came to his support 
strongly in the course of his presidential campaign.
14 Established using the Digital Methods Initiative’s tool T-CAT, and the database [Africa], 
searched for ‘Ebola’ in English-language tweet text, and where available, geolocation.
15 https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/united-states-imported-case.
html. Accessed 1 March 2020.
16 Hasian, Representing Ebola, p. 137.
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In a perceptive analysis of anti-Semitic Alt-Right YouTube star Felix 
Kjellberg, Jacob Clifton discusses the phenomenon of online Alt-Right 
groups that seem to appear from nowhere:
We’re conditioned to distance ourselves from Reddit dorks, anime-avatar 
trolls, and suddenly Nazi-identifying furries, and so they stay invisible 
– until they aren’t. They become collectives, at which point it feels like 
they came from nothing.17
Clifton argues that these collectives of self-identifying ‘dorks’, ‘trolls’ and 
‘edgelords’ tended for a long time to remain invisible to a larger public, 
because they are most active on platforms like Reddit and 4Chan. There 
they developed, often from gamers or comics fans, into Alt-Right activist 
collectives. They only became visible, also to audiences beyond Twit-
ter, when they started to ‘feed’ Twitter, which is primarily a circulation 
platform. On the feeder platforms, out of sight of the rest of society, online 
communities evolve in which the members radicalize one another in part 
as a result of a continued wish to shock one another.18 While it might seem 
that many of such extreme messages do not greatly matter, because they 
hardly reach any audience, this is missing the point. Edgelords do not 
usually aim to address their messages to everyone, but to a small group 
of likeminded users, which is why the term ‘edgelord’ is used with ironic 
pride. These expressions can easily move from ironic non-pc jokes that are 
intended to draw in-group laughs to hatred genuine enough to motivate 
group action against specif ic objects (be they Jews, non-Whites, women 
or any other group).
Apart from the fact that they tend to be active on platforms most users 
of mainstream platforms like Facebook and Twitter rarely use, another 
reason why edgelords and their evolving group dynamics are invisible, is 
because most social media users do not want to see them. They are, to most 
users’ tastes and sensibilities simply gross, even as badass jokes. To give 
one example a joke that went around on Reddit and Twitter in early 2015 
went along the lines of ‘Mom: what did your last slave die of? Me: Ebola’.19 
Such jokes, more recognizable as deliberate provocations than as jokes, 
are rife on message boards like 4Chan and 8Chan and some subreddits 
17 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jacobclifton/pewdiepie-isnt-a-monster-hes-
someone-you-know#.nfNVPxKqv%20(16%20February%202017). Accessed 1 March 2020.
18 Nagle, Kill All Normies.
19 E.g. https://twitter.com/Emoly28/status/566001752198373376. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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(Reddit threads around a specif ic theme or group of users). They seem to 
rely on casual racism, which remains soft or borderline by virtue of being 
syntactically or practically incomprehensible. However unseen, though, 
these groups, and their organizing and radicalization tactics have been 
around for about a decade. While there are many examples (the Birther 
movement is one, but the most famous is perhaps Gamergate), the 2014 
Ebola scare on US American Twitter is a case that has not been scrutinized 
in depth so far.
Trump as a superspreader of the Ebola scare
Donald Trump, however, did, during the Ebola crisis, lead a very specif ic 
and seemingly deliberate response to Ebola on Twitter, which politicized 
the Ebola scare. He incessantly attacked the Obama administration for its 
supposedly ‘weak’ handling of the crisis, repeating that the only way to 
stop Ebola from infecting Americans on a large scale was to stop all f lights 
from Africa. He also argued that Americans going to the affected areas to 
help affected communities, should not be allowed back into the country, 
and suggested that those who entered the US with the virus, did so with 
malignant intentions. In doing so, Trump politicized the crisis, roping the 
presumed risk into his white nationalist agenda, which, like the birther 
movement, contributed to the long process that propelled him into the 
Republican nomination, and the presidency. But simultaneously, and perhaps 
more importantly, his tweets reflected, interacted with, and spurred on a 
trend among the evolving Alt-Right on Twitter to dress narratives of white 
supremacy in very basic and familiar narremes and memes.
Throughout October 2014, Trump tweeted just under eighty times about 
Ebola (using either ‘Ebola’ or ‘#Ebola’ in tweets), up to eight, though often two 
or three times a day – a significant section of his average of 11 tweets per day. 
To give a sense of the kinds of tweets Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump) 
posted about Ebola in October 2014, here are some examples.20
Here we go! I stated long ago that we should cancel all f lights from West 
Africa. Now we have Ebola in U.S., AND IT WILL ONLY GET WORSE! 
(@ realdonaldtrump, 1 October 2014)
20 The examples are selected to be representative, but the entire collection of ‘Ebola’-tweets 
can be found here: http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive (search for ‘Ebola’).
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Ebola is much easier to transmit than the CDC and government repre-
sentatives are admitting. Spreading all over Africa-and fast. Stop flights 
(@ realdonaldtrump, 2 October 2014)
The Ebola patient who came into our country knew exactly what he was 
doing. Came into contact with over 100 people. Here we go-I told you so! 
(@realdonaldtrump, 3 October 2014)
This Ebola patient Thomas Duncan, who fraudulently entered the U.S. 
by signing false papers, is causing havoc. If he lives, prosecute! (@real-
donaldtrump, 4 October 2014)
Despite the ever increasing Ebola disaster, Obama refuses to stop flights 
from West Africa. It’s almost like he’s saying F-you to U.S. public (@ real-
donaldtrump, 7 October 2014)
The CDC chief just said Ebola is spreading faster than Aids. Marines 
are preparing for a pandemic drill. Stop all f lights from West Africa! 
(@ realdonaldtrump, 10 October 2014)
China is ripping wealth out Africa and yet, as usual, refuses to put 
anything back to help with Ebola. ‘Let the stupid Americans do it!’ SAD 
(@ realdonaldtrump, 10 October 2014)
As ISIS and Ebola spread like wildf ire, the Obama administration just 
submitted a paper on how to stop climate change (aka global warming). 
(@realdonaldtrump, 14 October 2014)
President Obama has a personal responsibility to visit & embrace all 
people in the US who contract Ebola! (@realdonaldtrump, 15 October 2014)
If this doctor, who so recklessly flew into New York from West Africa, has 
Ebola, then Obama should apologize to the American people & resign! 
(@realdonaldtrump, 24 October 2014)
The Ebola doctor who just f lew to N.Y. from West Africa and went on the 
subway, bowling and dining is a very SELFISH man-should have known! 
(@realdonaldtrump, 24 October 2014)
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President Obama has a major meeting on the N.Y.C. Ebola outbreak, with 
people f lying in from all over the country, but decided to play golf! (@
realdonaldtrump, 24 October 2014)
Many of these messages accord perfectly with the tendencies and mecha-
nisms Priscilla Wald analyzes in Contagious: Cultures, Carries, and the 
Outbreak Narrative (2008). As Wald notes ‘Disease emergence dramatizes 
the dilemma that inspires the most basic human narratives: the necessity 
and danger of human contact.’ She offers a cultural history and analysis 
of the role of the narratives in which communicable disease is framed, 
in addressing the outbreak on a medical and political level. She analyzes 
narrative framings of communicable disease in the context of religion, the 
rise of nationalism, globalization, and other cultural trends, as well as the 
interface with race, class, and sexual orientation.
The outbreak narrative – in its scientif ic, journalistic, and f ictional 
incarnations – follows a formulaic plot that begins with the identif ication 
of an emerging infection, includes discussion of the global networks 
throughout which it travels, and chronicles the epidemiological work 
that ends with its containment.21
Contagious is both a cultural history of outbreak narratives and a strong 
plea for taking such narratives seriously, not as implicit ‘truths’ that might 
be reproduced in addressing epidemics, but as stories that ‘[affect] which 
social structures and whose beliefs, poverty, prejudices, and personalities 
become the focus of analysis, as well as who is included in the “we” who 
might have been better off had the virus not been identif ied’.22
Donald Trump, however, is interested exactly in ‘reproducing the epi-
demic’s terms’, or rather, in using the actual epidemic to f ire up the social 
epidemic of fear and objectif ication of Africans and migrants in general as 
infectious and contaminating. This outbreak narrative – like most, Wald 
shows – reinforces national belonging: ‘indeed typically in outbreak narra-
tives, the effort to contain the spread of a disease may involve international 
cooperation, but is cast in distinctly national terms, especially in the United 
States’.23 Thus, many outbreak narratives foster ‘medicalized nativism,’ a 
term coined by the historian Alan Kraut ‘to describe how the stigmatization 




of immigrant groups is justif ied by their association with communicable 
disease; it implies the almost superstitious belief that national borders 
can afford protection against communicable disease’.24 Trump’s repeated 
call for closing the borders and stopping all f lights from Africa imply the 
notion that a virus cannot travel across a ‘closed’ border, closely matches 
that idea. Clearly, in Trump’s wilfully dramatic rendering, Ebola is ‘like 
wildf ire’, that can be contained and sealed off from reaching the United 
States through borders.
It is obvious that Trump in his Ebola tweets espouses a classic outbreak 
narrative, with all the basic ingredients. For example, he forcefully buys into 
the ‘Patient Zero’ myth – the idea, central to most outbreak narratives, that 
there is an ‘original virus carrier’ who is perpetrator rather than victim of 
the disease, and who knowingly and cunningly infects others.25
The Ebola patient who came into our country knew exactly what he was 
doing. Came into contact with over 100 people. Here we go-I told you so!
Trump implies that the man who was discovered to carry Ebola, although 
he only became ill after he had entered the United States, did so with a 
predetermined plan, and aim to infect as many as possible. Trump’s f inal 
half-triumphant, half hand-wringing exclamation at the end suggests the 
event is part of a detailed scenario – the outbreak narrative – which he 
already knows in detail. In that sense, the Ebola epidemic and the medial 
versatility of the outbreak narrative come in handy for him to promote a 
narrative he was already campaigning to get others to buy into as well.
The inarticulacy of Ebola rhetoric
However, virus metaphors, and the infectious cultural fascination around 
the threat of disease epidemics are not the same as an outbreak narrative. 
Rather, those metaphors and fascinations are circumstances that facilitate 
the development of a real structured narrative, in which time and characters 
play a role, evolves. Many of the hints about the Ebola epidemic together 
with frames and implications of virus metaphors on social media together 
suggest an underlying outbreak narrative, which however hardly surfaces 
as an actual narrative. When Trump on 1 October 2014, after the discovery 
24 Ibid., p. 8.
25 Ibid., p. 226.
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of the f irst Ebola case in the US tweeted ‘Here we go! […] AND IT WILL 
ONLY GET WORSE!’, his remarks were at once vague – what does ‘it’ refer to? 
Where are ‘we’ going? – and well-tuned into pre-existing cultural notions of 
what a disease pandemic is like. As such Trump does not offer an outbreak 
narrative but uses one that can be intuited, and at the same time remains 
very elusive.
As such, ‘the’ Ebola outbreak narrative as it evolves on Twitter is especially 
hard to capture. The outbreak narratives Wald analyzes are outlined in 
non-f iction books, novels, magazine stories and other more or less long-
form mainstream media stories, which can be taken to represent the most 
prevalent or most widely understood outbreak narrative, but in a world in 
which hypes happen largely on social media this is harder to do (for most 
researchers studying narratives – although prominent tweets others f ind 
by Donald trump are a good start – especially if these are the artefacts that 
endure over time).
The inarticulate terms in which the outbreak narrative he promotes is 
framed, is helpful in obfuscating its internal inconsistencies and logical 
and factual flaws. The vague language (‘Here we go!’) and the uncompleted 
thoughts and sentences allow for various interpretations. The narrative is 
hardly a real narrative, but rather a jumble of loosely connected 140-character 
messages that invoke a range of pre-existing popular narratives and images, 
which invite the reader to fantasize along using narremes from popular 
culture (small narrative units, e.g., the notion of the impending apocalypse).
A tweet like ‘This Ebola patient Thomas Duncan, who fraudulently entered 
the U.S. by signing false papers, is causing havoc. If he lives, prosecute!’ 
explicitly names the victim, and then falsely accuses him of fraud and ‘caus-
ing havoc’, as if these two, fraud and causing havoc were equally illegal. The 
implication is that being ill with Ebola in the United States is in itself illegal. 
Next to the obvious medicalized nativism here, Trump invokes another 
classical convention of outbreak narratives: the ‘super-spreader’: the idea 
that there are patients (often ‘Patient Zero’) who infect a disproportionate 
number of others, but also: ‘the archetypal stranger, both embodying the 
danger of microbial invasion, and transforming it into the possibility for 
rejuvenation and growth’.26
Trump’s ‘super-spreader’ tweets, like the one above, clearly speak to fear 
of ‘the archetypal stranger’ as well as more general anxieties about mobility 
in a shrinking world, but not explicitly to the possibility of rejuvenation or 
growth. However, these are present, not in Trump’s explicit words, but in his 
26 Ibid., p. 10.
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own positioning as a largely social-media-driven presidential candidate. The 
notion of a ‘global village’ in which health must be treated on a global scale 
is a prominent part of Wald’s analysis, however, she does not specif ically 
address how the Web 2.0 and social media have influenced or changed this 
dynamic. Writing in 2008, Wald addresses historically recent outbreaks 
such as HIV/AIDS, avian influenza, and SARS, without attending to their 
social lives and outbreak narratives in social media.
Dynamics of Twitter and other platforms
So what does the seemingly open, border-free, and transnational nature of 
social media interaction present that is new in the dynamics of narrating 
communicable disease?
While on the one hand these tweets presume (and construct) a nation 
that can function as a healthy bulwark against corrupting and debilitating 
disease, it simultaneously attacks its president, Barack Obama. Obama’s 
failure to stop flights from West-Africa in Trump’s rendering seems to bear 
a relation to his race. Coming after the long birther movement campaign in 
which Trump and a well-organized group of Tea Party supporters planted 
the notion that Obama was not born in the United States, the suggestion that 
his foreignness causes Obama to play a malignant role adds to a pre-existing 
tradition of racist insults. When Trump tweets ‘It’s almost like he’s saying 
F-you to U.S. public’ the direct implication is that Obama himself is part of 
the problem, indeed of the attack on the nation Ebola represents. Similarly, 
attacking Obama for ‘play[ing] golf’ plays in to pre-existing stereotypes of 
black laziness, and the racist notion that it is inappropriate for a black man 
to play golf.
Such suggestions of Obama’s complicity in the outbreak simultaneously 
contribute to the idea that the bordered nation can function as a bulwark 
against the invasion of the Ebola virus, and imply that Obama’s identity 
in itself represents a fracture in the texture of that border. If one accepts 
the fabrication of Obama as an intruder and impostor himself – a notion 
strengthened by the idea that a black president should always be working 
and has by def inition no business playing golf – then the extension of that 
implication is that he is the vehicle for the entrance of the virus into the US. 
Trump may support his accusations with criticism of Obama’s policies (or 
policies he falsely attributes to Obama), but in essence the message is that 
Obama’s identity ‘naturally’ causes the leak. This can be observed also in 
the tweets in which Trump connects Obama’s allegedly conscious choice 
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to make the US porous to its own detriment, to Obama’s own body, as in: 
‘President Obama has a personal responsibility to visit & embrace all people 
in the US who contract Ebola!’
While Trump does not explicitly move beyond claiming that Obama’s body 
politic is at fault in allowing Ebola to enter the US, implicitly it is clear that 
Obama’s body natural is at fault. The idea that he be punished on the body 
natural is appealing in part because Obama’s body natural, and his African 
roots in the birther movement’s racist frame of reference have enabled the 
nation’s porousness. There is a long tradition of seeing the president as an 
embodiment of the United States, that facilitated the superficial conflation of 
Obama’s allegedly alien status with his alleged complicity in bringing Ebola 
into the country. Neither allegation is correct but they support each other 
in a narrative that weaponizes the fear of the other, while using vagueness 
about the precise meaning and implications of the claims to deny racism, 
in a way that is fairly usual for outbreak narratives.
Twitter, because of its accessibility and instantaneity, tends to suggests 
it is both democratizing and, literally, im-mediate, direct, both in terms of 
speed and transparency. As the company itself asserts in advertisements: 
‘People use Twitter to gush, geek out, and get informed. Use our tools to 
target every type of tweet’.27 Twitter is, in reality used for far more, and 
more pernicious, ways of doing things with words. Some of the key ‘types of 
tweet’ indeed are performative: they harass, silence misinform, or scapegoat, 
often in a collective and organized fashion.
The birther movement – and particularly Trump’s way of employing 
it – exemplif ies how narratives that appear to gain attention on the strength 
of their entertainment value, gather very concrete political traction. Twit-
ter, with its classif ication of ‘types’ of tweets suggests that tweets may 
be believed to be authentic expressions of thoughts and feelings. This 
misunderstands what kinds of messages tweets can be employed for, and 
also, how messages can evolve, work on several levels, and operate in a 
context that is not always visible, and leads all too easily to the tendency 
to take tweets too much at face value.
Since the rise of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube 
and Instagram, the concept of virality has taken on a new set of meanings. 
Of course virality – not even necessarily online – has over the last decades 
come to be understood to pertain to computer ‘viruses’ (malware, spyware) 
that spread through infected data carriers, email, scams, unsecured WiFi 
networks and other ‘carriers’, but I limit my discussion here to material that 
27 https://twitter.com/TwitterBusiness/status/809804186271379456. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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is deliberately shared on social media platforms. For something to ‘go viral’ 
online means that it succeeds in attracting attention, clicks, shares, likes, or 
whatever specif ic platforms enable, far beyond its own direct environment.
The metaphor of digital content ‘going viral’ relies on the tendency of actual 
viruses to spread to others who are in contact with the already infected. 
However, unlike with disease (or malware), in the case of a YouTube video 
that goes viral, this is usually seen as positive. Indeed, viral videos have the 
potential to generate large sums of advertising revenue. Online virality is 
thus close to a connotation of contagiousness that has long been around in 
marketing and sales: the idea that human longing or need to have or be part of 
something works like a virus. If your neighbour has it, you are likely to acquire 
it too. One difference with online virality is that anyone, anywhere in the 
world can spread the object with incredible ease, and at – seemingly – no cost.
Such viral objects – video footage, photos, memes, tweets – often spread 
more aggressively than any real virus would, whether airborne or otherwise. 
Indeed, Trump seems to have discovered that he himself was able to act 
as a kind of superspreader of the medial Ebola scare, in part through the 
generic dynamics of social media, and in part through the specif ic proper-
ties of his language. While the very discursive notions of super-spreaders 
and Patient Zeros often work to unduly incriminate individuals, Trump 
seems to relish his role as metaphorical superspreader of online fears and 
trends more broadly. His entire candidacy, of course, could be framed in 
‘superspreader’ terms: he positioned as an archetypal ‘stranger’ or outsider 
candidate (more than was justif ied in fact for a long-time political donor, 
and potential candidate), and he rhetorically posed as a political promise 
who embodied not just the danger (to the establishment) of invasion, but 
also the possibility of ‘rejuvenation and growth’.
Thus, Trump seems to have realized the potential power of virus meta-
phors as a kind of metaphorical virus in and of itself, during and through the 
Ebola epidemic, although of course without the sophisticated discourse in 
which Wald analyzes it. James Peacock and Tim Lustig have identif ied what 
they term the ‘Syndrome Syndrome’ – in the current-day Western culture 
one needs some kind of syndrome to retain a right to human imperfection 
socially and economically. In a similar fashion one can speak of a ‘Contagion 
Contagion’ – the virus metaphor itself enjoys a cultural popularity only too 
easily considered in its own terms.28
If the Alt-Right, and Donald Trump, can be credited with one thing, it is to 
discover and learn to employ the tremendous power of metaphorical virality 
28 Lustig and Peacock, Diseases and Disorders in Contemporary Fiction.
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to implicitly or explicitly make an argument, and particularly to ridicule, 
inspire fear, collectively enjoy, and shame, often using the latter strategies 
to achieve the former. Theoretically the power of fear as metaphorically 
contagious was already well known. Wald notes: ‘Morrow was one of many 
cultural observers who worried that the fear generated by the epidemic 
was more socially disruptive than the virus.’29 However, something that 
existed primarily as a worry, and which is among other things central to the 
response to epidemics of the Centers for Disease Control, this fear can also 
be employed to disrupt society or mobilize groups for political gain. While 
the ‘Ebola scare’ did not actually disrupt life in the US to a great extent, it 
did influence the lives of people who were somehow involved directly, and 
in any case the disruptive intention of these tweets (for instance to interrupt 
flights from African countries to the US) is clear.
From the Ebola scare to the presidential campaign
Such social disruption in general is indeed what Trump, and a great many of 
the Alt-Right’s online activists are aiming for. In an extensive interview with 
New Yorker’s Andrew Marantz, Mike Cernovich, ‘an expert at using social 
media to drive alt-right ideas into the heart of American political discourse’,30 
explained how he became leader of the ‘Trolls for Trump’ movement that 
aggressively campaigned against Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections. Al-
though it does not mention any literal virus or epidemic, both interviewer and 
interviewee are clearly acutely aware of the relevance of the virus metaphor:
Rush Limbaugh had just mentioned #ZombieHillary on his radio show. 
The hashtag, referring to Clinton’s supposed frailty, had trended the 
previous day on Twitter, after Cernovich encouraged his followers to 
use it. ‘I would like to claim credit for it, but I can’t,’ Limbaugh had said. 
‘Somebody on Twitter did it.’ Cernovich told me, ‘He’ll never mention me 
by name, but he’s at least listening to the periphery.’
People have always expressed extreme views online, but for many years 
there was no easy way for such opinions to spread. The Internet was a vast 
landscape dotted with isolated viruses. The rise of social networks was 
like the advent of air travel: a virus can now conquer the world in a day.31
29 Wald, Contagious, p. 203.
30 Marantz, ‘Trolls for Trump’.
31 Ibid.
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If there is one striking trend in many American tweets about Ebola, it is 
their tendency to compare it to a ‘zombie virus’ – perhaps because of Ebola’s 
gruesome effects on the body. While Trump does not literally use the word 
zombie in his Ebola tweets, he does dehumanize Ebola sufferers, suggest that 
they ‘feed’ on spreading the disease, and refer to the epidemic as if it were 
an impending Walking Dead-style zombie apocalypse. For Cernovich then 
to employ ‘#ZombieHillary’ as a hashtag to jeer at illness, contributes to the 
narrative frame in which being ill is a reason to be blamed and suspected 
of wanting to spread disease. In the same movement, Cernovich himself 
uses online virality to influence the mainstream discourse from the fringe, 
a possibility, as Marantz notes, that results from the internet’s shift towards 
an environment that encourages the spread of such ‘viruses’ like air travel 
does with actual viruses.
Not only do Cernovich and others use online virality to troll others, and 
push content into the mainstream that without social media never would 
make it into the public arena. Since becoming president, but also already 
before that, Donald Trump himself had a role in mainstreaming Alt-Right 
messages. Or more specifically, there is a large machine producing pro-Trump 
memes, often in response to Trump’s tweets, which he then retweets, so that 
they reach a mainstream, mass audience. Thus, many messages that are not 
seen beyond very specif ic Alt-Right marginal communities on platforms 
like Reddit, on the one hand respond to Trump and on the other are made 
visible by him. One example concerns a video clip in which Trump beats 
to the ground a person whose head is replaced by the CNN logo. Trump 
retweeted it on 2 July 2017 (‘#FraudnewsCNN #FNN’)32, but it was f irst made 
and shared by a Reddit user. Although Trump denies taking the video from 
that platform, this is its source, and the video became world news after he 
had shared it, as part of a general campaign to discredit and delegitimize 
media that are critical of him, particularly CNN.
The original maker of the video pastiche who had pasted the CNN logo 
into the clip quickly removed it from Reddit when he saw the upheaval 
it caused, but at that point it had already spread far and wide, both 
geographically and across different platforms and media. There was no 
going back. Trump has learned to use such materials, which are on the 
one hand clear in their message, that Trump wins the battle in and with 
the media, and on the other imprecise and inarticulate. The metaphor is 
obviously silly and it is unclear what it refers to exactly, but that is also 
what produces its comical effect. Trump, time and again, manages to create 
32 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881503147168071680. Accessed 1 March 2020.
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a perfect storm out of something that is ‘going around’. He already had 
experience in that before the Ebola epidemic, but cheering on the Ebola 
scare also taught him how to employ the dynamics of outbreak narratives 
in his own resounding yet disjointed manner. Simultaneously Trump’s 
functioning in turning news of the Ebola epidemic into a veritable scare 
far away from the sites of the epidemic shows how Wald’s theory could 
be ‘updated’ to include the shape and politics of outbreak narratives in 
a social-media ecosystem.
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Histories of Online Vitriol

4 Historical Prefigurations of Vitriol
Communities, Constituencies and Plutocratic Insurgency
Frans-Willem Korsten
Abstract
The historical pivot of this chapter is the baroque 17th-century Dutch 
Republic where the rapidly developing printing press facilitated new 
forms of masking and of speed. Masked speaking allowed an anonymity 
in which communities came to intermingle with constituencies. In the 
current situation, the often used phrase of ‘online communities’ needs 
scrutiny, for there is little that makes such groups communities. They 
are entangled with social businesses and lack a complicated texture. 
Vitriolic online collectives are much like the religious constituencies 
in earlier times, in that they depend on iconic f igures or platforms that 
attract and form groups and that vilify one another. Vitriol has become a 
form of socio-symbolic capital, partaking in neoliberal insurgencies that 
superimpose constituencies over communities.
Keywords: rhetorical maskedness, vitriol’s speed, community, constitu-
ency, neoliberal insurgency
‘Fascism attempts to organize the newly proletarianized masses while leaving 
intact the property relations which they strive to abolish. It sees its salvation in 
granting expression to the masses – but on no account granting them rights. The 
masses have a right to change property relations; fascism seeks to give 
them expression in keeping things unchanged. The logical outcome of fascism 
is an aestheticizing of political life. […] All efforts to aestheticize politics 
culminate in one point. That one point is war.’
− Walter Benjamin, Epilogue to The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanization
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
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This chapter looks at some pivotal historical prefigurations of vitriol, with a 
focus on vitriol’s use of masks and need of speed – its ‘going viral’ – in relation 
to either communities or, better, constituencies. Nasty, masked speech was 
paradigmatically embodied f irst by the classical Greek god Momus, who 
would use masks to mislead or counter divine power and to create chaos. 
Not coincidentally, he also happened to father Rumor.1 There are other 
historical pref igurations, to be sure. The Dutch online news medium De 
Correspondent, for instance, reproduced the image above in a contribution 
titled ‘This is what the most important memes used by extremists mean’.2
In this case the infamous Pepe the frog is clothed as the god Kek, Egyptian 
god of chaos, who watches the world burn.3 It might be an allusion to Steve 
Bannon, at some point the dominant voice of Alt-Right, who propagated 
1 I will be using Rumor to indicate the god, rumour to indicate its everyday manifestation.
2 Tokmetzis, ‘Dit betekenen de belangrijkste memes’.
3 Pepe the frog has real historical resonances, here. The Egyptian god Kek of Kekui was 
sometimes depicted with the head (not the mask) of a frog.
Figure 1  Pepe the Frog, ‘This is what the most important memes used by 
extremists mean’
De Correspondent, 30 May 2018
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the total destruction of the political system so that a new one might arise.4 
As De Correspondent explains, Kek is also a term used in circles of fervent 
gamers, indicating fun or lol (‘laugh out loud’), and it is at the basis of a virtual 
world: Kekistan. Still, Kek has been given a mask here, namely of Pepe. It 
is the both destructive and aggressively comical play with masks that is so 
characteristic of vitriol, and this play starts with Momus.
The functional aspect of memes, if one knows how to read the masks 
used, is double: they spread easily, with speed, and their message is both 
informative and suggestive, connoting rumour. With respect to these, 
I will f irst be looking at specif ic aspects of historical pref igurations of 
online vitriol connected to Momus, like his fathering Rumor. Its speed in 
classical antiquity was rather a metaphor for something else: rumour’s 
uncontrollable spreading. Via a short detour on how medieval rumour 
was positively def ined as talk that offered vital and valuable information 
to communities, I move to a qualitatively different form of masked-ness 
and speed in the early modern period, when vitriol’s speed was technically 
made possible by a rapidly developing printing press. Here, people’s talk 
came to be orchestrated in the service of powers that aimed to vector-
ize public debate antagonistically. In that context communities came to 
intermingle with constituencies and masked speaking came to facilitate 
an anonymity that worked to cook up political struggles. A third phase 
brings us to the current situation in which masks and speed have acquired 
an independent value in relation to forms of public talk that serve as both 
symbolical gratif ication and distraction. Here, vitriol will be considered 
as a form of socio-symbolic capital, partaking in neoliberal insurgencies 
that superimpose constituencies over communities.
Defying sovereign power: The functions of masks and rumour’s force
Between 1443 and 1450 the Italian artist Leon Battista Alberti wrote a satiri-
cal story in Latin titled Momus.5 Existing as a manuscript f irst (it would be 
published after Alberti’s death, in 1520), it was probably meant to be told 
or read at the court of one of Alberti’s protectors: a prince. The text played 
with the rather popular medieval and early modern genre of the speculum 
principes, the Fürstenspiegel or mirror of princes, which was a genre that 
4 See for instance Burton, ‘Steve Bannon’.
5 Leon Batista Alberti, Momus.
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specif ically told princes or leaders how to behave.6 Yet, only at the very 
end of the story the prince, as the symbol of political harmony and order, 
is addressed and given advice. Before that the text is a paradigm of what 
in modern times would come to be called a negative aesthetics, presenting 
a continuing series of nasty or dirty tricks performed by the protagonist 
Momus. The latter is a classical Greek god who would be taken up as an 
important character in the renaissance and baroque. From the eighteenth 
century onward he would disappear from view, but can still be traced in 
the English word ‘mummer’, a mime player, derived from French momer: 
to disguise oneself. Indeed, Momus is the god of masks. As a son of Nyx, 
goddess of the Night, he is a dark force. He would be the perfect patron saint 
for online vitriol, for he was the god of taunting, f louting and unfounded 
criticism.
This is how the most recent translator and editors, Sarah Knight and 
Victoria Brown, summarize the f irst part of Alberti’s story in their intro-
duction.7 After Jupiter has commissioned the gods to provide the Earth with 
useful objects, Momus ‘criticizes the efforts of other deities, and unleashes 
a plague of biting insects upon the world. Momus’ duplicitous lover, the 
goddess Mischief, plots to have him exiled from Olympos, and tricks him 
into treacherous statements about Jupiter’s regime. Jupiter discovers Momus’s 
disloyalty and the other gods demand that he be punished.’ Fleeing to 
earth, Momus ‘poses f irst as a poet, then as a philosopher to spread slander 
against the gods and foment atheism.’ So the gods send Virtue, together 
with her children Praise, Trophy and Triumph, to get Momus back on the 
right path. Yet being the god of deceit, Momus can change into anything he 
wants, and now he changes himself into the ugly Thersites, who then turns 
beautiful because of relentless prayer. Momus’s tactic, here, is to make all 
women pray so that the gods will be overwhelmed with prayer, ‘making them 
cantankerous,’ because they now are forced to work. Then he goes to the 
temple of Justice, where Virtue holds sway, and rapes her daughter Praise. 
Out of this enforced union a child is born: Rumor. The goddess Fortune 
immediately realizes what a dangerous force has now come into being and 
‘urges Hercules, Praise’s suitor and Momus’s enemy, to capture Rumor’. Yet 
6 For an overview, see Bejczy and Nederman. Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages. Peter Stacey 
builds forth on Quentin Skinner’s analysis of Macchiavelli’s The Prince and its indebtedness to the 
genre, by pointing to its classical pref igurations: Stacey, Roman Monarchy and the Renaissance 
Prince, pp. 4-5.
7 Brown and Knight, ‘Introduction’.
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Rumor ‘f lies up to heaven dragging Hercules with her’ and deposits him in 
the house of Mars’ (‘Introduction’, viii-ix).
Alberti’s story illustrates a dominant characteristic of vitriol throughout 
the ages, which is not only that it prefers to appear masked, but that it can 
easily swap masks and positions. Moreover, Momus is not only a f igure of 
multiple masks, but he also turns into an allegorical meta-mask, one that 
speaks to Alberti’s time in terms of a classical other. Due to the character’s 
mask and its allegorical doubling, Momus may invoke laughter. It is a form of 
laughter, however, that has little to do with humour because there is always 
pain involved, the pain of others and that inflicted on others. A specif ic 
case is when Momus rapes Virtue’s daughter, Praise. The result is Rumor. 
With respect to this, one function of the masks is that without them the 
infliction of pain would be too real. The other function is that the masks 
work in a carnevalesque context, in which divine or sovereign powers are 
being def ied and defiled, or temporarily subverted.8
Momus’s carnevalesque behaviour and unreliability confuses the gods 
and they are not inclined to invite Momus in their tent to have him take a 
piss out, though as a result they run the risk of his pissing in from the outside 
(I am referring here to a phrase by US president Lyndon Johnson on J. Edgar 
Hoover, f irst director of the FBI, that he had rather have him piss out than 
piss in; quoted in The New York Times of 31 October 1971). This is why the 
gods want Momus out of the vicinity of their tent. Still, at some point he 
suddenly appears to have his uses. He makes people pray more than they 
did before. So Jupiter invites him back. Then Momus starts to plant the idea 
in Jupiter’s head that the world, especially mankind, should be destroyed in 
order to make it craftily anew again, an idea that will keep the gods busy for 
most of the rest of the story. Here Momus loses his carnevalesque nature of 
playfully subverting order and turns into a demiurge or some sort of engineer; 
a chilling prefiguration of modern f igures. The crafty, playing, both masked 
and masking, carnevalesque Momus comes to prefigure a political actor that 
we know from futurist manifestos with their fiat ars – pereat mundus: let art 
rule even if the world perishes. Or Momus manifests himself in line, here, 
with what Dutch philosopher Hans Achterhuis def ined as the key marker 
of utopian thinking: the world that is has to be destroyed f irst before we 
can get to the ideal situation of a new world (also Steve Bannon’s favourite 
8 Probably the Netherlands’ f irst carnevalesque society, founded in Maastricht in 1839, named 
itself Momus; see http://www.mestreechtersteerke.nl/paggebmomus.htm. Last accessed March 
2018.
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scenario, as we saw above).9 That is to say: Momus may pref igure all those 
that f ind ‘anything better’ than current circumstances, or all those types 
that want to destroy the status quo by organizing chaos, so that the world 
can be built anew.
Considering Momus as a possible prefiguration of vitriol, I found the fol-
lowing aspects to be of interest: 1. Momus wants to destroy order or harmony. 
Yet would he be living in disorder he would start to promote order, just to 
be able to destroy it again. In this sense he is not a truly political actor that 
wants to build or make worlds but one that wants to destroy worlds. Making 
one anew serves only the purpose of its possible destruction. 2. Accordingly, 
he may act rhetorically but he lacks a proper, rhetorically convincing goal. 
One could, for instance, ethically defend an actor who strategically wants 
to unveil the hypocrisy of gods. Yet Momus does not mind hypocrisy for 
ethical reasons nor does he have a true strategy to counter such hypocrisy. 
He works mostly through tactics, ‘acts of arrangement’. He is much like a 
stage director setting up his own theatrical scenes. 3. As senseless as it is 
to ask what motivates Venus to be the goddess of love or Mars the god of 
war, as senseless is it to ask what motivates Momus’s actions. In a classical 
frame of mind, in the context of an honour and shame culture, his lacking 
understandable intentions and motivations imply that Momus will not, and 
cannot, be brought to justice. He only can be fought. 4. When he has fled to 
Earth, Momus poses as poet or philosopher. One could consider these two 
as the epitome of hypocrisy, in their capacity to say whatever one wants, 
yet Momus’s impersonation also symbolizes the radically open potential 
in language. If literature’s task and aim, in the end, is ‘to say all’ as Derrida 
wanted it, this also implies the possibility of a relentless production of f ilth. 5. 
His being a poet/philosopher, f inally, leaves open the possibility that Momus 
embodies the radical potential in and of critique. This, at least, is why he was 
considered positively by humanists such as Erasmus and Giordano Bruno.
The latter, in The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast, used Momus to 
criticize the corruption and perversion of ruling elites, especially the all-
powerful Catholic church.10 At the same time Momus was also considered 
negatively, as when Martin Luther compared Erasmus to a modern Momus 
because of what Luther considered to be Erasmus’ sacrilegious standpoints.11 
9 Achterhuis, De Utopie van de Vrije Markt.
10 Giordano Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast.
11 Arnoud Visser states it as follows, quoting from Luther’s Tischreden (book 1, no. 811): ‘It 
conf irmed his image of Erasmus as a new Momus, the ancient god of satire, who ‘ridicules 
and plays with everything, the entire faith and Christ.’ To this end, Erasmus was ‘thinking up 
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The mask of Momus, and by implication vitriol, has a double function, then, 
in relation to power. The Momus mask serves those who speak against 
power; or helps those who run a risk. Yet Bruno’s using Momus as a mask 
did not avoid his dying on the stake. The reason may be that the Momus 
mask can also serve those in power to accuse a speaker of being a Momus. 
Or, whereas on the one hand Momus can be used as a mask to hide from 
ruling powers in order to look for some form of freedom of speech, on the 
other hand he can be used as a mask that serves to vilify those to whom 
the mask is applied. As Luther’s attack on Erasmus illustrates, the name of 
Momus worked as a meme that was functional in what would later become 
shaming, or a shitstorm.
Using Momus as an easily readable meme to attack others with, introduces 
the aspect of speed and of suggestion. Both are addressed in Alberti’s text 
when Momus rapes Praise as a result of which a new creature comes to life: 
Rumor – a semi-divine creature with wings. Ovid, in the 12th book of the 
Metamorphoses, tells that Rumor has his palace at the connecting point of 
sky, earth and seas in a palace that is made of brass so that it can amplify 
and echo everything. This is an index to the kind of speed at stake. Rumor 
does not surprise or have power because it can move faster than a horse (it 
cannot, in Ovid’s and Alberti’s world). Rather, horses can only speed towards 
one goal and get tired in the course of it, while rumours swerve and swirl to 
all sides while gaining energy.12 Rumours do not have speed, that is, they 
rather suggest speed, in their uncontrollable spreading to all sides, as a result 
of which they pop up at unexpected places and come to have a force that 
has outgrown any original source. Allegorically captured in the f igure of 
Rumor, rumour becomes a separate subject with independent agency that 
has a powerful and potentially disturbing or destructive function when it can 
‘f ly’ to all sides, as it could in Rome or, by extension, in the Roman empire.
Still, rumour also had a positive value in the context of the construction 
and functioning of medieval communities. In the early 13th century, Pope 
Innocent III stated: ‘It is not so much that the judge is himself the accuser; 
rather it is as if fama were accusing and clamor denouncing.’ Here, fama 
came to indicate, positively, ‘the voice of the injured community’ and as 
such it became immensely important in the medieval honour and shame 
culture, to the extent that even when no explicit complaint had been brought 
ambiguous and equivocal words day and night, so that his books can even be read by a Turk.’ 
Visser, ‘Erasmus, Luther, and the Margins of Biblical Misunderstanding’, p. 248.
12 Kuehn, ‘Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence’.
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forward, city judges could use fama as a motivation for inquiry.13 In other 
words: fama was valuable information, pronounced by ‘a sort of collective 
voice’.14 This is why in The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe 
Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail use the term ‘talk’, to avoid the pejora-
tive term gossip. The latter acquired its bad name in the 18th century, but 
etymologically means godsibb (‘relative in God’), connoting the talk people 
had at happy or festive events. Happy talk was community talk, then, and 
fama was pivotal when the community was somehow injured. In this context, 
fama was informative and had a shaping force: It was the expression of an 
existing community or something used to restore or establish a community.
Yet when the medieval world changed into the urban mercantilist and 
legalized culture of early modern Europe, fama, as community talk, also 
changed in nature. At first it ‘was fleeting, aspectual and notoriously protean; 
it was a process, rather than the f ixed, unchanging memory that written 
records necessarily convey to us.’15 Yet in the late Middle Ages, ‘the capacity 
of talk to serve as legitimate and widely acknowledged legal, social, and 
moral agent’ came to be taken up by professional agents, operating in the 
service of bureaucracies.16 Fama became an essential component in courts 
of law where what people said about something or someone, as ‘common 
knowledge’, would become fact.17 The performative changed into constative 
as a consequence: talk became fact. In the process fama not only came to 
replace the ordeal as a mode of proof,18 it also lost its suggestion of speed 
because it was written down and archived. Coincidentally, it changed colour 
in terms of gender because knowledge was common on the basis of talk or 
gossip that was predominantly a female affair, while in courts it became 
a male issue.19
The move from fama on the f loor of daily society to the legal system 
implied different functions in the service of cultural homogenization 
or cultural hegemony and growing state control. It was also intrinsic 
to a shift from what was an honour and shame culture to a culture 
that was based, in a fully Christianized Europe, on internalized and 
13 Steinberg, Dante and the Limits of the Law, pp. 19-20.
14 Bettoni, ‘Fama, Shame Punishment and Metamorphoses’.
15 Fenster and Smail (eds), Fama. The Politics of Talk, p. 6 (Introduction).
16 ‘…in medieval societies, talk did many of the things that in modern society are handled, 
off icially, by bankers, credit bureaus, lawyers, state archives, and so on’, Fenster and Smail (eds), 
Fama. The Politics of Talk, p. 9 (Introduction).
17 Kuehn, ‘Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence’, p. 29.
18 Hyams, ‘Due Process versus the Maintenance of Order in European Law’, p. 82.
19 Kuehn, ‘Fama as a Legal Status in Renaissance Florence’, p. 34.
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provable guilt, and by implication liability. This is why ‘bad talk’ would 
become punishable, in its being maliciously disinformative. It became 
a pref iguration, that is of fake news. Now that valuable and trustworthy 
information had become the domain of experts, the question became 
what role was left for public, community talk. I move to a second phase 
in the genealogy of vitriol.
Fuelling antagonism: Communities intermingling with constituency
In Dutch the genre of the schimpdicht has a rich history, so rich that it has 
two synonyms: hekeldicht and scheldgedicht. In English satire is the average 
translation; in German Spottgedicht, in French satire, brocard, flèche. Yet 
the Dutch verbs beschimpen, hekelen, and schelden are not so much satirical 
as vitriolic in nature. They mean: to scoff; to jeer; to denounce; to decry; 
to castigate; to curse; to scold; to swear; to call names. The aggressive and 
potentially violent type of poetry of the ‘hekeldicht’ is abundantly present in 
the 17th century Dutch Republic, in the context of a f ierce and decades-long 
political battle between Dutch Republicans and Orangists, who longed for a 
quasi-royal ruler for the Dutch Republic. One such ruler was prince William 
III of Orange (1650-1702), who was behind a f lood of vilifying pamphlets, 
mostly anonymous ones, or written under a pseudonym in the period leading 
up to a pivotal year in Dutch politics, 1672, that would def initely end the 
republican nature of the Republic.20
With Momus the mask was functional to subvert power, or to protect 
the radical speaker against supreme powers. With fama, considered as the 
collective voice of an injured community, public talk had to appear mask-less 
even if its original source would not be known. It concerned what one had 
heard, and one who had appeared masked could be punished for arousal 
and bad talk. The 17th century masks, however, were used in the context 
of what one could call free, public speech. Here, masks were used in the 
service of a power that secretly wanted to close down the public political 
realm while using that public realm’s space of freedom. It is telling that 
John de Witt, the political, republican leader of the times and proponent 
of ‘the true freedom’ had recurrently asked the prince to stop his attempts 
to rouse the sentiments of the common folk, who for more than a century 
had supported the house of Orange.
20 Harms, Pamfletten, p. 169.
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For this arousal, William of Orange made use of the astounding devel-
opments in the Dutch printing press. Pamphlets could be made almost 
impromptu and spit out in numbers with great speed. The speed of rumour 
that was formerly only metaphorical, a matter of suggestion, now made way 
for technically produced real speed, that effectively made public debate 
as a debate impossible. Speed served forms of arousal, which, most of the 
time, tapped into earlier moments of disruption (an issue central to the 
second chapter in this section). For instance, almost half a century before 
the pivotal year 1672, stadholder Maurits had organized the execution of 
another state pensionary, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who was, like John de 
Witt, the Republic’s most important public off icial. This older f igure, from 
1618, could easily be fused with de Witt, as in this poem:
The ghost of Oldenbarnevelt, enemy of the land, arch-traitor
Come back to life in De Wit, cursed by the common folk
As bastard, piece of shit, and son of such progenitor
Born only to trample the country’s prosperity
Is brought here next to him, comparable in virtue and deeds
Two enemies of the state (each in turn)
Betraying church and fatherland by perjuries
In such a way that even baby’s eyes’d come to burn
Who have nevertheless received their deserved reward
One, on the court’s scaffold, had his head chopped off f irst
The other was trampled, heart-ripped, hung, and torn apart
Because of a rightful revenge, swollen till it burst.21
The verbal violence is both performative and constative, here. In 1672, 
circles around William III had organized a lynching party in the course of 
which the bodies of John and Cornelis de Witt had not just been mutilated 
but had been torn apart, intestines had been eaten raw, their hearts had 
been ripped out and their naked bodies, or what was left of them, were 
21 ‘‘t Leven en Bedrijf van Mr. Jan van Oldenbarnevelt nagevolght van Mr. Jan de Wit.’ Knuttel 
10433: ‘De geest van Barnevelt, ‘s Landsvyant, aartsverrader. / Herlevende in de Wit, vervloekt 
van het gemeen, / als Bastaart aterlingh, en Zoon van sulk een Vader: / Gebooren om ‘s Lantsheyl 
met voeten te vertrêen; / wort hier by hem gepaart. Gelijk in deuchde en daaden. / Twee vyanden 
van Staat, (maar ider op sijn beurt:) / om Kerk en Vaderlandt meijneedich te verraden, / Daar 
noch den Suygelingh sou hebben om getreurt; / Maar hebben (Godt sy dank) hun loon na werk 
ontfangen, / den een op ‘t hofschavot ten kosten van zijn Kop. / Den anderen vertrapt, onthart, 
verscheurt, gehangen, / Van rechtgetergde wraak, gesteegen hoogh in top’.
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hung, publicly, in the centre of The Hague. The poem forgets to mention 
that body parts were traded.
This brutal violence did not come out of the blue. On the morning of 
lynching day a text was hammered on the door of The New Church, in the 
centre of The Hague and close to the prison where de Witt’s brother, Cornelis, 
had been tortured and was still imprisoned. It said:
Belzebub is writing from hell
That Kees de Wit is done for, arrive he shall,
He is waiting for him in the coming day
But f irst his head should be chopped away
And his brother is a villain too22
The one who was probably responsible for this text was preaching a day 
later, in a church f illed to the brim, that the murder on the brothers was 
the revenge of God: a clear hint of how the political, the religious and the 
cultural coincided. The Orthodox Protestant desire for a state religion 
matched the Orangist’s longing for the conflation of royal house with state. 
In contrast, the brothers de Witt belonged to the more tolerant parties, 
who saw religions f lourish in a Republic for all. The battle between the 
two concerned an irreconcilable difference in the distribution of power 
and the organization of public space. Were regents in charge and did 
religion have a subservient place, or was religious rule to be fused with 
that of the sovereign? Was public space to be like the inner court of a 
ruler’s house of should it be as open as a market? The models were not 
just different but disparate, and political agonism easily toppled over 
into antagonism.23
As the very term antagonism suggests, one can hardly speak of public 
debate, in the 17th-century context. Rather, radical parties were battling 
one another, not just Catholics, and radical Protestants or atheists, but 
also Anabaptists, Coornhertists, David-Jorists, Arminians, Gomarists, 
Socinianists, or Vorstians,24 and others. They all were f ighting to have 
22 The minister responsible for the text was called Simon Simonides. In the original: ‘Belsebub 
schrijft uit de Hel / Dat Kees de Wit haast komen zel / Hij wacht hem in korte dagen / Maar zijn 
kop moet eerst zijn afgeslagen / En zijn broer is ook een schelm’ See Van Gemert, ‘De Haagsche 
Broeder-Moord: Oranje ontmaskerd’.
23 I am referring here to a distinction made by Chantal Mouffe, with her pivotal distinction 
between politics and the political in On the Political.
24 For instance, Vorstians were followers of Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622) who was asked to 
occupy the seat in Leiden University that was left empty after the death of Arminius.
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a voice, to establish a constituency, in an endeavour to establish a new 
world. The difference between community and constituency is pivotal 
in this respect. If citizens were tied to existing communities at f irst, they 
could also become part now of new entities that depended on leading, 
often charismatic f igures who would parade, explicitly or implicitly, as a 
new Messiah. In this context, conceptually speaking, ‘the Dutch Republic 
was not the solution to a political problem. It rather posed the problem of 
the political. Being ruled by a king f irst, the Low Countries had to solve 
the problem of how to rule themselves.’25 In having to rule themselves, the 
Dutch had to be able to deal with radical cultural diversity in a dynamic 
that was driven as much by flexible constituencies as by relatively stable 
communities. A key problem, in this context, was not so much how to 
choose for one world instead of another, but how to keep the body politic 
together, either as one homogenized house, or as the complicated texture 
of peoples with different interests and cultures. As we will see in the next 
part of this chapter, it is this work to keep the body politic together that is 
exploited by vitriolic actors.
If vitriol is aiming at antagonizing the body politic, this is indeed the 
opposite of what one could call a public debate. Moreover, once in play, it is 
diff icult to stop the antagonism. This is evidenced by the fact that, almost 
a century later, the political split that characterized the Dutch Republic 
re-materialized in the ‘war of the de Witts’ in 1757. It was a culture war of 
public debate in journals, newspapers and pamphlets, defending or attacking 
the republican brothers. One such pamphlet is shown below (Figure 2).26
The print shows men who crush pencils or cut texts with a knife, thus 
allegorically indicating a war of words. The first line of the poem underneath 
the etch reads: ‘How is fama still roaring with her raw trumpets / about the 
innocent blood…’27 Here, fama is informative in pronouncing out loud that 
innocent victims have fallen by the hands of tyrants. The big book in front 
is def ined as the Bible of the Synod: an index to the Calvinist endeavour to 
install a monopoly by state religion. The both literal and f igural violence 
comes, then, from the side of the so-called tolerant, republican Arminians 
who are f ighting the texts that were used to legitimate the murder of those 
who, in their eyes, were innocent.
25 Korsten, A Dutch Republican Baroque, p. 22.
26 ‘Spotprent op de strijd tussen arminianen en calvinisten over de geboeders De Witt en de prin-
sgezinden, ca. 1758, anonymous, 1756-1759’, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam; https://www.rijksmuseum.
nl/en/collection/RP-P-OB-84.500. Accessed March 2018.
27 In Dutch: ‘Hoe schatert noch de faam met haren rooue trompetten / over het onnoosel bloet 
[…]’.
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In relation to the previous medieval phase, we see a reversal, here, of 
the use of fama. When historiography had come to work in the service of 
political powers, talk became the domain where repressed voices could be 
heard. Its def ining marker was no longer speed but its unstoppable, time 
transcending potential. Speed had become the prerogative of the printing 
press. This, in turn, has come to change in our times, now that slow, or time 
transcending collective talk has acquired a technologically enhanced speed, 
as a result of which collective talk and writing come to be conflated, and a 
battle about the informative quality of public talk ensues. Whereas in the 
medieval context experts had come to take over trustworthy information 
from fama, claiming it as their domain, nowadays public talk has come to 
Figure 2  ‘Cartoon about the fight between Arminians and Calvinists about the De 
Witt Brothers and the royalists’
ca. 1758, anonymous, 1756-1759, rijksmuseum amsterdam
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target experts as untrustworthy, paradoxically claiming back an informative 
status while using all the qualities of f ictitious rumour.
Online communities as constituencies
One can pick a paradigmatic case every hour of the day, but let me take one 
of three Dutch journalists, Rosanne Hertzberger, Loes Reijmer, and column-
ist Heleen Mees, who addressed the coincidence of vitriol, pornif ication 
and misogyny on two online Dutch news media: GeenStijl and Dumpert. 
The f irst literally means ‘Nostyle’; it is a pun that might be translated as 
Badform. Dumpert, connotes the English ‘to dump’. Both were, in f irst 
instance, platforms of TMG Digital, part of the Telegraaf Media Group – part 
of an off icial right-wing media group, that is, with a turnover of 35 million 
euros. Despite its being part of a journalistically oriented media group, the 
subtitle on the GeenStijl site perverted any journalistic attitude in stating: 
‘insinuating, unfounded and needlessly offensive.’28 Perhaps they should 
have called themselves Momus. Whatever the name, in 2017 the site was 
visited monthly by 1.9 million visitors, while Dumpert with 8 million visitors 
got 151 million video views per month.29
Especially Loes Reijmer’s critical article in the national newspaper 
De Volkskrant provoked a f ierce reaction. On 25 March 2017 at 10:54 a.m., 
GeenStijl posted her photograph with the text: ‘Would you do her?’ The f irst 
response came at 10:56. Within hours, 254 derogative responses followed, 
published online, including rape phantasies, some elaborate. There were 
twenty-f ive comments on 26 March; the two last ones came in on 27 March; 
the rest was from the very same day, 25 March. Considering that several texts 
were repulsive, one wonders what the comments said that were removed, or 
what the persons who were banned from the site contributed. After years of 
intimidation, with a growing number of journalists being victim of online 
threats and insults, and a growing problem of self-censorship, two Dutch 
national newspapers, NRC Handelsblad and De Volkskrant, decided to publish 
a pamphlet in which companies that advertise on GeenStijl were asked to 
withdraw their money. Some of them did. In response GeenStijl published the 
28 In Dutch: ‘tendentieus, ongefundeerd en nodeloos kwetsend’; http://www.geenstijl.nl/. 
Tellingly, in June 2017, the new owner of TMG, Het Vlaamse Mediahuis, made public it wanted 
to buy and then sell GeenStijl, but then didn’t.
29 https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nederland/rel-met-adverteerders-geenstijl-kan-uitgever-tmg-
miljoenen-kosten. Accessed July 2017.
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list of those who had signed the pamphlet. These were insulted, threatened 
or put on what one voice called ‘an execution list’.
In terms of style, morality or ethics, the indecencies allowed, provoked, 
facilitated, or used by GeenStijl call to mind the comment of Joseph Welch 
when provoked by Joseph McCarthy during the Army-McCarthy hearings 
in 1954: ‘Have you no sense of decency, sir? At long last, have you left no 
sense of decency?’ The very McCarthy period may have been one of the 
f irst examples we have in modern times of media driven vitriol, which 
served the purpose of eliminating communism, the political alternative 
to capitalist, corporative democracy. The comparison may also serve to 
highlight how McCarthyism, with its anchors in several cultural currents 
and undercurrents, was more prominently a matter of producing new forms 
of constituencies rather than of mobilizing existing communities.
Despite the often used phrase of online communities there is little 
that makes these groups communities in the proper sense of the term. 
They are entangled with social businesses and lack the complicated 
texture of culture: a texture consisting of the nuances or differences 
that characterize a community not bound by one homogenous culture 
but consisting of a network of cultures. It may be clear, here, that I am 
talking about a different kind of community than the one glorif ied under 
fascism and Nazism. As Susan Sontag argued in her analysis of fascist 
aesthetics: ‘The exaltation of community does not preclude the search 
for absolute leadership; on the contrary, it may inevitably lead to it.’30 
Such exaltation is also at work in the attempts of the extreme right to 
reinvigorate national identities. Yet in the current circumstances it is the 
combined exaltation of community with the flexibility of constituency that 
propels neoliberal strategies and tactics. When Pierre Bourdieu def ined 
neoliberalism as a relentless attack on collectives, he meant collectives 
that are cultural in nature.31 In contrast, vitriolic online collectives are 
much like the religious constituencies in the Dutch Republic, in that they 
depend on iconic f igures or platforms that attract and form groups and 
that vilify one another. As bodies of constituents – people ‘who appoint 
or elect a representative’ – they form f lexible and competitive wholes 
based on personal and stylistic ties. They use certain expressive forms 
of self-articulation or self-actualization, yet they miss pivotal elements 
needed for the cultural build-up of communities in the sense of their 
30 Sontag, ‘Fascinating Fascism’.
31 As for communities in the context of neoliberalism, I follow the analysis of Kelly and Caputo, 
Community.
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connoting ‘society, fellowship, friendly intercourse; courtesy, affability.’ 
They are not cultural at all if we specify culture with Griselda Pollock 
as ‘the imaginative faculty that can grasp multiple life worlds, different 
experiences, and the nature of change and the function of creativity 
based on work.’32
Instead of being cultural in nature, allowing the formation, continuation 
or establishment of communities, vitriol is rather aesthetic in nature in the 
sense of an anti-aesthetics. The latter serves what Susan Buck-Morss defined 
as especially fascism’s ability to tap in on a typically modern anaesthetized 
aesthetics,33 using ‘media which rob our senses of experiential connection 
and instead drug us into a blank “aesthetic” enjoyment of self-destruction.’ 
Vitriol’s speed partly f its such a form of anaesthetizing aesthetics, yet can 
be explained differently still.
Speed in the age of plutocracies: The subversion of power revisited
Online vitriol is not concrete or meaningful in the sense of its having 
semantic use value. This would fall under the rubric of making sense 
by means of communication, like talk that holds a community together 
on the basis of culture. The value of online vitriol consists in how it 
appears on a market of exchange, much like a discursive commod-
ity. Here, online vitriol’s real speed gets another force. If it does not 
go viral, it means nothing, or has no value. Vitriol only superf icially 
resembles early modern rumour, here, with the printing press spitting 
out pamphlets. Its desire and ability ‘to go viral’ within hours, lingering 
on for some days, but often not much longer, embodies something else. 
Speed has gained an independent value, in some sense valued higher 
than content. I read vitriol, here, not so much as an analogy to, but 
as a symptom of a neo-liberal capitalism that resonates with the f irst 
anarchic phase of capitalism in the late 18th and early 19th century, as a 
form of anarcho-capitalism.34
I am following the analysis here of Chrystia Freeland, who before she 
became minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada wrote Sale of the Century 
(2000), sketching Russia’s transition from communism to anarcho-capitalism, 
and Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone 
32 Pollock, ‘Saying NO!’, p. 333.
33 Buck Morss, ‘Aesthetics and Anaesthetics’.
34 Fulcher, Capitalism, p. 38.
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Else (2012). Moreover, I follow the analysis of Robert J. Bunker and Pamela 
Ligouri Bunker in Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the 
Demise of the Western Economies: Dark Renaissance (2014). Bunker and 
Bunker describe two insurgencies that are taking place simultaneously: 
one plutocratic in nature, embodied in the international elite of the ultra-
wealthy; one criminal in nature, embodied in the ‘deviant globalization’s 
winners’, as Nils Gilman (historian in global developments and author of 
Mandarins of the Future, 2004) def ined them in his foreword:
Unlike classic twentieth-century insurgents, who sought control over 
the state apparatus in order to implement social reforms, criminal and 
plutocratic insurgents do not seek to take over the state. Nor do they wish 
to destroy the state, since they rely, like parasites, on the state to provide 
the legacy goods of social welfare […] Rather, their aim is simpler: to carve 
out de facto zones of autonomy for themselves by crippling the state’s 
ability to constrain their freedom of (economic) action.35
Online vitriol partly partakes in this double insurgency. It does not speak 
against real power, but serves the real powers that want to weaken the state. 
For instance, the multi-billionaire Koch brothers in the United States, of 
Koch Industries, which made its basic capital with cracking techniques in 
the thirties and forties of the 20th century, have funded multiple projects 
of disinformation, which have also produced vitriol.36 The ‘Competitive 
Enterprise Institute’, for one, and funded in part by the Koch brothers, 
by mouth of Rand Simberg, targeted climate scientist Michael Mann by 
comparing him with a child molester.37 Much vitriol, moreover, is close 
to being criminal in the sense that it can be brought to court; some of it is 
allied to criminal organizations, whether these are political or so-called 
entrepreneurial in nature.
Those who truly own power, without being responsibly in power, know 
quite well how to aestheticize politics by means of vitriol, in order to avoid 
the mobilization of forces that want to change property relations for real. 
In this context vitriol can be seen as a topsy turvy form of what Pierre 
Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron coined symbolic capital, with which they 
35 Gilman, ‘Foreword: the Twin Insurgency – Facing Plutocrats and Criminals’, p. xx.
36 See http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/fight-misinformation/global-warming-
skeptic.html#.WT6hVMakLIU. Accessed March 2018.
37 See http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/center-science-and-democracy/protecting-scientists-
harassment/va-ag-timeline.html#.WT6i_8akLIU. Accessed March 2018.
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indicated the not straightforwardly f inancial or economic possessions and 
capabilities of the French elite but a symbolic capital that was the opposite 
of social capital.38 Whereas the f irst is, indeed, elitist and can be radically 
anti-social or shamelessly individual, the latter is collective and indeed 
socio-cultural in nature. With vitriol the two become perversely entangled as 
socio-symbolic capital: a collective form of anti-social, symbolic capital. And 
analogous to non-symbolic or concrete capital, it exploits public services, 
like the internet, and it feeds on something else, namely communal life.
Whereas the political realm consists in and due to conflict, or agon, 
the work of the body politic at the same time is to keep people together, 
respecting differing interests and socio-cultural differences. In other words, 
politics has to facilitate and guarantee a texture of cultures that does not 
exist as one unity, what one could call the fetish of the nation state, but 
that defines a political, that is to say internally conflicting, unit. The pivotal 
political work to accept such conflicts while avoiding dissolution, has become 
precarious nowadays because neo-liberal actors have succeeded in redefin-
ing the work of the body politic as labour, something that can be bought 
and exploited. In this context, vitriol affectively exploits communal life, 
using its attention and affective resources for the creation of socio-symbolic 
surplus value. Since time is of the essence, here, this explains vitriol’s need 
of speed. There is nothing in terms of content, or use value, that needs to 
come on the discursive market with this speed. The speed is needed only 
to make a discursive prof it. As a consequence, cultural expression gets a 
different nature and status.
In comparison with medieval talk, vitriol is a hybrid conflation of talk 
and written language that constantly moves to and from between being 
a performative and a constative. Talk and fact alternate. And whereas in 
medieval courts fama came to replace the ordeal as a mode of proof as 
information, in the case of vitriol fama is used to fuel a public ordeal on the 
basis of disinformation. Considered as a form of expression per se, vitriol 
‘talk’ is a form of discursive possession and as such the opposite of what 
Giorgio Agamben defined as ‘pure language’, the language of a community 
to come.39 In contrast, online vitriol is an attack on culture, with culture 
def ined as the complex texture that both holds together and empowers a 
communal entity with a living culture. In attacking this culture, vitriol is 
symptomatic of a neo-liberal capitalist system that has perhaps reached a 
38 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction in Education.
39 See, for instance, Agamben, Language and Death.
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limit, but not the limit of growing inequality.40 To avoid any serious dealing 
with this growing inequality, plutocrats grant peoples expression, while 
‘on no account granting them rights’. If capitalism celebrates the victory of 
the desire for possession over that of enjoyment, as Marx wanted it, vitriol 
should be seen in the light of possession rather than enjoyment.41 When 
Thorstein Veblen talked about symbolic capital, in Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899), he indicated how the nouveau riche used displays of wealth to 
compete with upper classes that previously had been at untouchable social 
heights.42 This dynamic appears now to have been reversed. Those who 
will never belong to the international elite, and have little money to mirror 
them because they belong to the parties exploited and marginalized by the 
processes of globalization, are granted to possess their own digito-discursive, 
socio-symbolic surplus value. They may feel this gives them some sort of 
purchasing power. In effect it gives them nothing but a hollow gratif ication.
In terms of historical comparison they are not part of a newly prole-
tariarized mass, moreover, like in Walter Benjamin’s times, for the current 
masses are split up, in a new kind of Lumpenproletariat and a precariate. 
Both are struggling to survive, the f irst by looking for the chance and the 
moment that they are given some sort of labour, the second by trying to 
stay desperately in the system. Both are inclined to form constituencies 
that are granted expression with all sorts of devices as a result of which 
they tend to forget that they have no real chance to change any property 
relations. The real f inancial surplus value owned by the plutocracies of this 
world, meanwhile, remains untouched, in its swiftly moving wherever it 
is safe for the time being. This is not to say that vitriol is simply the tool of 
an international plutocracy, the elite of the ultra-wealthy. Still, it has its 
function in arousing people’s emotion on all sorts of topics, as long as the 
topic is not the enormous inequality of wealth and property. Any dealing 
with vitriol that considers it per se, misses the symptomatic nature of vitriol, 
that is to say: its mediated relation with neo-liberal insurgencies and cur-
rent plutocracies. Such a dealing per se will mistake vitriol’s anger for real 
whereas it is at best a veil, and more probably an entangled knot of despair 
and manipulated consciousness.
40 In The Death of a Discipline Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak distinguished between the global 
as ‘the imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere’ and the planetary – ‘the planet 
is a species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan’ (Spivak, The 
Death, p. 72). This was a way of def ining and distinguishing a whole that is marked by respect 
for difference in contrast with a system that imposes the same logic everywhere.
41 Marx, Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts.
42 See Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class.
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5 White Femininity and Trolling
Historicizing Some Visual Strategies of Today’s Far Right
Ewelina Pepiak
Abstract
This section interrogates historical prefigurations of anti-immigrant online 
vitriol following sexual assaults that occurred during the 2015 New Year’s Eve 
in Cologne. The study of the post-Cologne inventory of European far-right 
memes and internet portals draws on anti-miscegenation iconography and 
narratives that reach back to European imperialisms. Apart from cataloguing 
fairly well-documented dehumanizing representations of non-white men, it 
brings about an ambiguous f igure of a white woman. While white women 
typically symbolize national dignity, they, too, have been perceived as 
unpatriotic traitors and stakes in biopolitical warfare on democratic institu-
tions. After Cologne, online trolling closely resonated with some politicians’ 
calls for more surveillance, arming citizens, expulsions of immigrants, and 
attempts at political recuperation of feminism on the far right.
Keywords: race and gender in colonial discourses, New Year’s Eve in 
Cologne, Far Right memes, feminism and intersectionality, miscegenation
‘Just as human productions cannot be divided into a desiring-production on the 
one hand and a ‘material’ production on the other, so also can men in power 
not be seen to have made that distinction in the process of establishing and 
consolidating their power. It was two aspects of a single conquest that set up 
white masters over the coloured nations of the world and placed the dominant 
male ego of the emergent bourgeoisie in a position of domination over women in 
his own society. He [white male – EP] would continue to employ those women 
as the colourful raw material for shaping the images and setting the boundaries 
that were so necessary to secure his domination’
− K. Theweleit, Male Fantasies1
1 Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vol. 1, p. 323.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
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Many of the current forms of vitriol follow a logic of biological and cultural 
supremacy. In the present-day European context, white supremacy dis-
courses are informed by the colonial-era images of non-white populations’ 
innate primitivism and deviancy.2 The present analysis reaches to historical 
pref igurations that determine the affective force of online violence and 
trolling. Recent racist and sexist images, depicting white women sexually 
harassed by non-white men, reflect the centrality of intersecting narratives 
of race and gender in articulating otherness. One of the most charged events 
that led to dissemination of such images online is the wave of sexual aggres-
sions committed mainly by men of Algerian and Moroccan descent during 
New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, Germany.3 Starting from a sample of 
images disseminated on the internet in the wake of the Cologne events, I 
move back to historical discourses that set deviant sexual behaviours of 
non-white men in contrast with a f igure of a white woman. Stereotyping 
practices involving non-white male sexuality can be investigated from 
myriad angles, such as fetishization (fantasy) or stigmatization (taboo).4 This 
critical study of juxtaposing white femininity with non-white sexual violence 
epitomizes the historical preponderance of representing miscegenation 
in Europe as a threat.5 I focus specif ically on past and present images and 
discourses closely resonating with the prevalent visual rhetoric after the 
Cologne assaults.
New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne
The sexual assaults that took place in Cologne during the New Year’s Eve 
celebration in 2015 led to massive reactions in various media, and in political, 
academic and intellectual discourses. These reactions came in several waves 
and with varying intensity. Most online images including memes, tweets, 
and political cartoons, ref lected the following logic: a) they denounced 
2 Colonialist and imperialist preeminence of today’s racist discourses is one of the most 
explored topics in postcolonial scholarship. On non-white rapist’s representations see: Ware, 
Beyond the Pale.
3 The exact report regarding the events was published by Zeit Magazine on 23 June 2016. 
https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/2016/27/silvesternacht-koeln-fluechtlingsdebatte-aufklaerung.
4 Hall, Representation.
5 ‘Miscegenation – marriage, cohabitation, or sexual intercourse between a white person 
and a member of another race’ (Merriam-Webster). The term replaced ‘amalgamation’ and 
f irst occurred in a 1863 pamphlet written by two then-anonymous authors as an apology of 
mixing races, in an attempt to breed controversy around Abraham Lincoln shortly before the 
presidential election of 1864. See: Miscegenation.
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presumably deliberate disinformation by the police and media, and b) 
they identif ied the perpetrators as Arabs, North Africans, Muslims, and/
or refugees. While the f irst narrative redirected the assaults to the matters 
of public security (immigrants as public threat, critique of diversity and 
multiculturalism), the second amounted to considerable visual racializing 
of the assaults. In the racially charged visual rhetoric perpetrators were 
framed as ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’, both terms were used as synonymous with 
backwardness and violent behaviour, while ‘rape culture’ became a ‘Muslim 
rape culture’. In mid-2015, an American anti-Muslim think-tank, Middle East 
Forum, published an article entitled ‘Muslim rapists prefer blondes’ contain-
ing claims of an ‘ongoing epidemic’ in Europe in which ‘Muslim men sexually 
target white women’.6 Calls for more surveillance and collective punishment 
of both the Muslim population and the pro-immigration government were 
voiced to no-one’s surprise: both are standard elements of far-right reaction 
to crimes committed by non-white perpetrators. However, post-Cologne 
trolling particularly capitalized on historical anti-miscegenation rhetoric 
and on the ongoing feminist ambivalence with regard to the interlocking 
categories of gender and race in dealing with representations of sexual 
violence.7
‘Silence hides violence’
Since 2014, the opposition to the immigration policies introduced by 
the liberal German government has become part of a struggle for white 
supremacy. The events in Cologne sparked off numerous vitriolic reactions 
suggesting that the mainstream media and politicians are hiding the truth 
from the population. The provocative and polarizing female representations 
in the images and narratives after Cologne helped to redirect the question 
of sexism and racism to a debate on European security and cultural identity, 
two pillars of the far-right political programme. Postulates to save ‘our’ 
women were pronounced by organizations such as PEGIDA8 and Alternative 
6 Ibrahim, Muslim Rapists Prefer Blondes.
7 Hark and Villa, Unterscheiden und Herrschen.
8 Founded in Dresden in 2014, PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the 
Occident (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) is an international 
political movement promoting nationalism, Christianity and denouncing Islam as a threat to 
‘the European values’.
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für Deutschland (AfD).9 The European Far Right – in Hungary the support-
ers of Victor Orban, in Poland the ruling extreme-right Law and Justice 
party, in France Front National, etc. – unilaterally politicized the Cologne 
aggressions as part of their securitization campaigns. They argued that the 
threat represented by the incomers was far greater than the mainstream 
media and politicians were willing to admit. During anti-Muslim protests 
following the aggressions in Cologne, PEGIDA demonstrators held a banner 
that read: ‘silence hides violence’. The slogan targeted careful reactions 
uttered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Henriette Reker, the 
mayor of Cologne, following the news of the assaults. The #einearmlänge 
hashtag referring to the advice given by Reker to German women to stay 
one arm’s length away from foreigners resulted in memes accusing the 
female politician of betraying German women. Trending images featured 
white women armed against Muslim men (#einearmlänge, #stopIslam, 
#taharrush). One of the memes depicted a f ierce-looking blonde f igure 
– adopted by the Far Right on various occasions.10 The caption reads: ‘To 
avoid sexual assaults against women during the next Carnival of Cultures, 
this time I will vote AfD. That one-arm’s-length distance simply does not 
hold’. (Figure 3). As a number of journalists and researchers acknowledged 
afterwards, the media’s unwillingness to disclose the fact than many of the 
perpetrators were of North African origin legitimized the anti-immigrant 
far-right online outburst to a large degree.11 Much of the far-right trolling 
after Cologne focused on legitimizing neo-Nazi racial slurs arguing that 
silencing immigrant crimes and appraising the merits of multiculturalism 
should be interpreted as violent acts against the population. According to 
that rationale, the biological preservation of the white race could no longer 
be entrusted upon the existing power structures who fail to protect ‘our’ 
women. And inversely, white female representatives of the German society 
were depicted in the memes and slogans as renouncing their traditional 
9 Since its foundation in 2014 out of disgruntled members and supporters of the centre-right 
CDU, Alternative für Deutschland has changed its anti-EU rhetoric and focused on criticising 
the pro-immigration policies of Angela Merkel. In 2014 AfD entered the European Parliament 
with 7.1 percent of votes (Vorländer et al., 2016, p. 52-53).
10 For instance, in the US Lana Lokteff and Tomi Lahren are among the white female faces of 
the Alt-Right. In the European politics some examples are Marion Marechal Le Pen and Marine 
Le Pen in France (Front National), and Corinna Miazga and Alice Weidel in Germany (AfD).
11 F. Klask, ‘Die Stille nach der lauten Nacht’, Zeit Online, 29 December 2017, https://www.
zeit.de/2018/01/silvesternacht-koeln-sexuelle-belaestigung-schweigen-medien; Hans-Peter 
Friedrich labelled the lack of news ‘the Silence Kartell’, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/gesells-
chaft/medien/kritik-an-den-medien-wegen-koeln-berichterstattung-schweigekartell-und-
nachrichtensperren/12797422.html.
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role of protecting the white population. This population, embodied in an 
every-day regular white woman, is presented with a far-right alternative, 
where the government has allegedly left a void to f ill.
‘Rapefugees not welcome’
The far-right rhetoric aimed principally at identifying the perpetrators 
from Cologne as (predominantly Muslim) refugees who had been coming 
to Europe since July 2015. To that effect another slogan seen during PEGIDA 
demonstrations, ‘rapefugees not welcome’, went viral. One particular meme 
established the ‘rapefugee’ cliché: it is composed of two photos set together 
– one with three smiling girls holding a ‘refugees welcome’ banner and 
marked ‘Cologne October 2015’ and the second, marked ‘Cologne January 
2016’, showing a white woman being raped by a black man. The rhetoric 
Figure 3  Twitter handle titled: Safety in Berlin sent from AfD twitter account
Posted on 30 July 2016 at 03:53
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of security and solidarity with women who are no longer protected by the 
existing power structures gained in Islamophobic tones.12 In his comment 
on Cologne events a Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders named refugees 
‘Islamic testosterone bombs’ and called for a legalization of pepper spray.13
From non-white foreigners to refugees and Muslims, the enemies of white 
women have been swiftly identified as beasts who would lead the population 
to decline. They are aided by the enemy within f igure, represented by a 
white female ‘refugee helper’. A prominent example of the ambivalent villain 
12 Angela Merkel, as a symbol of ‘Wilkommenskultur’, has been on numerous occasions – not 
least on air (ARD news on 8 October 2015) – portrayed wearing an Islamic veil. A meme issued by 
a Zionist ‘Jihad Watch Deutschland’ blog run by a journalist Fred Alan Medforth shows Angela 
Merkel in sexy underwear and veiled, the article holding her responsible for sexual aggressions 
and death of German women at the hands of Muslim men. See: https://fredalanmedforth.
blogspot.com/2018/06/susanna-14-ermordet-kanzlerin-merkel.html.
13 The call for civil armament is another common narrative occurring in the aftermath of 
violent events involving immigrants. For instance, Donald Trump tweeted shortly after the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks on 7 January 2015: ‘Isn’t it interesting that the tragedy in Paris took place 
in one of the toughest gun control countries in the world?’ suggesting that violence occurs 
because the population is not armed. See: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/552955
167533174785?lang=en.
Figure 4 Meme identifying refugees/immigrants with Nazis (#einearmlaenge)
it states on top: ‘Time-tested’; and underneath: ‘always stay at arm’s length from evil men’. 
Meme inspired by #einearmlänge, reposted on german far-right websites
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f igure after Cologne is the use of a 1934 postcard depicting German girls 
saluting to Hitler in another #einearmlänge meme (Figure 4).
The image amalgamates Hitler, an ‘evil man’ with a ‘North African or 
Arab’, ‘Muslim’ rapist.14 Women depicted in the meme are framed as sup-
porting the powers that be, unaware (hence in need for protection) but 
also easily subjected (hence not trustworthy, the f igures of enemy within). 
The #einearmlänge memes are particularly telling, precisely due to the 
paradoxical message they carry. Although the Nazi postcard meme carries 
a warning, it simultaneously dissociates the anti-immigration propaganda 
from the Nazi ideology, even though both the present-day far-right parties 
14 On the preponderance of labelling New Year’s Eve perpetrators as ‘Muslim’, ‘refugee’, 
‘immigrant’ and ‘Arab’, see: Abdelmonem et al., The Taharrush Connection.
Figure 5 Polish magazine W Sieci
The title reads: The islamic rape of europe. in his tweet, an italian researcher alessio fratticcioli, 
likens the cover to a 1941 italian fascist propaganda poster: “defend her! She could be your 
mother, your wife, your sister, your daughter”.
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such as Alternative für Deutschland and the Nazis in the 1930s advocated 
blood purity and promoted xenophobia.15 Far-right representations of the 
Cologne victims drew directly on the Nazi propaganda posters in their use 
of an iconic image of a white woman: She is sexy, blond, slim, and helpless 
(Figure 5).
Feminists and trolls
Thirdly, trolling the Cologne sexual offenders as backward and violent due 
to their skin pigmentation and religion points to an ambiguous relationship 
between the feminist and the far-right rationale. While trolling after Cologne 
focused on the migrants, feminists had also been accused of deliberate 
silence.16 Alt-Right internet news outlets such as Breitbart, Euroislam, Riposte 
Laïque, and Politically Incorrect used ambivalent feminist reactions to 
the events as an opportunity to further their racist rhetoric. Although 
traditionally anti-feminist, these outlets seconded the feminist outcry 
against sexual harassment in order to gain legitimacy. Some statements 
made by prominent feminists enabled the articulation of racial and sexual 
difference. For instance, a German feminist Alice Schwarzer writes that the 
Cologne culprits were ‘North Africans or Arabs, hence Muslims. And it is on 
that basis that they got in touch. Yet, they weren’t just any Muslims. These 
were the kind of young men with no jobs or perspectives, standing on street 
corners and listening to pied pipers telling them for years and decades: you 
are not guilty of your misery – the ‘inf idels’ are.’17
Breitbart’s article from 16 January features a photo of Angela Merkel and 
Alice Schwarzer sitting next to each other but looking away. According to 
Breitbart, Schwarzer ‘claimed Cologne police have been covering up Muslim 
rape for 20 years, and said that sexual violence was now being used as a 
weapon of war in Germany.’18 In her interview for a Polish anti-Muslim 
outlet Euroislam, another German feminist and activist Rebekka Sommer 
blamed Muslim culture for practicing ‘sexual terrorism’:
15 The AfD campaign billboards before the 2017 parliamentary election featured pregnant white 
women and read: ‘New Germans? We will make them ourselves’, https://www.welt.de/politik/
deutschland/article165297337/Was-setzt-die-AfD-gegen-Burkas-Alkohol-oder-Frauenrechte.
html.
16 Prendergast, ‘Why are feminists refusing’.
17 Schwarzer, Der Schock, pp. 17-18.
18 https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2016/01/16/old-school-feminist-slams-establishment-
calls-for-debate-on-islam-without-political-correctness/.
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For the f irst few years I thought that the people coming here were real 
refugees and that they were happy to be in a safe place. So I thought they 
would be willing to adapt to their new surroundings here and become 
integrated. But as time went by, step by step I awoke to an unpleasant 
truth. There were so many different clues that pointed to this conclusion 
that I just could not go on ignoring them any longer. Certainly one of the 
decisive turning points was what happened on New Year’s Eve 2015 in 
Cologne. That’s when I f inally had to admit to myself that that sort of 
behaviour is characteristic for the overwhelming majority of the Muslims 
I was seeing on a day-to-day basis. That’s when I said to myself: ‘Rebecca, 
now is the time to pull the emergency brake, simply because as a women’s 
rights advocate you bear collective responsibility as a woman.’19
Other feminist activists denounced the racializing of sexual violence as part 
of the feminist discourse. The #ausnahmslos movement led by a German 
feminist Anne Wizorek stated on its website: ‘Sexualised violence must not 
only be addressed if the perpetrators are supposedly the “others”: Muslim, 
Arab, black or North African men – in short, all those considered “non-
German” by right-wing populists.20 As a result, the German Alt-Right portal 
Politically Incorrect attacked them as traitors, relativists, and blamed them 
for the assaults. Apart from feminists who denounce both sexual violence 
and racism, female refugee helpers were particularly subject to trolling. 
Contrary to the image of an innocent, helpless victim used to vilify the 
dark-skinned men, female refugee helpers were accused of treachery and 
simulating charity to mask their sexual fantasies about ‘an oriental prince 
charming’.21
On Reddit, they were mocked as unattractive and desperate:
Is Ahmed, 20, with no job or skills, an afghan face and genetics and a quest 
for European wellfare money a high value male? Yeah right.
And the females in these stories, I can only speak personally for Sweden, 
but those women I wouldn’t wanna touch with a 10 foot pole. Fat, old, 




21 The expression comes from an article on refugee assistants published on the Islamophobic 
far-right German blog run by a controversial Turkish-German author Akif Pirinçci. https://
nixgut.wordpress.com/2016/12/19/studie-die-irren-f lchtlingshelfer_innen/.
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ugly, left-wing, horrible scum. Let the ahmeds have them. They are using 
this opportunity to extort sex from young males when they can’t get any 
other man on the planet. They are sex-offenders, pedophiles.22
Historical prefigurations of anti-miscegenation campaign after 
Cologne
In the visual rhetoric and narratives exploited by trolls after Cologne, the 
racialized sexual threat was framed as an act of terror that would eventu-
ally lead to a decline of the white population. This was not the f irst time 
such a response to the presence of non-white men on the European soil 
occurred. A similar outcry took place in the early 1920s when 30,000 to 
40,000 non-white soldiers from several French colonies were stationed in 
Rhineland.23 Xenophobic reactions to the foreign presence on the European 
soil had been entrenched in European mentalities even earlier, throughout 
nineteenth-century anti-miscegenation campaigns.
In the nineteenth century, in the attempt to assert modern states’ control 
over colonial subjects, an emerging concept of population became interwo-
ven with various othering strategies. The notions of a rational individual 
and a rational society that used to fall under all-encompassing jurisdiction 
were superseded by a new ‘character’: a population.24 According to Michel 
Foucault, population is ‘a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, 
while they might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted’.25 
Populations, states Foucault,
become pertinent only at the mass level. They are phenomena that are 
aleatory and unpredictable when taken in themselves and individually, 
but which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, or at 
least possible to establish.26
Therefore, populations, albeit randomly manifested, are representative of 
their time when studied in a historical context. In addition to that, they 
22 https://old.reddit.com/user/samenrofringslikeLBJ (Reddit Account is removed by 
user. Post no longer available); https://www.reddit.com/r/TheRedPill/comments/7dmiuu/
women_and_refugees_a_compilation/.
23 Wigger, The Black Horror.
24 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 245.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 246.
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generate outbursts of normative functions, such as racial purity, narrated 
as essential for survival. The threat of miscegenation (allegedly resulting in 
sterility) has been one of the most prominent discourses sustaining white 
supremacy. The preservation of the white race has become a vital part of 
the far-right propaganda. These functions, due to a growing complexity of 
social realities (in the nineteenth century these were industrialization and 
centralization, today digitalization and globalization), make the ‘human 
masses’ particularly predisposed to self-regulate.27 Hence, racial regula-
tion, embodied in anti-miscegenation rules, became imperative for the 
population.28
Not unlike in the past, multiculturalism embodied in the inf lux of 
refugees in 2015 was a turning point that authorized the far-right all over 
Europe to openly call for regulation. Backed by considerable civil movement, 
the European far right effectively echoed the racist undertones established 
in colonial-era narratives. That these narratives did not resonate with 
mainstream politics is not new either. Foucault argued that the specif icity 
of the population lies also in being beyond a society. While society relies on 
institutions, populations will only survive through regulatory mechanisms. 
The more personalized character of populations makes them easier to believe 
in and identify with. Contrary to a population, as it is implicitly argued, a 
society would inevitably turn against tyrannical tendencies of the biopower. 
Because the population is responsible for ‘the biological continuum of the 
[…] distinction between races’29, it is determined by its biological functions 
rather than its individualistic capacities. By instigating racism as a norm, 
the population will be divided and thus easier to control, and additionally 
it will be made to believe that in order to live it must destroy its enemies. 
Destroying a degenerate race will make life healthier and purer, and by 
destruction Foucault does not only mean a biological annihilation of a 
race considered ‘degenerate’ – he also means ‘political death, expulsion, 
rejection, and so on’.30 This logic reveals the power of a discourse of biological 
preservation: dying out represents weakness and racial mixing represents 
degeneracy. After Cologne, older images of white women, traditionally in 
charge of ensuring the preservation of the white race, being sexually as-
saulted resurfaced in order to generate a threatening symbol of a civil society 
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representations of decline blamed on abstract politics, political correctness, 
widespread diversity, and a too-generous welfare state. For instance, the 
political cartoon that went viral in Alt-Right online circles links the spread 
of multiculturalism and diversity to the decline of ‘straight white men’. One 
of the Reddit users commented underneath: ‘Isn’t multiculturalism great! 
You can have sex with just about anything and you get to suppress straight 
white guys.’ (Figure 6).
Colonial discourses of racialized sexual deviancy
How did the verbalization and shaping of sexual norms come to the fore? In 
order to retrace recent representations of miscegenation, researchers turned 
to texts and images from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that 
reveal the construction of atemporal, oversexed, and violent non-white 
men.31 While in the nineteenth century scientif ic and intellectual discourses 
were the dominant spaces of conceptualizing otherness, at the turn of the 
centuries journalism took over that role. As mass printing increased the 
volume of popular press, the representations of miscegenation became not 
only more commonplace, but also more explicitly racist.
In the nineteenth-century scientif ic discourse, especially in the realms 
of phrenology and sociology, efforts were made to identify the ‘general 
31 Hund, ‘Racist King Kong Fantasies’; Wigger, The Black Horror.
Figure 6  This political cartoon went viral in far-right digital media following the 
New Year’s Eve in Cologne.
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characteristics of savages’:32 narrow-mindedness, intensity of desire, un-
natural physical strength, and brutality with women,33 followed by a general 
idiocy, unattractiveness and animal-like features:
If it is admitted that the European cannot hope to civilize the negro, 
and manages to transmit to the mulatto only a very few of his own 
characteristics; if the children of a mulatto and a white woman cannot 
really understand anything better than a hybrid culture, a little nearer 
than their father’s to the ideas of the white race, – in that case, I am right 
in saying that the different races are unequal in intelligence.34
A French academic authority of that period and Arthur de Gobineau’s 
friend, Ernest Renan, writes of the Semites as ‘an incomplete, simplistic, 
and undifferentiated race’.35 In the sixth volume of his works published 
in 1847, Condorcet endeavoured to scientif ically prove that Islam ‘seems 
to condemn people to eternal slavery and incurable stupidity’.36 In the 
period of the Third Republic, the demonization of Arabs, hitherto objects 
of orientalist fascination, served the purpose of reinforcing discourses of 
white supremacy and imperial politics. Jules Ferry, a key political f igure in 
the French Third Republic, claimed in his speech on 28 July 1885 that ‘the 
superior races have the right to rule over the inferior ones’ and a duty to 
civilize them. Ferry points to the German colonial expansion and urges the 
French to catch up, giving as an example their successful colonization of 
Algeria, where ‘piracy has been replaced by a controlled free exchange’.37 The 
press narratives in the nineteenth-century British Empire were particularly 
keen on reproducing reports of non-white men sexually assaulting women. 
In the aftermath of the Mutiny, as the American historian of the Victorian 
era Bernard Semmel noted, ‘day after day, the newspapers told stories of 
massacres of British women and children, of gruesome oriental tortures 
and mutilations, of assaults on the virtue and honour of English women’.38 
According to a researcher on mass literacy, ‘no episode in British imperial 
32 Pickering, Stereotyping, p. 49.
33 ‘They are proud and revengeful, and make war and kill each other; and among the names 
of honour given to them are ‘the adulterer’, ‘the woman-stealer’, ‘the brain-eater’’, Spencer, The 
Study of Sociology, p. 294.
34 De Gobineau, The Inequality, p. 179.
35 Said, Orientalism, p. 149.
36 Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableau historique, p. 124.
37 Ferry, ‘Discours’.
38 Ware, Beyond the Pale, p. 39.
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history raised public excitement to a higher pitch’.39 In the French humoristic 
press some of those representations emphasized the exoticism of non-white 
men: their love of music, dance, anything referring to their accrued sensual-
ity. Popular magazines, such as Le Sourire (1899-1940), La Vie Parisienne 
(1863-1970), and Fantasio (1906-1937), featured miscegenation drawings by 
famous draftsmen (Paul Colin, René Giffey, George Leonnec, etc.). In these 
aesthetically exquisite illustrations, French women were portrayed mostly 
as libertarians, lying down or relaxing, enjoying housework or light outdoor 
activities, dressed either fashionably, or as vaudeville dancers, but most 
often simply undressed. As a contrast, their non-white counterparts were 
predominantly represented with explicitly simian traits, displaying lustful 
looks, or else portrayed as playthings of excited and f lirtatious Parisian 
women.40 In one of these drawings for Rire (another French humourist 
magazine) published in 1896, a black tribesman is squatting on a severed 
body of a white woman. In the background, we can see five men representing 
European colonial enterprises. Ironically, colonialism is here portrayed as 
potentially dangerous for European populations, in case colonial transfer 
of human subjects changes its course. The change eventually ensued, due 
to shortages in the European armies.
Owing to the mass recruitment of colonial subjects during World War 
I, non-white presence in Europe led to a shift in visual representations. 
Colonial soldiers or tirailleurs (largely recruited from Sub-Saharan and 
Northern Africa) were now represented in the French, American, Brit-
ish and German press as either romantically involved with or sexually 
assaulting white women. For the sake of the post-Versailles Treaty status 
quo, some of these images strove to normalize a mixed-race couple. While 
the benign clichés, mimetically situated in the ‘white mother’ and enfant 
nègre register, are mostly draw on non-sexual supremacist undertones, the 
‘Black Shame’ iconography is dominated by sexualisation and simianiza-
tion of non-Europeans. In 1921, Guido Kreutzer published ‘Black Shame’, 
a novel defaming Black and Arab soldiers from the French troops who 
stationed in Rheinland for f ifteen years following the Versailles Treaty 
in 1918. Kreutzer’s novel contains the ‘Black Horror’s’ standard images: 
cynicism and immorality of black soldiers, rape, stigmatizing mixed-race 
individuals, a mulatto running a brothel for non-white troops f illed with 
39 Ibid., pp. 199-224.
40 It is striking to what extent these representations differ from those of unattractive, old, 
and bossy suffragettes in the Anglo-Saxon press of that period. See Lysack, Come Buy Come Buy, 
p. 142.
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white German women. The French in the ‘Black Horror’ narratives represent 
the treacherous governance and humiliation – an equivalent of the Cologne 
narratives’ ‘Wilkommenskultur’. Kreutzer’s novel depicts German women as 
a symbol of moral integrity, honour and racial purity of the German people. 
Their tortured bodies, attacked by the ‘savages’, symbolically marked the 
boundaries of the German nation and the white race, injured and violated 
by France’s ‘Black Shame’’.41 The non-white soldiers in Rheinland, often 
forcefully recruited from the colonies, were accused of ‘countless’ rapes 
and other crimes. The visual representations of Black soldiers raping white 
women multiplied in the German press in between wars. In her analysis 
of the ‘Black Shame’ discourse, Iris Wigger points out the flexibility with 
which the white female f igure was instrumentalized to racist, sexist and 
nationalist ends.42 A typical example of the animal-like rapist cliché is an 
illustration entitled ‘the Black Shame’ in the 1927 album The French in the 
Ruhr (Französen im Ruhrgebiet). The motive, common in the Black Shame 
era, depicts a simianized French soldier groping a German blonde (Figure 7). 
The caption reads: ‘the lust of the coloured man towards a white-skinned girl, 
the horror of the poor creature in the deepest distress […]. The German girl, 
a lamentable example of more than two hundred similar cases, symbolizes a 
fate threatening every white woman. Apparently, the French promised white 
women to black soldiers in exchange for their military service and victory’.
Another influential document of that era, a pamphlet written by Edmund 
D. Morel, a Labour MP and specialist on Africa, depicted colonial soldiers as 
beasts and rapists.43 While criticizing the militarism of the French, Morel 
denounced Europe’s lethargy (prefigurative of ‘silence hides violence’) that 
preordained a white female’s doom:
From the plains and forests, from the valleys and the swamps of Africa 
they brought tens of thousands of savage men, and thrusted them upon 
us. Boys, these men raped our mothers and sisters! This, neither you, nor 
we, nor they, must ever be allowed to forget.44
‘They’ are the imperial powers that be, the enemies of the people in interbel-
lum Europe. Not only did these and many other voices gain ground in the 
41 Wigger, The Black Horror, p. 85.
42 According to the Rheinland ‘Black Horror’ narrative, the white German woman ‘became a 
coherence-generating symbol for a nation and white racial community threatened by a desecra-
tion’. See: Wigger, The Black Horror, p. 128.
43 Ibid., pp. 46-52.
44 Morel, Horror of the Rhine, p. 22.
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course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century because of the 
technology of power in place, they also emerged and thrived due to the 
popular demand to denounce miscegenation as dangerous and alien to 
white Europe and the United States.45
During the Second World War, fascist propaganda posters established 
representations of Jewish and African sex offenders depicted as spiders or 
monkeys reducing them, as women themselves and lower classes are often 
‘being reduced to the very margins of humanity’.46 These images have been 
increasingly reused to spread racist and sexist memes, and they continue 
to fuel trolling rhetoric.
45 The prominent anti-miscegenation voices in the American discourse were, for instance, 
Francis Galton and Madison Grant. The latter stated in his 1916 The Passing of the Great Race 
that ‘the laws against miscegenation must be greatly extended if the higher races are to be 
maintained’. See. Grant, The passing of the great race, p. 31.
46 Hund, Racist King Kong Fantasies, p. 45.
Figure 7 “Die Schwarze Schmach!” (The Black Shame!)
französen im ruhrgebiet, 10 illustrations by a.M. cay (alexander M. kaizer). reimar Hobbing 
Verlag berlin, 1927. copied from Scientific Public library Mainz
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Civilizing mission, miscegenation and the feminist struggle
The emancipatory virtue of Christianity, brought by white female educa-
tors and missionaries, was another facet of nineteenth-century normative 
practices in the colonies. Because women were the bearers of moral goodness, 
their presence and active role was considered indispensable for the bettering 
of the ruled populations. In the French iconography of the first decades of the 
twentieth century, the ‘white women’s burden’ consists in dissuading men 
in the colonies from having sexual relations with native women, which had 
earlier been widely accepted. Visual representations deprecating métissage 
(‘miscegenation’) were part of the politics of prestige – the idea according to 
which to better govern subalterns Frenchmen must keep ‘a good distance’.47
Another aspect concerns the attitude to native men among white women 
in the colonies, and their own racism. A conflict between Isabella Mayo and 
Catherine Impey, two prominent f igures in the Anglo-American feminist 
anti-racist movement, reveals the scale of the problem. On the pages of the 
anti-racist journal ‘Fraternity’48 Mayo expressed her indignity at the news 
of Catherine Impey’s desire to marry a non-white man:
There are women who will ‘fancy’ anything which will give them a 
sensation and a little passing notoriety. […] the morbid egotists may 
only imagine that men fall in love with them’. Be it remembered that even 
this imagination, if indulged in by a ‘white woman’, regarding a ‘nigger’ 
in some of the States, would mean the death of the man, perhaps even 
more ignominious death, if he ventured to say in self-defence that the 
‘imagination’ was wholly baseless […]. For it must be noted that female 
sufferers from this diseased egotism are not necessarily young and flighty. 
They are often elderly, dowdy and disappointed.49
Mayo’s attack on Catherine Impey demonstrates to what extent the femi-
nist struggle was not to be confused with calling for racial mixing. On the 
question of race, the feminist position was thus originally in unison with 
the white patriarchy.50 Beyond civilizing mission and feminist activism, 
the function of white women overseas was to police and distract white 
47 Edwards, ‘Womanizing’, pp. 121-123.
48 The anti-racist journal published between 1888 and 1895 in Britain, later as Anti-Caste, 
established by Catherine Impey (EP).
49 Ware, Beyond the Pale, p. 195.
50 See: Newman, White Women’s Rights.
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men.51 Despite their merits in the service of the empire, the British colo-
nial narratives often represented white women as passively waiting for a 
f inal decline of the colonial status quo. At times they even jeopardize the 
practices of the colonial enterprise (although not the Empire itself) through 
their emancipatory activities. As transpires from Richard Dyer’s reading 
of a British series, The Jewel in the Crown (Granada Television 1984), white 
women in the Raj ultimately do nothing, even if some support civilizing 
mission while others strive to change things: ‘The serial’s focus is women, 
to whom it allots three narrative possibilities: doing that fails; boredom 
and bitchiness; or […] transf ixed listening and observing’, thus condoning 
the ongoing violence.52 In the end, as Dyer demonstrates through a tragic 
story of one of the characters who crossed the line and fell in love with the 
native man,53 white women take the blame and provide the spectacle of 
moral suffering, for the loss of empire’.54 These two short portrays of white 
women in British colonialism were cited to explore the challenges white 
feminists face, now and then, as agents of the imperial patriarchy implicated 
in the question of race, positing the notion of their own sexuality as part 
and parcel of their struggle.
Conclusion
The racialization of sexual practices that was established in the nineteenth 
century is historically specif ic and ought to be historicized in its own right. 
However, re-enacting the seemingly redundant clichés has been a dominant 
51 Dyer divides the activities of white women in British colonies into two categories: imperialist 
and feminist. The f irst category generated a positive f igure of white women doing missionary 
work and giving example of moral ref inement (civilising mission) and a negative image of them 
being even more snobbish, more cruel to the natives than men, and while morally repressive, 
often adulterous (presumably due to boredom and heat). The second, feminist, is character-
ized by both the critique of racism and encouraging female independence. See: Dyer, White, 
pp. 184-187.
52 Ibid., p. 196.
53 Among the series’ many characters who represent either the imperialist or the feminist 
type, is Daphne who questions the enterprise itself by opposing to anti-miscegenation laws, 
for which both she and her Indian lover are severely punished. The ‘pandora’s box’ of racial 
transgression opened by Daphne according to another character (Lady Chaterjee), is used as 
an overarching metaphor for the fall of the British rule. Dyer concludes: ‘The British withdraw 
because they have failed; and they have failed because of their women, who have weakened 
the fabric of empire with both their sexuality and their questioning of the enterprise’. Ibid., 
p. 199.
54 Ibid., p. 206.
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strategy in the recent instances of online racist and sexist violence. Today’s 
Far Right sustains the decline narrative in that it denounces the media and 
political establishment for concealing the truth of an ongoing ‘epidemic’ 
of ‘Islamization’ and ‘bastardization’ of Europe from its population. The 
struggle of Alt-Right trolls to uphold white supremacy relies on the in-
strumentalization of the image of white women as endangered by violent 
multiculturalism embodied in the invasion of lecherous non-white men. 
Trolls after New Year’s Eve in Cologne acted as protectors of white women 
and simultaneously accused the ‘traitors’ among them of facilitating violence 
by their permissive approach to the influx of refugees in 2015. On the one 
hand their discourse resonates with the pseudo-scientif ic claims made in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Yet, it has also been endorsed 
by public f igures who usually identify as anti-racist (certain intellectuals 
and feminists). It is arguable that the politics of representation – practised 
in the pre-digitalization era, as well as the one emerging from online con-
flicts described above – has a factual social impact (see Chapter 5). Yet, the 
articulation of racist and sexist memes after Cologne and some feminist 
reactions to the events definitely bring forth ‘some uncomfortable questions 
about feminism’.55 The above analyses of some particularly popular images 
and narratives that pointed to racial origins of sexual deviancy in the past, 
reveal the reiterative quality of today’s far-right argumentation. Moreover, 
the ties between established scientif ic discourses, intellectual debates and 
racist trolling – now and back then – signal the possibility for racializing 
gaze to flourish far beyond the political scope of the Far Right.
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6 The Case of Telefilm De Punt’s Online 
Discussion Forum




The Dutch direct-to-TV feature f ilm De Punt (2009) was aimed at instigat-
ing public discussions about the collective memory of a train hijacking in 
the village De Punt, which was carried out by second generation Dutch-
Moluccans, a postcolonial migrant community in the Netherlands. The 
f ilmmakers created an online discussion forum as an accompaniment to 
the f ilm, in which viewers were invited to participate directly in discus-
sions about the hijacking itself, as well as the role of the state in ending it, 
and the larger postcolonial context of the action. This chapter is aimed at 
contributing to this volume’s central questions concerning online violence, 
by providing a comparative analysis between the f ilm itself and the debate 
culture on the online forum, in which the latter will be critically assessed 
in terms of its intrinsic, polarizing structure.
Keywords: colonial memory, Dutch-Moluccan community, online discus-
sion forum, group polarization, train hijacking De Punt
In what follows, I will discuss an online discussion forum that was designed 
to invite debate about Dutch postcolonial society. The website was active 
in 2009, and was an accompanying feature of telef ilm De Punt.1 Telef ilms, 
according to their website (https://telef ilm.cobofonds.nl/over-telef ilm/), 
1 Smitsman, De Punt.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
doi: 10.5117/9789462989481_ch06
132 gerloV Van engelenHoVen 
‘are Dutch direct-to-TV feature f ilms that discuss current societal themes’.2 
Since their inception in 1999, six f ilms have been released every year. De Punt 
and its accompanying online discussion forum were aimed at encouraging 
discussions about the Dutch collective memory of a train hijacking in 
the village De Punt, which was carried out by second generation Dutch-
Moluccans, a postcolonial migrant community in the Netherlands (currently 
around 50,000 people).3 The hijacking was a radical protest against their 
disadvantaged position in Dutch society, took 20 days, and ended when 
the military intervened, which resulted in the deaths of six hijackers and 
two hostages.
The main question to be explored concerns the structural limitations 
of an online forum as a space for societal debate. By analyzing the way in 
which the hijacking was remembered and discussed on De Punt ’s online 
forum, as compared to the telef ilm itself, my aim is to critically assess the 
participatory reach and productive potential of online discussions. As such, 
this text to some extent recalls (and bases itself on the resource material 
of) Randi Marselis’s article ‘Remembering Dutch-Moluccan radicalism: 
Memory politics and historical event television’ (2016). Marselis argues 
in favour of the discussion forum, because to her it was an example of the 
‘participatory culture of digital media […], where viewers can voice opposing 
interpretations and express their own memory work’.4 With this point of 
view, she refers to a common interpretation of the internet as possessing the 
promise of a participatory culture (a term coined by media scholar Henry 
Jenkins),5 that encourages internet users’ productive participation in society, 
in this case by actively debating shared colonial memory.
My intent, however, is to take a less optimistic standpoint regarding 
the participatory effects of online discussion forums. I will study to what 
extent De Punt’s online forum perpetuated and perhaps amplif ied the group 
polarization of opinions that is frequently seen in public discourses about the 
hijacking. I owe my definition of the concept of group polarization to legal 
scholar Cass R. Sunstein (2008), who argues that ‘[it] means that members 
of a deliberating group predictably move toward more extreme points in 
the direction indicated by the members’ pre-deliberation tendencies’.6 
2 ‘Telef ilms zijn Nederlandse speelf ilms die speciaal gemaakt zijn voor televisie, en die 
actuele maatschappelijke thema’s behandelen.’ All translations from Dutch are mine, except 
those taken from Marselis’ article.
3 Fridus Steijlen (Algemeen Dagblad, 9 February 2018).
4 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 214.
5 See for example: Jenkins, Confronting the Challenges.
6 Sunstein, ‘The Law’, p. 81.
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According to Sunstein, online violence is a particularly hostile escalation 
of such group polarization, which occurs when ‘diverse social groups are 
led, through predictable mechanisms, toward increasingly opposing and 
ever more extreme views’.7 The case study of the Moluccan hijackings will 
follow this emphasis on predictable mechanisms, in that it will study the 
quality of De Punt ’s online discussions as a matter of what Sunstein calls 
‘the architecture of the Internet’.8 As such, this text does not directly discuss 
online violence, but is rather aimed at exploring the structural limitations 
of one of the spaces that enables it, i.e. the discussion forum.
I will develop this argument through a comparative analysis of the 
online forum with the f ilm itself. The f irst step, however, will be to give 
an overview of the Dutch-Moluccan community’s migration history and 
the polarizing effects that the hijacking had on the way Dutch society 
perceives them.
Historical context of the Moluccan migration leading up to the 
hijacking
Moluccans originate from the eastern Indonesian province Maluku. During 
the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949), they took the side of the 
Dutch colonizers against the Indonesian nationalists, because they had 
hopes that the Dutch would help them establish an independent state: the 
rms (Republik Maluku Selatan: ‘South-Moluccan Republic’). The state was to 
be independent from Indonesia, and independent from (although allied to) 
the Netherlands. This hope was based on a more than three-centuries-long 
history of Moluccan social and political privilege above other Indonesian 
ethnic groups.9 This privilege was the result of the importance of the 
Moluccan territory for Dutch colonialism. Maluku was the centre of the spice 
trade on which the Dutch trading company voc (Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie: ‘Dutch East India Company’) held the monopoly. The spice 
monopoly was an important reason for the strength of the Dutch colonial 
empire and brought it considerable wealth in the 1600s, a century which 
national history still refers to as the Golden Age.
7 Ibid., p. 90 [my italics].
8 Ibid.
9 Chauvel, Nationalist, p. 41. Richard Chauvel’s book provides a comprehensive account of 
how the history of Moluccan privilege led to their ideology of separatism, which was part of the 
cause for their migration.
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Indonesia became independent in 1949, initially as a federal state 
system (United States of Indonesia) that allowed provinces the right to 
self-determination. However, the new government rapidly worked toward 
a unitary Republic of Indonesia, leading to violent confrontations between 
Indonesian nationalists and Moluccan separatists. Because the Moluccan 
soldiers were off icially still part of the Dutch army, the Dutch government 
was by law required to protect them. For this reason, they brought most 
Moluccan soldiers and their families to the Netherlands in 1951-1953 (around 
12,500 migrants in total). Upon arrival, the Moluccan soldiers were fired from 
the army, and they were sent to camps in remote places, some of which had 
served during the Second World War as Durchgangslager: i.e. Nazi camps 
used as transit locations for prisoners before their deportation to Germany. 
The Moluccan camp in Dutch city Vught had served as a Konzentrationslager 
(i.e. a concentration camp). The reason for this isolation from Dutch society 
was that their residence in the Netherlands was supposed to be temporary: 
the original planning was for a period of six months. In the 1960s and 1970s 
most Moluccans were relocated to newly built, segregated neighbourhoods 
in the margins of cities, where many Moluccans still live today. Throughout 
these years the Moluccan dependence on the state was reduced gradually 
until they received citizenship in 1976, 25 years after the f irst Moluccans 
had arrived.
From the mid-1960s, a portion of the community’s second generation 
sought violent means to protest their continued marginalization by the 
Dutch government. They had perceived the slow retraction of Dutch 
support for their residence, and the increasing unlikelihood of their return 
to Maluku, as a systematic denial of responsibility from the side of the 
government. The hijacking at De Punt, which is the focus of the current 
case study, was one of the f inal actions in a longer history of attacks 
between 1966 and 1978.10 On 23 May 1977, a group of nine Moluccan youths 
10 1966: attempt to set f ire to the Indonesian embassy in The Hague;
1970: occupation of the residence of the Indonesian ambassador in Wassenaar (one Dutch 
person dead);
1975: attempt to take the Queen hostage;
1975: f irst train hijacking in Wijster (three Dutch people dead);
1975: occupation of the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam (one Dutch person dead);
1977: second train hijacking in De Punt (six Moluccans and two hostages dead, all killed by 
the military);
1977: occupation of a primary school in Bovensmilde;
1978: occupation of a province house in Assen (two Dutch people dead).
Total deaths: f ifteen, of which seven Dutch people by Moluccans, six Moluccans by the military, 
and two hostages by the military (accidentally).
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hijacked the train, and took 54 passengers hostage. The action was meant 
to re-draw attention to the Moluccan ideology of independence, and to 
demand that those who were involved in a previous hijacking in 1975 be 
released from prison. After twenty days of unsuccessful negotiations, a 
special task force of marines surrounded the train and ended the hijacking 
violently, killing six of the hijackers. They also accidentally killed two 
hostages. The three surviving hijackers were charged with six to nine 
years in prison.
The Moluccan actions have been remembered in many cultural and 
media representations since, and the hijacking at De Punt more than the 
other actions. The event has featured in literature: both f iction11 and non-
fiction.12 A four-part television documentary about it, Dutch Approach, was 
released in 2000. Telef ilms were released for both hijackings,13 of which 
De Punt ‘became the most seen telef ilm in the ten years this concept had 
been running, which indicated that the theme of the f ilm was not only 
important to the Dutch-Moluccan community but had broader national 
interest’.14 A 2017 article of national news channel nos remarks that ‘it has 
been almost forty years, but the train hijacking at De Punt still reappears 
in the news on an almost yearly basis’.15 The action’s lasting public impact 
was possibly a result of the action headlining the national media for three 
weeks, as well as the televised live report of the military intervention. The 
violence of this intervention furthered the controversy of the event, which 
until today is unresolved. A new ongoing investigation began in 2014, when 
the killed hijackers’ next of kin started a lawsuit against the Dutch state, 
accusing them of having approved the use of disproportionate violence by 
the military.
The continued presence of the hijacking in cultural and journalistic 
representations shows the event’s impact on Dutch society and the ongoing 
need to further process this collective memory. The next part of this case 
study analysis will explore some of the prominent ways in which Dutch 
society remembers and interprets the hijacking.
11 For example Scholten, Morgenster; Dam, Dood Spoor; Pessireron, Gesloten Koffers.
12 For example Barker, Not Here; Westerman, Een Woord Een Woord.
13 Oest, Wijster; Smitsman, De Punt.
14 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 206.
15 ‘Het is alweer bijna veertig jaar geleden en nog steeds komt de treinkaping bij De Punt bijna 
jaarlijks in het nieuws’.
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Victims and perpetrators: Polarized interpretations of the hijacking
The hijackings caused a shift in the way in which Moluccans were generally 
perceived in the Netherlands. In his article about the hijacking’s effects on 
the Dutch-Moluccan community and their position in Dutch society (1986), 
anthropologist Dieter Bartels argues that the actions triggered
widespread abuse by Dutch civilians and indiscriminate actions by the 
police against younger Moluccans […] countrywide. […]. The immediate 
repercussions ranged from Dutch civilians cursing Moluccans on the 
streets to police harassing young Moluccans or anybody who faintly 
resembled them […]. A more long-term effect resulted from stereotyping 
Moluccans as violence-prone, leading to widespread discrimination, 
particularly on the labour market.16
The stereotype of Moluccans as violent indicates one of two directions 
in which the hijackings polarized public opinion about them. This f irst 
direction regards them as perpetrators, the other as victims. As perpetrators, 
they are interpreted as aggressors, who took innocent bystanders hostage 
for an unreasonable cause. As victims, they are interpreted as marginal-
ized postcolonial subjects, who were driven to despair as a result of their 
systematic mistreatment by the government.
The latter interpretation was to a great extent encouraged by publications 
appearing at the time on the role which the Dutch had played in their 
colonies during the last decades before independence. In 1969 a government-
initiated investigation into archive material about the independence war 
led to what was called the Excessennota (‘Note of Excesses’): i.e. a research 
report that made public a long list of war crimes committed by Dutch soldiers 
during this war. The Excessennota inspired many further reconsiderations of 
the recent colonial past. Most prominently, war veterans J.A.A. van Doorn 
and W.J. Hendrix released a large amount of details about the systematic 
cruelty of the Dutch army during decolonization in their book Ontsporing 
van geweld (‘Derailment of Violence’, 1970). These are examples of a Dutch 
self-critical perspective that was developing in public opinion on colonial 
memory around the time of the hijackings. They form an indication of the 
context that enabled a general interpretation of the Moluccans as victims 
of severe mismanagement from the side of the Dutch government during 
and directly after decolonization.
16 Bartels, ‘Can the Train Ever Be Stopped’, p. 35 [my italics].
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This interpretation is further strengthened by the fact that the hijackers 
had not killed any hostages, whereas the military intervention caused eight 
deaths, including those of two hostages. The investigation that started in 2014 
has released new controversial material to the court and the press, including 
tapes of recording devices that were placed under the train, which seem 
to indicate that the soldiers were also shooting at unarmed hijackers. The 
uncovering of such details has led to renewed discussions in traditional and 
social media about the position of Moluccans in society. These new discussions 
have perpetuated the polarization of public opinion about the hijacking. 
Fridus Steijlen, Professor of Moluccan Migration and Culture in Comparative 
Perspective, argued in a 2018 interview with the national press that the lawsuit 
is ‘reducing the discussion to a case study about perpetrators and victims’.17
According to sociologist Bernard Giesen (2004), this f ixation on perpetra-
tors and victims is common for a society that is dealing with the memory of 
disruptive events. He argues that the two archetypes appear as the result of ‘a 
social construction [that is] carried by a moral community defining an evil’.18 
This argument informs the relevance of Giesen’s theory for the current case 
study: i.e. victims and perpetrators do not construct themselves. Instead, their 
construction is in the hands of what he calls ‘the public perspective’, which acts 
as a ‘universalist moral discourse that aims at impartiality and justice’, and 
which is ‘at a certain distance from the victims, as well as from the perpetra-
tors’.19 Giesen locates this public perspective in different institutional arenas:
The public perspective can be based on the authority of […] intellectuals, or 
judges or it can just refer to the majority of impartial spectators. It can be 
constructed in the discourse of civil society, articulated in literature and art, 
or brought forward by the response of the common people on the streets.20
These discourses work together to establish the moral boundaries of society, 
by defining deviations from its norms: ‘the moral community needs deviance 
and perpetrators in order to construct the boundary between the good and 
the evil’.21
Giesen’s theory provides an explanation for why these polarized interpreta-
tions occur. The hijacking, as the climax of a longer history of radical attacks 
17 ‘De rechtszaak verengt de discussie tot een casus van daders en slachtoffers’.
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on Dutch society, forced the reconsideration of a fragile element of Dutch 
collective identity: i.e. colonial memory. This reconsideration has repeatedly 
re-appeared into public consciousness since: through public discussions taking 
place in some of the institutional arenas that Giesen mentions; through the 
ever-expanding list of cultural and journalistic accounts of the event; and most 
recently, through the lawsuit. To re-stabilize itself in such situations, society 
has to re-determine questions of right and wrong, and decide on matters of 
responsibility and justice. By interpreting the hijackers as perpetrators, they 
are held responsible for their actions. By interpreting them as victims, their 
actions are seen as a desperate attempt to gain attention for their treatment 
as exiles by the government on arrival and ever since, despite their history 
of loyalty to the Dutch empire. In the latter case, major responsibility is 
located on the side of the state. In both cases, the hijackers are regarded as 
deviants who have lost their place as full members of the moral community: 
‘the moral community constitutes its basic tension and its fringe of restricted 
membership mainly by pointing to victims and perpetrators’.22
The purpose of the analysis thus far was to establish the reasons be-
hind the polarized public interpretations of the hijackers as victims or 
perpetrators. The next step is to use these considerations as the basis for 
a close-reading of some of the contributions on the f ilm’s online forum, in 
order to study the kind of public debate which this platform encouraged.
De Punt’s online discussion forum: A platform for further 
polarization
At the end of the f ilm, a text appears on-screen, inviting the viewers to visit 
the accompanying online forum, in order to engage in further discussion 
about the topic: ‘Would you like to respond? Go to www.eo.nl/depunt.’23 In 
her article, in which she analyzes the 363 comments that were posted on 
the day of the f ilm’s premiere, Marselis observes that recurring themes of 
the online debate were:
the perceived degree of realism of the f ilm, personal memories of the 
situation in the 1970s, whether the military ending of the action was 
justif iable or not, wider references to postcolonial politics and so on.24
22 Ibid., p. 53.
23 ‘Wilt u reageren? Ga naar www.eo.nl/depunt’.
24 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 209.
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Especially the question concerning the degree of justification of the hijacking 
itself, as well as the state’s response to it, were discussed at length: most of 
the other elements mentioned served to support this central question about 
justice. This interest corresponds to great extent to Giesen’s argument that 
in the aftermath of a collective trauma, society feels the need to determine 
matters of responsibility and justice by identifying victims and perpetrators. 
Marselis mentions many forum posts accused the f ilm of attempting ‘to turn 
the moral positions of perpetrators and victims upside down’.25
According to some discussants, the f ilm’s approach ‘downplayed the 
radicalism of the young Moluccans’, while others protested the f ilm’s (al-
leged) intention to ‘make the Moluccans the victims of the events’, something 
that was at times even identif ied as ‘part of a broader tendency in Dutch 
society’.26 Marselis quotes one post that provides an apt indication of 
this polarizing element of the online discussion: ‘What a terrible shame 
that we the Dutch always seem to be masters at making perpetrators into 
victims’.27 Alternatively, there were also voices taking up the opposite 
opinion. For example, one discussant declared to be ‘ashamed of the way 
the Netherlands have treated our Moluccan fellow creatures [sic]. [These] 
people have been treated like old trash’. Another argued that ‘[a] people, 
who have been so loyal to us in diff icult times, should not be left alone with 
this pain and these wounds’.28
The above citations were all from Dutch participants, but Marselis also 
discusses Dutch-Moluccan responses. The latter often drew upon the so-
called injustice frame, a phenomenon that was ‘found by Beatrice de Graaf 
in her interviews with the radicalized Moluccans’ and which states that 
‘the Dutch government left the Moluccan minority in the cold, ignored 
their struggle for independence and gave them false promises’. According to 
Marselis, the injustice frame was most tangible in the ‘[n]umerous postings 
[that] called for an off icial apology from the Dutch government […]’.29 This 
points towards a Dutch-Moluccan inclination to sketch the government as 
being responsible for the trauma. This inclination was further communicated 
by discussants pointing towards ‘the role of the Dutch during colonialism, 
[as well as] Dutch postcolonial politics in regard to the Moluccan soldier 
families and a free Moluccan republic’.30
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With Dutch discussants interpreting Moluccans as either victims or 
perpetrators, and Moluccan responses pointing towards the responsibility 
of the government, the forum’s content can be interpreted as predominantly 
polarized. This polarization furthermore gained an ethnic element, because 
of the forum’s protocol to ask discussants to state ‘their afkomst (‘origin’), 
[which] meant that many participants categorized themselves in terms of 
ethnic or national belongings’, and which leads Marselis to conclude that the 
web debate served as the platform for ‘a cultural encounter between people of 
Dutch-Moluccan and of Dutch majority background’.31 With this requirement, 
the forum reduced the discussion to a conflict between two ethnic groups.
In short, the forum to a great extent furthered the polarization which 
the previous section identif ied as a main characteristic of public debates 
about the hijacking. Despite its aimed function as a platform for participa-
tory societal debate, the forum to great extent reduced the discussion to a 
back-and-forth between polarized opposites: guilty and innocent, victim 
and perpetrator, Dutch and Moluccan. This part of the analysis was aimed at 
pointing out the polarizing tendencies of De Punt’s online discussion forum. 
By way of comparison, the next step is to shift the focus from the forum to 
the f ilm itself, and to provide close-readings of some of its central scenes. 
The aim of this comparison is to see to what extent the f ilm achieves what 
the online forum could not, i.e. to bring nuance to the group polarization 
that is characteristic of public perspectives on the event.
De Punt’s fictive discourse: Complicating the possibility of 
polarization
Telefilm De Punt presents a story around a fictional talk show called Met andere 
ogen (‘With Other Eyes’), for which several people are invited that were involved 
with the hijacking: a surviving hijacker, the father of a killed hijacker, a hostage, 
a marine who was part of the special task force that ended the hijacking, and 
former Minister of Justice Dries van Agt, who had sanctioned the task force. 
These guests are all portrayed by actors, but are based on real people. Over a 
sequence of images that one by one introduce the main characters, a voice-over 
reads out the invitation letter which they all received from the television station:
For our television programme about Moluccans in the Netherlands, we 
would like to dedicate some time discussing the train hijacking in De 
31 Ibid., p. 208.
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Punt. [The hijacking] made history not only as a result of its violence, but 
also because of the involvement of a female hijacker, Noor Pattipamena. 
[…] Very little is known about this woman, who was probably the f irst 
female terrorist in the Netherlands. Together with you and four other 
guests, we want to try to give her a face.32
With this approach, the f ilm frames the hijacking as an event that is 
remembered differently by different parties. Every invited guest func-
tions as a synecdoche for one of these parties, i.e. each of them represents 
one of the groups that were involved in the hijacking. The former hostage 
represents the hostages; the marine represents those who were part of the 
special task force; Van Agt represents the government at the time; former 
hijacker Koen Manuputty represents the hijackers. The father of the deceased 
hijacker, i.e. Noor Pattipamena, is depicted as being in an ongoing conflict 
with Koen Manuputty, who was not only the leader of the action, but also 
Pattipamena’s boyfriend. The father disapproved of their relationship and 
blames Manuputty for his daughter’s death. This conflict is shown mostly 
in flashbacks, but also comes out briefly during the talk show. As such, the 
conflict can be interpreted as a reminder that the hijacking caused a rift 
within the Dutch-Moluccan community, between those who supported and 
those who decried the action. The father, as a representative of the latter, 
opens up the possibility for viewers to consider the lasting, painful effects 
which the action has had on them.
These lasting effects, f inally, are represented by the late Noor Pattipamena 
herself, whose absence precipitates the complicated conversations that happen 
between the other characters. These conversations are further provided with 
a sense of urgency due to the film’s choice to have cast all characters, except 
former Minister Van Agt, as being personally related to Pattipamena. Apart 
from her father, and her boyfriend and co-conspirator, the other guests are 
the marine who killed her (which in the film is depicted as an accident in the 
midst of the chaos), and the hostage who became friends with Pattipamena 
during the hijacking and in whose arms she died (the latter element is not 
based in reality). Because her story is singled out and developed only in the 
form of flashbacks and personal memories narrated by the other characters, 
32 ‘In het kader van een tv-programma over Molukkers in Nederland willen wij aandacht 
besteden aan de treinkaping bij De Punt. [De kaping] maakte niet alleen geschiedenis door 
de gewelddadige aanval maar ook door de aanwezigheid van een vrouwelijke kaper, Noor Pat-
tipamena. […] Slechts weinig is bekend over deze vrouw die waarschijnlijk de eerste vrouwelijke 
terrorist in Nederland was. Samen met u en vier andere gasten die destijds nauw bij haar en bij 
de actie betrokken waren willen wij proberen haar een gezicht te geven.’
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Pattipamena functions as a symbol for the hijacking’s tragic and unresolved 
aftermath. This function is further strengthened by the fact that Pattipamena 
is based on a real person: the group of hijackers indeed included one female 
activist, by the name of Hansina Uktolseja. Her death is currently under 
investigation, because it is now assumed that she was killed despite being 
unarmed during the military intervention. As such, the lack of closure which 
her absence in the film’s talk show represents, is a direct reference to a real-life 
lack of closure, i.e. the uncertainty about the circumstances of Uktolseja’s death.
Despite the emphasis on Pattipamena’s absence, one of the talk show’s main 
aims, and by extension that of the film, is ‘to give her a face’, as was expressed 
in the letter which all invited guests received. This aim is pursued by staging 
her as the central topic of the other characters’ conversations, accompanied by 
frequent flashbacks from before and during the hijackings, in most of which 
she plays a leading role. In these flashbacks, Pattipamena is often the one 
who urges her co-conspirators not to use violence against the hostages. When 
another hijacker argues in favour of violence (‘we have nothing to lose’),33 
she retorts ‘we have everything to lose: not only the action, but also who we 
are. […] No victims, that was the agreement’.34 Therefore, these flashbacks 
provide her not only with a face, but also with a voice, which she mostly uses 
to speak out against violence and in favour of more humane strategies of 
protest. These practices of giving her a face and a voice complicate her and the 
other hijackers’ interpretations as one-dimensional victims or perpetrators, 
who according to Giesen, ‘have no face, no voice […], they are numbed and 
muted, displaced and uprooted’ (53). The subjectivity which the hijackers 
lack in such polarized interpretations, is to some degree restored in the film.
Not only Pattipamen receives a degree of subjectivity: the same applies 
to the other guests, and by extension the parties they represent. By bringing 
all these parties into view, by giving them all a voice, and by staging a 
conversation between them that never happened in reality, (although it 
could happen), the f ilm invites viewers to place themselves in the positions 
of these parties one by one and thereby to realize the complexity of the 
situation. Literary theorists Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan and Richard 
Walsh (2015) call this practice fictive discourse:
Fictive discourse […] invents or imagines states of affairs in order to 
accomplish some purpose(s) within its particular context. Those purposes 
33 ‘Wat hebben wij te verliezen?’.
34 ‘Semua (‘alles’). Niet alleen de actie, maar ook wie we zijn. […] Geen slachtoffers, dat was 
de afspraak.’
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can vary widely – sometimes f ictive discourse is a strategy for generating 
a fresh perspective; sometimes it is an implicit argument for change 
[…]. In this respect, f ictive discourse is […] a means for negotiating an 
engagement with [the] world.35
Through this approach the f ilm complicates the polarized public interpreta-
tions which were discussed in the previous parts of this case study analysis. 
All guests, and by extension the parties they represent, are provided with 
emotional and ideological context, all of them are granted a face and a voice 
with which they can motivate their actions and negotiate their positions 
amongst each other.
The nuance that is thus offered extends to the f ilm’s depiction of the 
government as well. During flashbacks of political deliberation about the 
hijackings, Van Agt is depicted as someone who is torn between two sides. In 
his capacity as the Minister of Justice, he has to make decisions about what 
measures to take against the hijackers, whereas on the personal level, he is 
not at all feeling certain about these decisions. His portrayal as a reluctant 
mediator between his colleagues’ opposing opinions about the issue at hand, 
urges viewers to consider that the government’s involvement in the event is 
at least as complicated and internally conflictive as that of the other parties 
involved. Their sanctioning of the military intervention was the result of a 
group of people debating matters of life and death under time pressure and 
making decisions based on majority votes. This means that ‘the government’ 
as a body cannot be held unanimously responsible for the hijacking’s ending, 
because individual people involved in the decision-making process might 
have opposed the measures that were eventually agreed upon.
This part of the case study was meant to explore how De Punt, unlike 
the accompanying online forum, achieves a degree of nuance with regard 
to the way it remembers and discusses the hijackings and their aftermath. 
Rather than trying to identify victims and perpetrators, the f ilm uses f ictive 
discourse in order to suggest that there were more than just two parties 
involved, and that all of these parties’ perspectives on the hijacking are 
worth considering. A preliminary conclusion that can be drawn here is 
that the f ilm, despite lacking the online forum’s possibility of interactive 
participation, still seems to be a more suitable medium for breaking down 
the rigid polarization common in public perceptions of the hijacking. The 
next step is to discuss the implications of this conclusion, with regard to 
the perceived effectiveness of online discussion.
35 Nielsen, et al., ‘Ten Theses’, p. 63.
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An echo chamber for the polemical few
Marselis sees the online forum as a step towards ‘more inclusive memory 
cultures, where national collective memories make room for individualized 
and minoritarian voices and where opposing interpretations may coexist’.36 
Within the context of the f indings that were presented in the previous 
sections, this argument requires further scrutiny. During her discussion of 
preliminary considerations about the forum posts, Marselis states:
Obviously, the viewers who took up the invitation to respond and debate 
were not representative of all viewers. Rather, the comments were posted 
by viewers who had been especially moved by the telefilm, were especially 
positive towards or angry about it or already had a special interest in this 
part of Dutch, postcolonial history.37
What can be taken away from this consideration is that the contributors to 
this online discussion were viewers who had pre-existing reasons to voice 
their opinion about the topic. Correspondingly, Sunstein argues that the 
internet’s influence on public debate is often
one of fragmentation, with certain people hearing more and louder ver-
sions of their own pre-existing commitments, thus reducing the benefits 
that come from exposure to competing views and unnoticed problems.38
In other words, a space that allows a plurality of voices does not automatically 
lead to a productive discussion. Marselis points this out as well, when she argues 
that ‘user-generated comments have strength in terms of spontaneity although 
they may be lacking in terms of complexity’.39 A collection of intuitive, unfiltered 
comments therefore does not necessarily become a productive conversation, 
but could instead become an echo chamber for recurring, polarized voices.
In his article, Sunstein criticizes this, to him, unconvincing general 
predilection for ‘spontaneous’ public deliberation, by asking:
Why deliberate? [Those] who emphasize the ideals associated with delib-
erative democracy tend to emphasize its preconditions, which include 
36 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 211
37 Ibid., p. 208.
38 Sunstein, ‘The Law’, p. 89.
39 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 208.
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political equality, absence of strategic behaviour, full information, and the 
goal of ‘reaching understanding’. In real-world deliberations, behaviour 
is often strategic, and equality is often absent in one or another form.40
This argument is a critical reminder that optimistic theories about the 
productive possibilities of the internet as a ‘horizontal’, participatory space, 
often seem to be based on the assumed possibility of a neutral starting point, 
devoid of pre-existing power relations that influence participation into 
specif ic directions. The online forum’s contributions that were discussed 
previously showed that Dutch participants had a tendency to interpret the 
hijackers as either victims or perpetrators, while Moluccans tended to blame 
the government for the role they played during the migration, as well as 
during the colonial era at large. These tendencies are hardly surprising when 
taking into account the wider context of the public debate and the power 
dynamics in place. Not only was the hijacking to some extent a symptom 
of a colonially marked, historically controversial ethnic divide between 
Dutch and Moluccans, it also further escalated this divide. Because the 
hijackers were Moluccans, and the state they addressed their attack to was 
the Dutch state, there were pre-existing differences in place between the 
social and political positions of the forum’s participants, which influenced 
the content of their debate. 
Sunstein alludes to this common presence of unequal starting positions in 
public debate, when he argues that ‘deliberation predictably pushes groups 
toward a more extreme point in the direction of their original tendency’, 
which leads him to emphasize ‘the importance of paying far more atten-
tion to the circumstances […] of deliberation’.41 The circumstances of the 
online forum, for example, included the requirement for contributors to 
state their ethnic belonging, i.e. something which Sunstein directly argues 
against: ‘when the context emphasizes each person’s membership in the 
social group engaging in deliberation, polarization increases’.42 The point 
here is not so much to argue that the discussion’s focus on ethnicity was 
purely produced by the structure of the forum: given the issue at hand, 
it is quite likely that contributors would have identif ied with one or the 
other ethnicity in any case. Instead, the argument concerns the question 
of the forum’s responsibility to try to prevent, rather than strengthen, such 
patterns of stratif ication. ‘In this light’, says Sunstein, ‘a system of checks 
40 Sunstein, ‘The Law’, p. 91 [italics in original].
41 Sunstein, ‘The Law’, p. 81-82 [my italics].
42 Ibid., p. 85.
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and balances might be defended, not as an undemocratic check on the 
will of the people, but as an effort to protect against potentially harmful 
consequences of group discussion’.43 A thought-experiment, for instance, 
would be to hypothesize what would have happened to the discussions if 
the forum would have disallowed the possibility of stating one’s ethnicity.
These considerations indicate that one of the major weaknesses of online 
discussion platforms is exactly the lack of moderation which proponents of 
the internet’s participatory culture so strongly favour. This observation corre-
sponds to Sunstein’s argument that creating the possibility of non-polarizing 
deliberation is a matter of ‘institutional design’ (90). As he argues, because 
‘small groups of deliberators have relatively clear antecedent tendencies 
in one or another direction’, they could benef it from the participation of 
‘moderators, trained to make sure that no one dominates the discussion, to 
ensure general participation, and to ensure a level of openness likely to alter 
some of the dynamics discussed here’.44 This appeal to a stronger monitored 
form of deliberation can be supported by considering Marselis’s observation 
about the forum’s general lack of ‘aggressive or coarse language’.45 In her 
conclusion, she explains this fact as follows:
The tone of the debate was remarkably sober compared to other recent 
studies of user-generated comments discussing collective memory on 
YouTube, which has been described as having a harsh debate culture. 
Commenting on the website of a public service broadcaster might have 
framed the debate about De Punt so that users showed each other respect.46
Another reason she sees for the form’s respectful tone is that the forum was 
‘influenced by the inclusive memory culture proposed by the f ilmmakers’.47
The argument here is that, unlike similar discussions on YouTube, the 
forum’s discussion was guided by certain external factors, that prevented 
the platform from becoming a participatory free-for-all. These factors, i.e. 
the contextualization of the forum within a public service broadcaster, and 
as an accompanying feature to a f ilm aimed at providing nuance to the topic 
at hand, could also very well be the main reason that, in Marselis’s words, 
‘the user-generated reactions turned into a fruitful debate that showed 
43 Ibid., p. 93.
44 Ibid., p. 97-98.
45 Marselis, ‘Remembering’, p. 208.
46 Ibid., p. 214.
47 Ibid.
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some degree of reconciliation’.48 Marselis is referring to those discussants 
that responded more or less in correspondence to the nuance which the 
f ilm had originally intended. For example, she cites one discussant as 
arguing that the f ilm ‘shows that reality is more complex than a simple 
distinction between good and bad or perpetrator and victim’.49 However, 
such responses mostly adhered directly to the f ilm, typically mentioning 
‘how touched they had been by the f ilm and their appreciation for seeing 
the event from different perspectives’.50 For that reason, such reconciliation 
is at best a reference to the achievements of the f ilm, rather than to those 
of the forum.
Moreover, even when a reconciliation is reached between several partici-
pants of a localized internet discussion, one could wonder what significance 
this has for the larger societal debate. After the forum discussions of this 
case study took place in 2009, the topic has been discussed on many other 
online platforms as well, especially since the 2014 lawsuit started. Further 
analysis of such more recent discussions would show that polarized opinion, 
including conflicts about the determination of victims and perpetrators, 
are as common as before, and very little signs of a more informed approach 
towards colonial memory can be observed. In some cases, especially those 
that come closest to the non-moderated structure which Sunstein argues 
against, the practice of identifying victims and perpetrators happens in 
more directly violent ways as compared to the respectful character of the 
discussions of De Punt ’s forum.
A 2014 article on the right-wing, predominantly nationalist-oriented 
news website GeenStijl may serve as an indication for such violence.51 The 
article was in response to the news that the hijackers’ next of kin had sued 
the state, accusing them of having approved disproportionate violence. The 
article describes the indictment as ‘the ceaseless whining of the Moluccan 
hijackers’ next of kin, who, 37 years after the fact, come crawling from all 




51 For a more detailed description of GeenStijl, see Frans-Willem Korsten’s contribution to this 
volume: ‘[Geenstijl] literally means ‘Nostyle’; it is a pun that might be translated as Badform. 
Dumpert, connotes the English ‘to dump’. Both were (and still are, November 2018) platforms 
of TMG Digital, part of the Telegraaf Media Group – part of an off icial right-wing media group, 
that is, with a turnover of 35 million Euros. Despite its being part of a journalistically oriented 
media group the subtitle on the GeenStijl site perverts any journalistic attitude in stating: 
‘insinuating, unfounded and needlessly offensive’.
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11 June 1977 from the perspective of their victim roles’ (20 November 2014).52 
The article’s webpage features a large amount of responses that are all 
outspokenly in agreement with it. One contributor responded: ‘Yet another 
group of lost cases cast in the role of victims. If only they would stop whining 
to their offspring about their ‘beautiful’ land of origin, there would be less 
collateral damage down the line.’53 Another contributor adds that the leftist 
media ‘are doing everything they can [to change] the perpetrators into 
victims. Disgusting.54
This is a small selection of a longer list of responses, all posted in the f irst 
few minutes after the publication of the original article, creating a massive 
voice of unfiltered, aggressive antagonism. Such responses support Sunstein’s 
warning that ‘when people are hearing echoes of their own voices, the 
consequences may be far more than support and reinforcement’, including 
‘unjustif ied extremism, indeed fanaticism’.55 As such, discussion forums, 
depending on their degree of moderation, risk becoming echo chambers 
for the polemical few, which form ‘a potential danger to social stability, a 
source of social fragmentation or even violence’.56
Conclusion
Such extreme versions of the echo chamber, understood as escalated variants 
of the more modest one analyzed in the current text, to me indicate several 
structural dimensions of the occurrence of online violence. The limiting and 
stratifying structure of the online forum as a medium for societal debate, 
seems at best to result in localized reconciliations that have no further 
consequences for the larger debate taking place outside of the platform, 
and at worst to invite the possibility of unregulated, violent antagonism. 
The reason for this less than satisfying effect is that, far from representing 
society at large, discussion spaces such as De Punt ’s forum tend to attract 
52 ‘[…] het onophoudelijke gejammer van de nabestaanden van de Molukse treinkapers. 37 
jaar na dato komen zij uit alle hoeken en kogelgaten gekropen om vanuit een slachtofferrol te 
vertellen over die verschrikkelijke zaterdagochtend 11 juni in 1977.’
53 ‘Weer een groep dwaallichten in de slachtofferrol. Wat minder gejank over het “prachtige” 
land van herkomst richting je nakomelingen voorkomt later restschade.’
54 ‘[…] nu wordt er alles op alles gezet […], waar of niet waar om hen zoveel jaren later te 
kunenen [sic] beschuldigen en de van de daders [sic] slachtoffers te kunnen maken. Walchelijk 
[sic].’
55 Sunstein, ‘The Law’, p. 82.
56 Ibid.
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contributors who enter the debate with pre-existing opinions, and a desire to 
express themselves. If the discussion that follows is to some extent contained 
or directed by productive external factors, such as the f ilm itself, a degree of 
reconciliation may ensue, albeit purely within the boundaries of the forum 
and as such relatively ineffective on a broader societal scale. Without such 
moderating factors, the result may well be, and often is, the occurrence of 
online violence.
Therefore, contrary to the still prominent interpretation of the internet 
as a democratizing and participatory space, I would direct my hope for a 
more inclusive collective identity towards a plea for an increase of precisely 
the ‘expert-driven discussions’ that Marselis wants to move away from.57 As 
such, I follow postcolonial theorist Gloria Wekker’s point of view (2016), who 
states that, ‘[judging] by curricula at various educational levels, from grade 
school to university level, it is the best-kept secret that the Netherlands has 
been a formidable imperial nation’.58 A more informed education curriculum, 
led by experts who are capable of moderating discussions about the shared 
past, seems like a better place to start a more nuanced understanding of the 
postcolonial present, than an unguided discussion space for polarized voices.
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Affects of Online Vitriol

7 Love and Hate Online
Affective Politics in the Era of Trump
Greta Olson
Abstract
This chapter examines the affective politics of online vitriol in the era 
of Trump, the f irst Twitter president. Trump’s use of Twitter shapes the 
affective resonances of his presidency by fueling experiences of love as well 
as indignation. These dynamics are unpacked by examining the online 
style of Donald Trump and Mike Cernovich, a self-appointed spokesman 
for MAGA and the New Right. The chapter f irst outlines how affect theory 
helps to comprehend the emotional politics of Trump’s presidency in a 
manner that goes beyond notions of its simply invoking hatred. Second, 
the chapter argues that social media platforms create pleasurable in-group 
community experiences that function to produce collective support for 
Trump.
Keywords: Trump presidency, Twitter president, affect theory, affective 
politics, affect and social media
This chapter outlines how affect theory can help to understand the emotional 
politics of online hatred and its counterpart, online love. Affect describes 
pre-verbal experiences of feeling rather than emotions, which are experi-
ences that have been translated into and thus already explained through 
words. Affective experiences include getting hot and having one’s skin 
turn red when one feels embarrassed or getting goose bumps when one 
feels afraid. These feelings are deeply embodied and have little to do with 
rational arguments that are expressed in words. This chapter also wants 
to offer a bit of pushback against what I now see as a dominant narrative 
about the negative effects of social media. This narrative says that social 
media represents a ‘threat to democracy’ and to civility and that the main 
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
doi: 10.5117/9789462989481_ch07
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impetus behind online engagement and interaction is a sense of disgust or 
a thirst for novelty.1
The primary affects expressed in individual and group contributions 
to online vitriol have been described as outrage and a sense of ‘fellowship’ 
in commonly expressed grievance.2 Outrage is certainly the preferred 
mode of the f irst Twitter president Donald Trump, who likes f irst to berate 
others in his tweets and ‘then escalate’ whatever conf lict is at hand.3 
Alternatively, the desire for attention from both one’s peers and perceived 
enemies, also through shared humour, is said to drive trolls. How does this 
affective economy of vitriol, including experiences of extreme anger and a 
desire for violence, Schadenfreude, humour, and a hunger for recognition 
actually operate? Why can online vitriol only be understood with reference 
to its opposite, online love? How do the as yet unnamed and undertheorized 
experiences of pleasure and feeling positively connected fit into this mixture 
of intense sensations? Why do we need to think about political discourse 
and the politics of social media differently because of affects?
This chapter starts to address these questions. It notes preliminarily that 
theories of political and social intercourse have traditionally described a 
public commons that is governed by rational discourse and exchange. This 
presupposes that communication occurs primarily through language, that 
language is used to represent a commonly agreed upon reality, and that 
agreements about perceptions of this reality can be made on the basis of 
rational exchange. This reality is then also understood to be experienced 
mutually and to be negotiable through a commonly understood language.
An affective theory of the political, by contrast, suggests that political 
sentiments are determined by viscerally experienced sentiments and a 
physically imagined sense of rightness or wrongness, rather than one that is 
worked out through rational means. This aligns with notions of persuasion 
that stress pathos – the evocation of feeling – as an at least as important part 
of rhetoric as logos and ethos – the logical/evidentiary and the communicator’s 
conveyed sense of authority, respectively. Moreover, a sense of affective loyalty 
or being strongly bound to those who agree with one fuels a heightened sense 
of ‘taking one for the team’ and outdoing one another in terms of expressing 
online venom and eliciting strong reactions from those one vents against.
1 Cf. The Economist cover story of 4 November 2017, entitled ‘Social media’s threat to democracy’ 
and Vosoughi et al., ‘The Spread’ on the primacy of the ‘basic emotions’ of disgust and novelty 
in the spread of false news.
2 ‘Politics of Outrage’, p. 23.
3 Gessen, ‘How Trump governs by tweet’; Baker, ‘A Trump Vacation Formula’.
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More rational models have traditionally comprised deontological ethics, 
based on should(s) and ought(s) between subjects, or utilitarianism, based 
on an interest in minimizing suffering and maximizing the common good. 
Further, Jürgen Habermas’s notion of social communication was based on 
a linguistic model of exchange that was grounded in the ideal that every 
group would be able to equally participate in the process of developing 
rationally agreed upon norms through discussion and coming to consensus 
about better, that is more rational, arguments for these norms.4 Habermas 
writes that: ‘The concept of communicative action presupposes language 
as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which 
participants, through relating to the world, reciprocally raise validity claims 
that can be accepted or contested’.5 Through language, speakers can convince 
one another discursively about the validity of their claims using rational 
means. In contrast to Habermas, I am arguing that we need now to take 
a post-linguistic approach to the political, one that accounts for what has 
been called the affective turn in critical theory.6
In contrast to rational-choice theories of the political or to ones based on a 
notion of a common consensus that can be attained through communicative 
means, political thinkers like Chantal Mouffe describe a political climate in 
which the affective has to be taken with great seriousness: ‘My claim is that 
it is impossible to understand democratic politics without acknowledging 
‘passions’ as the driving force in the political f ield’.7 In the spirit of Mouffe, 
I would like to move away from a poo-poohing of affectively experienced 
and expressed politics as the result of a vulgar populism. Rather, I wish to 
explore how the political is literally felt differently in our historical moment, 
the era of Trump, and how these feelings are expressed in social media 
exchanges. To look at the affects of online vitriol as well as those of what, to 
my mind, have been the still underdiscussed phenomena of online affection 
and connectivity, I want to look at Donald Trump’s discourse f irst. Trump, 
it is generally agreed, has mastered the art of affective elicitation and has 
garnered a sense of loyalty amongst his followers that is genuinely diff icult 
to explain rationally. Put bluntly, Trump has been able to spread a sense of 
hatred of his perceived enemies so effectively only because he is so talented 
at bringing out a sense of f ierce love in his followers. After thinking about 
4 Habermas, The Theory.
5 Ibid., p. 99.
6 Clough and Halley, Theorizing the Social; Clough, ‘Political Economy’; Leys, ‘The Turn to 
Affect’; Olson, ‘The Turn to Passion’.
7 Mouffe, Agonistics, p. 6.
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Trump’s affective style, I wish to look more closely at the online expressions 
of a self-chosen spokesman for Trump and the New Right, Mike Cernovich, 
before f inally commenting, more generally, on how affect functions online.
Genealogies of affect
Versus a history of philosophy that has favoured the rational while exiling 
the irrational, the felt and the embodied, affect theory favours the somatic 
and questions the validity of representations that are based on descriptive 
notational systems. This is in contradistinction to Cartesian rationality 
which sets up a model in which there is a strict relation of control between 
the mind and the objects of consciousness that are contained in that mind 
and are accessed through cognition. Cartesianism extends into the present 
in that we use linguistic and/or other forms of semiotic representation to 
signify something as being such a thing. Writing about the break from this 
kind of notational economy that is based on the semiotic sign, Karen Barad 
remarks that ‘the belief in the ontological distinction between representa-
tions and that which they purport to represent’ has been obliterated by the 
notion of affect.8
Affect theory has more than one genealogy. The one I follow more closely 
extends from Baruch Spinoza’s emphasis on the irreducibility of ideas from 
the body in his 1677 Ethics. Considered a heretic, Spinoza directly contra-
dicted Descartes’s insistence on a dualism of mind and body as postulated 
in his Mediations (1641). This involves making rationality the sine qua non 
of existence. Descartes’ ‘I think, therefore I am’ means that the process of 
cogitating precedes and is the precondition for one’s being. Embodiment 
is a secondary state to cognition and therefore, like the environment, of a 
second-order status. By contrast, Spinoza writes in Ethics that ‘the body 
cannot determine the mind to think, nor the mind the body to remain in 
motion or at rest’.9 The two are inseparable.
Other anti-Cartesians have shown up within the history of Western 
philosophy in the work of thinkers like William James, Henri Bergson, 
the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and in Cognitive Metaphor Theory, 
which espouses a theory of the embodied mind. Yet the twentieth-century 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s affectus has perhaps become 
the most seminal basis for theoreticians like Brian Massumi, Rosi Braidotti, 
8 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, p. 804.
9 Spinoza, Collected Works, ‘Ethics’, 3P2.
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and Mieke Bal. Deleuze describes affects as embodied states of intensity. 
This is according to Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s translator Massumi to be 
understood as ‘a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from 
one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation 
or diminution in that body’s capacity to act’.10 Leading Deleuzian f igures of 
relation include ‘intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, 
bodies without organs’11 and the rhizome, which ‘assumes very diverse 
forms, from ramif ied surface extension in all directions to concretion’.12 
These forms provide metaphors for how things may be related without the 
linearity of beginning or end, subject and object, or the presence of a human.
Note that the affective is independent of individuation and person-
hood, denotation and consciousness. Affective relations are accordingly 
anti-narrative in that narrativization involves a structuring of experience 
through minimal narrative units that are generally set up in a linear relation 
to one another. Such units are for the greater part verbally processed and 
transmitted. Affects exist prior to their being articulated in speech or 
through other language-related forms. They are felt or experienced rather 
than related through words or other representational systems. Bodies, and 
not necessarily human ones, meet one another, skins touch, affects are sent 
forth and returned.
Another genealogy of affect theory arises from the psychologist Silvan 
Tompkins’s notion of basic emotions, which are shared affectively when one 
unconsciously mimics, for instance, the happy, smiling face one has unex-
pectedly encountered in the subway. Affects are expressed in non-verbal 
reactions, and particularly in facial expressions. Tompkins’s hypothesis is 
that basic emotions are shared through the report or representation of these 
emotions in affects. ‘All affects, with the exception of startle, are specif ic 
activators of themselves – the principle of contagion’.13 He explains this 
with the image of an infant who continues to cry even after the source of 
the tears has been alleviated: ‘This is because crying is as much to cry about 
as adequate a stimulus as is pain. […] we are referring not simply to the 
response of crying, but to the awareness, or report of crying’.14
Tompkins works with a notion of affect as non-verbal reaction and 
expression. According to Tompkins, intrinsic affects are experienced in 
10 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. xvii.
11 Ibid., p. 5.
12 Ibid., p. 7.
13 Tompkins, Affect Imagery, p. 296.
14 Ibid.
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the face, whose expressions are highly resonant in terms of how they are 
responded to, and thereby elicit emotions in others contagiously. The idea 
of what is alternatively termed emotional or affective contagion has been 
popularized in psychology to suggest that personal happiness for instance 
is more dependent on the equanimity of one’s friends and loved ones than 
on one’s personal material conditions.15 It has also been used to show how 
direct touch, for instance between mothers and their infants, positively 
impacts shared affects.16
Typically, models of contagion describe a three-part pattern of mimicry – 
feedback – contagion and are based on ideas of direct interactions between 
persons.17 It has also been used to describe the affective work that artistic 
images do. Jill Bennett calls ‘affect contagion’ the transportation of physi-
cally felt experience through the elicited awakening of similar somatically 
embedded experiences. Such images ‘touch the viewer who feels rather than 
simply sees the event, drawn into the image through a process of affect 
contagion,’ a reaction that ‘precedes the inscription of narrative, of moral 
emotion or empathy’.18 Bennett’s work is important in this regard because 
the affective charges she describes in viewers are elicited through images 
and not through non-verbal behaviours like smiling or snarling. This plays a 
part in the not yet adequately understood process of how affects are spread 
contagiously via digital media. We know that Facebook has experimented 
with trying to shape its users’ affective responses by manipulating users’ 
incoming content. This resulted in the insight that ‘[e]motions expressed by 
friends, via online social networks, influence our own moods, constituting, to 
our knowledge, the f irst experimental evidence for massive-scale emotional 
contagion via social networks’.19
Jodi Dean has suggested that online exchanges contain ‘affective 
nugget[s]’20 that take place within the frame of ‘communicative capitalism’ 
in which users are hailed into capitalist labour practices in which they act 
as both producers and consumers.21 Affective nuggets provide a useful 
alternative to the logic of narremes, that is how minimal narrative units 
relate to one another. The haptic quality of nuggets also allows us to think 
about bonds between similarly effected/affected individuals as also taking 
15 See Stein, ‘Happiness’.
16 Waters et al., ‘Affect Contagion’.
17 Hatf ield et al., ‘New Perspectives’.
18 Bennett, Empathic Vision, p. 36.
19 Booth, ‘Facebook Reveals’.
20 Dean, Blog Theory, p. 95.
21 Dean, ‘Affect and Drive’, p. 90.
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place in the body. Dean, like others, has suggested that social media can 
only function because it is pleasurable and its makers create it as it is.22 Let 
us suppose that a sense of enjoyment, titillation, pleasure in the outrageous 
and boundary making between an in-group and an imagined outgroup 
form the basis of online vitriol and online love in the Trump era. If this is 
the case, studying the libidinal politics of Trump’s media presence as well 
as of one of his self-appointed knights of the round table, Mike Cernovich, 
may be a way to understanding the felt politics of the present.
I suggest we move away from the negatively connoted metaphors of 
illness and non-volition that are suggested by ‘contagion’ and ‘going viral’ 
and think about affective contagion in a neutral sense, as the stickiness 
that binds people and also pushes them apart. Why is this so effectively 
elicited and transmitted through digital means, and how does this digitally 
elicited affective contagion determine personal sentiment so strongly at 
present? This notion of the contagiousness of the affective, its stickiness, 
stands somewhat in contrast to the negative reading of virality that Sara 
Polak offers in this book.
Trumpian affects
One of the perplexing things about the Trump era is that many of his 
supporters perpetuate a pattern in which working-class people support 
Republican candidates whose f iscally conservative policies are to their 
clear economic detriment.23 This trend, which is generally dated back to 
the culture wars of the 1980s, has, if anything, intensif ied in the polarized 
media economy that surrounds Trump’s presidency. The more Trump is 
criticized, it would seem, the more his supporters insist on their loyalty 
to him and their belief in the verity of the version of facts he espouses.24 
This affective attachment to Trump is often explained as people’s having 
fallen prey to the appeal of an authoritarian personality whose discourse 
and style reduces complexity and gives the disaffected a sense of safety 
in what is perceived as a belligerent or unsafe environment. The appeal of 
authoritarianism may be one part of the equation.
Yet Trump also needs to be credited for his having cued into a new political 
economy of passion, excess, and the naming of subjects once considered 
22 See Paasonen, ‘A Midsummer’s Bonf ire’, and Pedwell, ‘Mediated Habits’.
23 Frank, What’s the Matter, p. 204.
24 Olson, ‘Nur Emotionen’.
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unmentionable, at least by a politician on the public stage. Trump makes rac-
ist slurs, regularly incites Islamophobia and has dissed disabled people, and 
called immigrants ‘animals’ as well as ‘rapists.’ He has also repeatedly wagged 
f ingers at women who have gained weight, were supposedly menstruating 
while questioning him, women who were lactating, women who are not 
loyal to their husbands, and women who fail to be as ‘attractive’ as Trump’s 
wife. The list goes on. This is not to mention Trump’s self-fashioning in social 
media, that is to say how his presentation of himself in images and central 
narratives has contributed to creating a newly affective online environment:
He at once defines the f ield through his celebrity and performances which 
generated outrageous, cheap-to-produce content with each news cycle, 
while opening this space to the pure affective intensity of the alt-right.25
Trump supporters maintain loyalty and a sense of passion towards him, 
because he is a master of rousing passionate responses and using these 
responses effectively in media expressions and reports. Trump ‘is completely 
modern in embodying the values of affective media in eliciting the libidinal 
energies of his audience’.26
Trump, I am coming to believe, serves as much as a blank screen as 
Obama once did for the projection of a variety of diverse kinds of desire. Yet 
he has shown himself to be uniquely qualif ied in calling out expressions 
of hate, derision, and boundary making, as well as love. It is a mistake, I 
think, to concentrate on the negative affects that Trump inspires without 
also looking at the sticky attachment and sense of love and/or loyalty that 
he also calls out.
Trump supporters identify with the emotional immediacy of Trump’s 
address. He offers a sense of closeness and intensity by rhetorically breaking 
down the world into winners and losers, by championing the – according 
to him – formerly strong white men and working people who have been 
unreasonably weakened by Washington elites, and through his repeated 
attestations of love for these people. Note how he expresses a sense of shared 
affection at his rally in Phoenix in August 2017:
CROWD: USA! USA! USA! […]
You always understood what Washington, D.C. did not. Our movement 
is a movement built on love. Our movement is a movement built on love. 
25 Jutel, ‘Donald Trump’s Libidinal Entanglement’.
26 Ibid.
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It’s love for fellow citizens. It’s love for struggling Americans who’ve been 
left behind, and love for every American child who deserves a chance to 
have all of their dreams come true.27
The rally in Phoenix was held shortly after Trump had made equivocal 
comments about supporting the white supremacists responsible for at-
tacks on counter-demonstrators in Charlottesville, VA. The ‘love’ that he 
insisted on in Phoenix and which is at the basis of his movement may well 
sit uneasily with readers of this chapter. Yet it needs to be taken seriously 
as the attestation of a world view in which the in-group of Trumpians feel 
themselves to be passionately attached to each other and to a shared sense 
of felt identity. It is their ‘dreams’ that have been delayed, according to 
Trump. They, this group ‘built on love,’ stand in radical opposition to the 
haters in Washington, D.C. ‘You,’ as Trump addresses them in the second 
person, are the true lovers, dreamers, and believers.
And Trumpians do believe. On a website that charts Rustbelt Trump 
voters’ evolving opinions about their candidate before and after the election, 
one finds a continuing stream of steady support. For instance, the 54-year-old 
Ohioan driver and former Democrat voter Geno DiFabio speaks about the 
continued affective appeal of his candidate. Regarding criticism of Trump’s 
failure to get a new health-care bill through Congress and other setbacks, 
DiFabio’s position changed little between March and November 2017. If 
anything, his ratings of Trump on a 1-10 scale went up.
All they’re doing is solidifying the people that voted for him, believe me. 
Sometimes he says stupid stuff, but he’s still the only one that’s going to 
do anything for us, f ight for us, actually f ight for us.28
One notes the sense of affective connection, the belief that Trump is the 
f ighter for ‘us,’ the people, even if ‘he says stupid stuff.’ And in July 2017:
I think the swamp in Washington is bigger and deeper than he thought… 
I pay attention enough to see that no one is helping him as far as there’s 
no cooperation whatsoever from the Democrats and very little from the 
Republicans. So no, I’m not disappointed.29
27 ‘WATCH: President Trump holds rally in Phoenix’, 30:74-31:05.
28 DiFabio, 22 March 2017.
29 Ibid., 18 July 2017.
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The affective sense is that opposition shows the legitimacy and trueness of 
the people’s candidate, the man who so nobly f ights for them. This extends 
to Trump’s tweets and his take on the news:
He’s up against a lot more than I thought he would ever be up against, 
from both sides. The people that voted for him – and I’ll bet there’s more 
people every day – are still behind him… At f irst [his tweeting] made me 
nervous. I used to cringe – I’d say, ‘Oh God, what’s he going to say today?’ 
Now, I love it. Now, if they would take it away from him, that would 
probably ruin his presidency because he can bring what he wants to the 
forefront and they jump on everything he says. So people can make their 
own choice: here’s what Trump’s saying, here’s what the media is saying.30
I want to pause over DiFabio’s self-reflexivity, his awareness that aspects 
of Trump’s utterances once made him uneasy but that he now sees them 
as a vital part of Trump’s truth-saying in the face of media lies. DiFabio 
uses affectively charged words such as ‘f ight for us,’ ‘swamp’ and in the 
last citation ‘love.’ He expresses certainty that more people stand behind 
Trump, his politics, and his tweets than during the election.
DiFabio, like others, responds to the alternative route to information 
these tweets provide as well as their uncensored and surely also for this 
reason original content. As Trump has repeatedly insisted, his tweets allow 
him to circumvent traditional media vehicles and coverage as well as to 
hit back immediately at those who criticize him.31 Trump’s tweets do offer 
seemingly unmediated access to the President’s thoughts and affects. Their 
verity is attested to in their bluntness as well as their grammatical and 
spelling errors.
DiFabio expresses his sense of a world of ‘us’ – those with Trump – and a 
world of ‘them’ – the media and Trump’s detractors. Affectively, the greater 
the intensity of disapproval, or felt hate, that is extended towards Trump, 
the more love his supporters shall nobly bring to his support. As DiFabio’s 
statement about Trump reveals, the strong identif ication with him leads to 
a sense that all criticism is an effort to weaken Trump and is therefore also 
false. This mirrors Trump’s rhetoric that all of his critics are unproductive 
losers that have personal vendettas against him.
Trump personalizes America’s problems as his own in a manner that 
evokes passions. He insists that the country may excel again if it has a tough 
30 Ibid., 6 November 2017.
31 ‘Donald Trump defends’.
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guy in charge to do battle for it. Making a case for his ability to go to battle, 
Trump stressed at the beginning of his campaign announcement speech 
that he would be the f ighter-in-chief:
Our country is in serious trouble. We don’t have victories anymore. We 
used to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time 
anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I 
beat China all the time. All the time.32
Whereas the country f inds itself in a downtrodden and defeated state, also 
against China in terms of trade, Trump as tough commander will restore the 
country to its place of rightful dominance. ‘I beat China’ is a rallying cry: 
America under Trump will beat the world. Those who have been unfairly 
weakened will under Trump’s dominant leadership return, like the country 
in general, to glory.
Trump performs an alternative normative order whose performance 
is carried out by affective means, in the call and response pattern of his 
rallies and the binarist logic of his speeches. This logic divides the world into 
losers – those who are against Trump (the media, Washington, elites) – and 
winners (his loving and loyal supporters). As explicated by the earlier title 
of his campaign memoir ‘Crippled America,’ Trump’s dominant narrative 
concerns the nation’s lost greatness. It elicits a nostalgic yearning for this 
greatness that can be won back through the election of the winner and 
f ixer Trump. This narrative cues in with a generalized sense of lost position 
and dignity amongst Trump supporters. It is also expressed in Trump’s 
Alt-Right and New Right adherents’ urgent desire to recover an imagined, 
much longed for sense of lost masculine nobility.
Another aspect of Trumpian political affect is his certainty that any news 
about him is beneficial for his brand and that any negative news about him 
is simply untrue. As early as 1986, Trump espoused the value of negative 
coverage in The Art of the Deal: ‘The funny thing is that even a critical story, 
which may be hurtful personally, can be very valuable to your business’,33 
an idea he repeats in Great Again.34 In a chapter from Great Again, Trump 
(or his ghost-writer) vilif ies the press as dishonest, inaccurate, and personal 
in their vendetta against him:
32 ‘Donald Trump Announces’.
33 Trump, The Art, p. 57.
34 Trump, Great Again, p. 11.
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They [the media] hate me because they know I don’t need them. I learned 
a long time ago how to talk directly to the people who matter – to regular 
Americans who are fed up with the career politicians.
That’s probably you – the real Americans.35
By this view, real Americans align with Trump in despising the traditional 
press, believing that they are untruthful and have a personal vendetta 
against their candidate. Note the emphasis on hate to elicit love in the ‘real 
Americans’ Trump makes his appeal to.
Mike Cernovich, masculine nobility, and basic bitches
If Trumpian affective discourse serves as a communicative and sensational 
model for his online supporters, then it may be worthwhile looking at a 
self-appointed champion of Trump, Mike Cernovich. A defender of the 
Manosphere – ‘the pick-up artist community […] groups of men disil-
lusioned with feminism in society’,36 Cernovich is credited with master-
minding Pizza-Gate and currently acts as an alternative news pundit and 
a self-appointed denouncer of fake news. In a dualistic world of winners 
and losers, in which Trump is the self-appointed winner, the rest are liars, 
weaklings, and people without enough to do. Cernovich espouses a similar 
philosophy: negative news is good coverage and gets attention. Cernovich 
does in fact possess the wherewithal to make Kellyanne Conway quote 
his Twitter account as ‘unbiased journalism’ and for Trump Jr. to retweet 
his posts. As he states: ‘This is why the hoaxing media is so triggered by 
me. They can only keep saying, ‘Don’t listen to him; he’s not legit’ for so 
long. I’ll keep saying the opposite, and I’ll keep getting more views on 
Periscope’’.37
Cernovich also acts as a powerful voice in the #MAGA movement. With 
reference to Trump’s campaign slogan, this movement
was tapping into the fears of voters who felt that the America they lived 
in, the America they loved, had gone downhill. The slogan speaks to 
people who desired not just for a new America, but one which takes its 
cues from the America of old – America updated. America V 2.0. A return 
35 Ibid., p. 17.
36 Anglin, ‘A Normie’s Guide’.
37 Marantz, ‘Can a Pro-Trump Meme Maker’.
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to the past glory days, to employment, to stability, to working together 
to realise the American dream.38
Note, once again, the emphasis on love, lost greatness, and the simply and 
accessibly expressed conviction that the country’s prelapsarian ideal can 
be attained again.
Cernovich has recently been as much maligned by the mainstream 
and the non-mainstream media for his self-promotional tactics, the 
alleged charges of rape against him, and his presentation of himself as 
wealthier and more conventionally successful than he actually is.39 One 
could also make the critical point that my writing about Cernovich in this 
context performs the same kind of academic and media overexposure of 
Trump that abetted his branding of himself in a celebrity culture, and 
which contributed to his successful campaign for the presidency. Yet I 
f ind that Cernovich’s group tactics and his communicative patterns and 
allusions to traditional notions of masculinity and an ideal of dominance 
closely align with Trump’s affectively resonant rhetorical practices. They 
are helpful in understanding how the process of expressing hatred and 
disrespect online occurs on a background of a shared sense of knight-like 
brotherly love.
Cernovich has repeatedly stated that he is particularly impressed by 
Trump’s straight-talking brand of ostentatious masculinity, his unabashed 
championing of himself as The Donald, and his victories over his enemies. 
Trump’s triumphal masculinity is not only worthy of emulation but cause 
for Cernovich’s sense of intimate connection. As he proclaims in one Vlog 
during the campaign:
Trump is just doing what I am doing. He said, Fuck you. Fuck the establish-
ment. I believe in America. Here are my beliefs. When he was confronted 
about mean tweets he said this is why America is losing. Right, that’s the 
deep shame of real Americans. America used to be a masculine country. 
That’s why America is losing.40
Real Americans are associated with a sense of lost and nostalgically longed 
for male heroism and noble masculinity that Cernovich refers to at the begin-
ning of this video. There he complains of the demise of male ascendance 
38 ‘What made Trump’s ‘Make’’.
39 Marantz, ‘Trolls’.
40 Cernovich, ‘10 Ways to Reclaim Masculinity’, 8:27-8:45.
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due to the feminization of the United States. This imperious masculinity 
is associated with Trump and is counterposed with ‘the establishment.’
The affective love for Trump, the in-group’s support for their top dog, might 
be explained as an instance of hegemonic masculinity. As explicated by R.W. 
Connell, hegemonic masculinity privileges the top dog or the masculine 
hegemon.41 Yet those men who are subordinate to the hegemon nevertheless 
prof it from their relative position within a hierarchy of masculinity. They 
are still closer to power than those who are marginalized, like women, those 
identified with women, and gays. Within a system of hegemonic masculinity, 
women who have successfully internalized misogyny will be rewarded to 
the degree that they uphold and enforce the structures of this system to 
the detriment of other women who are less compliant. By contrast, such 
women will be treated with hostility who refuse to hold up the prevalent 
system of male privilege.42
Reading Cernovich in light of research on hegemonic masculinity and 
in reference to biographical details like his denying the existence of date 
rape, and his penning books on the virtues of masculine domination such as 
Gorilla Mindset (2015) and Danger & Play (2016), one notes with interest that 
all despised persons are described as ‘basic bitches’. This phrase deserves 
unpacking.43 The Urban Dictionary lists the top def inition of ‘basic bitch’ 
as follows:
Someone who is unflinchingly upholding of the status quo and stereotypes 
of their gender without even realizing it. She engages in typical, unoriginal 
behaviors, modes of dress, speech, and likes. She is tragically/laughably 
unaware of her utter lack of specialness and intrigue. She believers herself 
to be unique, fly, amazing, and a complete catch, when really she is boring, 
painfully normal, and par.44
And in an etymological explanation of the term Slang by Dictionary notes that:
Basic bitch is a term used to condescendingly refer to women who have 
predictable or unoriginal style, interests, or behavior. […] For many, the 
concept of a basic bitch is associated exclusively with middle-class white 
women, however, this term originated in black culture with a different 
41 Connell, Masculinities.
42 Manne, Down Girl.
43 See also Nagle, Kill All Normies.
44 Gee, ‘Basic Bitch’.
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meaning and connotations. In this entry [from Lil Duval and SpokenRea-
son from 2009], basic bitch is def ined as ‘a bum-ass woman who think 
she the shit but really ain’t.’ By 2011, with the release of Kreayshawn’s 
‘Gucci Gucci,’ basic bitch had come to refer more specif ically to women 
who rely on popular designer clothing for status: […]. This def inition of 
a basic bitch as a woman who likes things that are popular because they 
are popular began to stick.45
The term ‘basic bitch’ coheres with Julia Serano’s analysis of ‘traditional 
sexism’ as the denigration and deprecation of everything that is associated 
with the feminine, including pleasure in adornment and ornamentation.46 In 
the original meaning, ‘basic bitch’ referred to an uppity woman who refused 
to know her place. In the now more common usage, the term refers to a 
stereotypically feminine woman, particularly in terms of her consumerist 
practices and media tastes. Two forms of gender-related disparagement 
are carried out in the term. The f irst is to disdain an identif ied woman 
as a ‘bitch,’ a female dog – ugly, sexually unattractive, animal-like, and 
hyper-embodied, and the second term ‘basic’ as more highly so a woman. 
Work on verbal expressions of gender-based disdain shows that women 
are typically insulted for being either insuff iciently attractive according 
to normative expectations or for their perceived sexual (over)availability. 
Men, by contrast, are insulted for being weak, incompetent, or for being 
like women. Men tend to perceive as the worst kind of insult being told 
that they are like gay men.47
All of this plays into Mike Cernovich’s and his followers’ multiple uses 
of the term ‘basic bitches.’ Signif icantly, he has named his book series 
as such. ‘Basic bitches’ is used as a nomenclature of disdain not only for 
Trump critics and leftists but also for those who are deemed insuff iciently 
conservative. In the 2016 New Yorker prof ile that brought Cernovich to 
national and international attention, he is quoted as saying derogatorily 
of Hillary Clinton’s PR people that:
Her social-media advisers are twenty-four-year-old basic bitches who feel 
triggered by us, and so they asked their boss to yell at us and make us go 
away. Well, we’re not going away. They just made us stronger.48
45 Ibid.
46 Serano, Whipping Girl.
47 James, ‘Gender-linked Derogatory Terms’.
48 Marantz, ‘Trolls’.
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Here the disparagement is that they are women or weak men, who are as such 
incompetent and unable to defend themselves. Moreover, their weakness 
calls out an even greater show of strength in Cernovich’s army of trolls. In 
the same article, Cernovich is quoted as saying he shall care for his then 
unborn daughter ‘as long as she’s not a basic bitch’ and referring to George 
Soros’s son by the same term.49
In the following tweet, Cernovich responds to the furor about the 
comedian Kathy Griff in’s 2017 photograph of herself holding the bloody 
decapitated head of the president:
Basic bitch conservatives go, ‘Imagine if a conservative did what Kathy 
Griff in did.’ Yawn. The New Right is calling CNN’s advertisers! (@Cer-
novich, 30 May 2017)50
In this case, basic bitches are insuff iciently critical and radical. This is 
reflected in comments on the tweet such as
Yes please. I’m tired of the right ALLOWING themselves to be bullied. 
Pathetic. (@sheeplemmings, 31 May 2017)51
Yet this form of abuse is also commented on negatively by one Cernovich 
follower who tweets that
Calling teammates basic bitches really isn’t helping the situation 
(@chanopokes, 31 May 2017)52
Both responses, one of acclaim and solidarity, the other of critique of 
Cernovich’s discourse, demonstrate how cohesion is created within the 
group. Group members are intimately concerned with and involved in 
adjudging, aff irming, and editing each other’s utterances. This leads to a 
sense of immediacy, attachment, and mutual involvement.
The pattern I am pointing out is that to be weak in any way is to be basic-
bitch-like. This is to be insuff iciently strong, masculine, dominant, or, in 
Cernovich’s eyes, like a woman. Similarly, the supposedly inadequately radi-





loVe and HaTe online 169
refers to him as ‘Cuck Ryan’.53 ‘Basic bitch’ may however also refer to the 
mediocre and the insufficiently radically conservative, as in the tweet about 
supposedly lacklustre conservatives’ response to the Griff in photograph, 
quoted from above. Thus, Cernovich pitches his book MAGA Mindset: Making 
You and America Great Again with an obvious reference to Trump’s campaign 
memoir as follows:
‘Readers are tired of basic bitch content,’ Cernovich told me, ‘They want 
edge. They want pop. They want swagger. My readers are ferocious and 
want to stand out. Let the content serfs serve up the same undifferentiated 
slop. I only want savages and madmen and madwomen reading me.’54
And self-critically about his own work:
My content was getting a little basic bitch, so I had a three hour conversa-
tion with a Muslim nationalist. (@Cernovich, 11 June 2017)55
I do not read Cernovich’s use of ‘basic bitch’ necessarily as a hatred of 
particular women or of the female gender per se but rather a hatred of 
being dominated and a desire to win in any contest. The goal is making 
others submit to one’s control. Here, the self-appointed newsmaker mimics 
his much-admired president. Trump reports proudly on his having beaten 
up his music teacher in second grade: ‘I’m not proud of that, but it’s clear 
evidence that even early on I had a tendency to stand up and make my 
opinions known in a very forceful way’.56 Similarly, Cernovich’s supporters, 
like Trump’s, have an affective sense of intense loyalty to and commonality 
with this mouthpiece of theirs, the New Right movement. This loyalty is 
experienced as a brotherhood that champions a nostalgic longing for a lost 
masculinity.
Expressions of an affectively experienced brotherhood of insiders can be 
found in the following online commentaries. In responses to a Cernovich 
YouTube teaser for a documentary on fake news called ‘Hoaxed’ from 
8 July 2017, supporters posted comments such as
53 Cernovich, ‘Mike Cernovich’.
54 Ibid.
55 twitter.com/Cernovich/status/873713799513096192.
56 Trump, The Art, pp. 71-78.
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WoW..!! This is Epic..!! Your Stepping up Next Level Bro..!! Great Job !!! 
Thank-you & God Bless you and the Fam Mike for Bringing Truth to the 
Light.! (‘Dick Tracy’)
YES , f inally someone with balls , I’m in Lock & Loaded !!!( not literally 
!!!) (‘AimZ2909’)
revelutionary ,ground breaking frontal attack that will promote the 
movement we need towards the liberty and principles this land was ment 
to sustain. Thank you sir Mike cernovich (‘Bearcat Fierce’)
I F@$(?ing love you Mike! That made the hairs on the back of my neck 
stand up. Any freedom loving person who doesn’t react like I did to this 
challenge is fast asleep and we must wake them. I can’t think of a more 
noble cause in the world today for anyone who hopes to leave any kind 
of decent future for our children. Thank you Mike Cernovich. (‘Dizzy 
AUgustopherAG’)
Yaaaaa buddy (‘Tony N’)
CAPTAIN AWESOME HIT ONE OUT OF THE BALLPARK!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THAT 
LAST VISUAL HAD ME LMFAO!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! THIS IS THE BEST FREAKING 
TRAILER I’VE EVER SEEN! BRAVO! (‘Texas Cat’)
wow….a turn on the arthurian way of legend…enter at the darkest place…
where there is no path…now enter at the darkest place…and take it back 
from the evil ones that left their horrible tracks in us….BRILLIANT!!!! and 
dangerous…true bravery…can hardly stand to watch this… maga trump…
the true living arthurian king….and YOU a contemporary knight of the 
round table…where angels fear to tread bro…. (‘esmeralda’)
Thanks Mike! I appreciate youbrother! (‘Patrick Lacy’)
King Kong Cernovich Biggest monkey in the JUNGLE. (‘H8twoluz’)
Without analyzing each comment individually, I would like f irst to 
highlight the stress on a felt sense of masculine kinship articulated in 
words like ‘Bro..!!,’ ‘brother!,’ and ‘Yaaaaa buddy,’ each expression suggest-
ing that the speaker is a common member of a desirable closely linked 
group of men. Second, the respondents stress the inherent nobility of 
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masculinity that is exemplif ied by Cernovich in creating this trailer for 
his documentary on fake news. This is documented in expressions such 
as: ‘Thank you sir Mike Cernovich,’ and ‘maga trump…the true living 
arthurian king….and YOU a contemporary knight of the round table…
where angels fear to tread bro….’ and ‘I can’t think of a more noble cause 
in the world today for anyone who hopes to leave any kind of decent 
future for our children.’ In all three cases, Cernovich is portrayed as an 
altruistic noble who engages in battle for the honour of his king MAGA 
Trump. Finally, there are positive attestations of Cernovich’s superior 
masculinity and machismo, as in ‘YES , f inally someone with balls , I’m 
in Lock & Loaded !!!’ and ‘CAPTAIN AWESOME HIT ONE OUT OF THE 
BALLPARK!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!’ and, with reference to Cernovich’s earlier work on 
having a gorilla mindset, ‘King Kong Cernovich Biggest monkey in the 
JUNGLE.’ Here, the implication is that by being the top dog, the hardest 
hitter, the Captain Awesome of the fraternally bonded group, Cernovich 
champions and improves not only his own status but also that of his 
brothers. One notes the affective resonance that is conveyed by the use 
of shouting caps and multiple exclamation marks. These followers feel 
intently and deeply for their man, Cernovich.
Online affect
Affective emotions occur in physical sensations of hate, love, desire and 
disgust. We do not yet, I believe, have a model to explain our current political 
climate in which affects appear to spread differently via online media as 
compared to other forms of human exchange. One obvious explanation for 
expressions of online vitriol is the experience of deindividuation described 
in social psychology. This involves one’s feeling oneself intensely to be 
anonymous and/or as a part of a group rather than being recognized and 
potentially also adjudged for one’s actions as an individual. This decreased 
sense of personal responsibility and availability to critique happens in 
situations in which people feel a powerful sense of group unity, are focused 
on stimulating outward events, and have a sense of reduced individuality. 
Experiments on deindividuation show that when test subjects had white 
sacks placed over their heads they were more likely, in a simulated setting, 
to induce shocks in others than when their faces were uncovered and they 
knew that they could be seen. In this case, there are ‘weakened restraints 
against impulsive behavior’ as in expressions of online hate, and an ‘inability 
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to regulate [one’s] own behavior’.57 In descriptions of motivations behind the 
Alt-Right and the New Right movements, one f inds an obvious gratif ication 
in winning and in being outrageous, a sense of pleasure in outsmarting the 
other side. As Andrew Anglin explains in his guide to the Alt-Right: ‘One 
of the unifying marks of the Alt-Right sensibility is the assumption that 
no speech act is beyond the pale’.58 One also f inds an expressed sensation 
of happiness in belonging to a brotherhood with a common purpose. As 
Angela Nagle has discussed, in-group online subcultures are violently de-
fended through displays of superior skills in manipulating digital forums.59 
Deindividuated, one acts with lessened self-awareness and restraint in what 
are felt to be the interests of the group.
When groups pile on hate or copy-cat each other’s vitriol towards a given 
person, deindividuation may be at work. Another theory borrowed from 
social psychology suggests that people are more likely to help others in 
trouble when they are alone and in direct face-to-face encounters than when 
they are in groups of bystanders or do not have direct contact with the person 
in need.60 Processes of deindividuation and the diffusion of responsibility 
when multiple bystanders are present lead to acute concerns about the 
effects of drone warfare, for instance, about the sense of responsibility in 
the person operating the drone: what happens when targets are sighted on 
screen rather than in direct forms of combat? Similarly, anxieties grow about 
the oversharing that occurs between people who interact digitally rather 
than in person. The very anonymity of the exchange – the non-touching 
– appears paradoxically to invite highly personal exchanges, sometimes 
with painfully experienced consequences that occur in f laming, revenge 
porn, or other misuses of shared material.
Metaphors of contagion have also been used to describe what hap-
pens when people strongly empathize with anonymous others online 
in what might be described as online love rather than vitriol. Cassandra 
Sharp describes how a sense of vulnerability was affectively shared 
and enlarged upon per tweets after the terrorist attacks in Paris and 
elsewhere.61 Reading tweets added to users’ immediate perceived sense 
of their own threat from a possible terrorist attack, however safe their 
locality and position there actually was. What is counterintuitive here, 
57 Atkinson et al., Introduction to Psychology, p. 632.
58 Anglin, ‘A Normie’s Guide’.
59 Nagle, Kill All Normies.
60 Atkinson et al., Introduction to Psychology, pp. 633-636.
61 Sharp, ‘#Vulnerability’.
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is that touch is not involved in these experiences of spread sensation 
caused by interactions with others on social media. Nor is emotional 
intimacy based on face-to-face social interaction with another or others 
necessary to co-experience or even co-witness sentiments expressed on 
Twitter, Reddit, or Facebook.
How then do we explain the shared affects of online exchanges and 
responses, the expressions and sensations of hate and love? Applying affect 
theory to online exchange, Dean has argued that, similar to the distinction 
that game theorists have made between what happens in games and descrip-
tions of gaming in narratology, it is not the imposition of a linear tale that 
arouses, but the iterative and the participatory.62 To create content and to 
comment on the content of others or on their commentaries is to contribute 
to building something. The time one spends in specific online forums relates 
directly to one’s affective commitment, sense of purpose, and pleasure in 
being there. When a group that is experienced as unique and as subject to its 
own code is attacked, then the defence of this group becomes a passionately 
important pursuit. Face-to-face interaction is rendered irrelevant given 
group members’ experience of mutual banded togetherness. In a similar 
vein, Susanne Paasonen argues that a taste for affective or ‘sticky intensity’ 
of all kinds drives trolls and non-trolls alike.63 This intensity increases in 
scale in online conflicts.
Conclusions
Attributing Alt-Right and now New Right internet hate to misogyny alone 
is too monocausal. Trump’s rhetoric and self-fashioning is not fuelled by 
misogyny alone, nor is that of his knight-in-waiting Cernovich. Rather, Trump 
has been uniquely successful in creating an us versus them narrative that 
includes an antagonism towards traditional journalism and supposedly 
elitist sources of knowledge. This narrative focusses on the intrinsic greatness 
and largeness of Trump, #MAGA America, and those who believe in these 
entities. It also espouses the supposed virtues of hegemonic masculinity. 
Online hate functions in part through experiences of deindividuation and 
perhaps also through a diffusion of responsibility caused by actors’ ability to 
inflict pain and not be held directly accountable for it. Yet these explanations 
of online vitriol prove too simple. The real affective charge that is spoken 
62 Dean, ‘Affect and Drive’.
63 Paasonen, ‘A Midsummer’s Bonf ire’.
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about by Cernovich and his compatriots results out of exchanges with their 
in-group community that can be regarded as expressions of a libidinal 
economy. In meticulous commentaries about each other’s messages, group 
members pat each other on the back for what is perceived as their having 
won online battles not only individually but also for the glory of the group.
To begin to understand online hate during the age of Trump and other 
populist authoritarians, we need to understand the love that binds those 
who feel themselves to be passionately f ighting for common cause in their 
support of him. What motivates Trump’s supporters is in parts a nostalgically 
longed for, phantasmagoric image of lost American glory and an ideal of noble 
manhood that, for many of us, went out of fashion with medieval knights 
or Braveheart. Yet it is also intensely experienced love. We need to attend 
seriously to the stickiness involved in expressions of hate and vitriol on 
online platforms and their background in a shared sense of commonality and 
affection. This means taking affect seriously. We may also have to critically 
adjust our continuing attachments to the power of rational arguments and 
our sense that others should be convinced by these arguments as well.
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8 Satire and Affect
The Case of Stefanie Sargnagel in Austria
Ann-Marie Riesner
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the case of the Austrian writer Stefanie Sargnagel 
focusing on the hateful reactions to a 2017 f ictional travelogue published 
in the Austrian newspaper Der Standard. Her case is exceptional because 
she did not only live through, but also publicly commented on the outburst 
of hate she faced. Moreover, Sargnagel – as an astute observer of the 
mechanisms of social media – exposes the logics of hate speech in social 
media and shows how they work in triggering the reactions she wants to 
turn the readers’ attention to. Sargnagel’s reactions and reflections, the 
chapter argues, shed light on the phenomenon of hate as an affective 
network that runs through the online and the offline world.
Keywords: affect and media, social media, online literature, Internet 
culture
‘She needs the same treatment as what the Americans did to those bitches 
in Vietnam.’1 These words, written as a reaction to a provocative newspaper 
article written by the Austrian writer Stefanie Sargnagel seem completely 
out of proportion, but are quite familiar to us as users and observers of 
social media. Thousands of similar threats and insults are likely to appear 
whenever a woman, and sometimes a man, posts politically or sexually 
1 ‘die braucht gleiche Behandlung wie Amis haben gemacht in Vietman krieg mit solchen 
Nutten.’ Wegrzyn, Ryszard, Facebook Post, Posted as a screenshot in Stefanie Sargnagel’s Facebook 
Album: ‘Richard Schmitt wishes you a Happy Women’s Day’, 9 March 2017, https://www.facebook.
com/media/set/?set=a.10154578674413037.1073741857.711248036&type=3.
Misspellings in the original German quotations from Twitter and Facebook are not rectif ied 
here. Translations of all posts by Ann-Marie Riesner.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
doi: 10.5117/9789462989481_ch08
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provocative or ambiguous content in any other way on the Internet. Jarett 
Kobek, for instance, has dedicated his novel I Hate the Internet to the problem 
of online vitriol in the USA. One of the narrative threads of the book is the 
history of Adeline, a graphic novel artist from San Francisco who has lived 
through the worst series of harassment and death-threats after carelessly 
making statements in public and, without knowing it, online: ‘Being a kind 
of famous woman who expressed unpopular opinions in a culture that hated 
women was in itself a serious mistake, but neither it nor its constituent parts 
were the big one.’2 As the reader learns several pages later: ‘She neglected 
to notice that someone was recording every word that she said.’3
If the main pillar of the Internet project back in the days of its inception 
was to create a space of free speech, it is worth noting that hate speech or 
revenge projects are also among the oldest practices of online communities.4 
The relative anonymity and the lack of technical barriers in social media 
leads to an ever increasing amount of online vitriol, as the case of Stefanie 
Sargnagel demonstrates. Her case is noteworthy for at least two reasons 
which are deeply linked. The f irst is that Stefanie Sargnagel is one of the 
most astute observers of the mechanisms of social media in the German 
speaking world. I would argue that a signif icant part of her posts is actually 
about the relentless logic of social media which makes the unrestricted 
expression of spontaneous euphoria and hate possible. To analyze her case 
seems promising because she not only underwent but also consciously lived 
through and commented on the outburst of hate – what one might call a 
shitstorm – that occurred to her. Generally, Sargnagel not only comments 
on but exposes the logic of hate in social media, plays with connotations 
and shows how they work in triggering the reactions she wants to turn the 
readers’ attention to. She employs a couple of very particular strategies, 
sometimes through bold provocation, sometimes by playing with identities, 
with fact and f iction and with changing frames. The way she ‘manipulates’ 
the readers and triggers hate comments allows many insights into the 
phenomenon of hate as an affective network that runs through the online 
and the offline world.
This chapter analyzes one of her newspaper articles which elicited a 
furious shitstorm, titled ‘Three Authors in Morocco: Now We Have a Horse 
2 Kobek, I Hate the Internet, p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 34.
4 The News Group Alt.Revenge e.g. was founded in 1983 already, when the world wide web 
was not even launched.
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and Hashish’.5 In what follows, I will f irst introduce Stefanie Sargnagel as an 
author and focus on her particular interest in the mechanisms of affect in 
social media. I will then present the case of the harassment she experienced 
after the publication of her newspaper article in Der Standard. The analysis is 
grounded in theories of media and theories of affect, and employs analytical 
methods originating from literary studies. Through the analysis, this chapter 
aims to untangle the inner dynamics of online vitriol and elucidate on the 
functioning mechanisms of online hate speech.
The author: Stefanie Sargnagel
Stefanie Sargnagel (1986) is an emerging Austrian author writing almost 
exclusively on social media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram and 
regularly publishing selections of her best posts in print anthologies.6 
Sargnagel started posting on Facebook in 2007 and initially did not have 
many followers. In 2013, the newspaper Wiener Zeitung stated that she had 
only 1300 followers.7 By contrast, in 2016, the newspaper TAZ counted al-
ready 20,000 followers.8 The publication of her forth book Statusmeldungen 
(‘Status Updates’) in 2017 by the renowned publishing house Rowohlt in 
Germany brought her vast attention and more than 50.000 followers9 – a 
considerable number in the German speaking context. Her posts embrace 
a broad range of topics from very harmless observations on the everyday 
life in Vienna, in the tram line 6, or at the supermarket, to sensitive political 
issues like Austrian (cultural) politics, being a feminist, a ‘bohemian’ and a 
female author and on the mechanisms of social media, be they good or bad.
On 7 October 2017, Sargnagel writes on Facebook: ‘Everything written here 
is f ictional, in reality my name is Lara and I work at the graphics department 
of an NGO.’10 Whereas integrity and authenticity are usually among the most 
defended issues on social media, Stefanie Sargnagel plays with identities and 
with the boundaries between fact and f iction. That does not only account 
5 Haider et al., ‘Drei Autorinnen’.
6 These publications are: Sargnagel, Binge Living; Sargnagel, In der Zukunft sind wir alle tot; 




10 ‘Alles was ich hier schreibe ist f iktiv in wirklichkeit heiß ich lara und arbeite in der graf i-
kabteilung einer ngo.’ Sargnagel, Stefanie, Facebook-Post 10 July 2015, https://www.facebook.
com/stefanie.sargnagel/posts/10153055927808037.
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for scenes from her daily life that she sometimes turns into f iction, even 
fantasy, but also for highly explosive political topics. On the one hand, it 
is obvious that she stands for left-wing politics, for feminism, the freedom 
of art and speech. On the other hand, she also ironically comments on the 
positions she herself supports. One of the topics she ironically reflected on 
was the movement for help for the refugees in Vienna in the fall of 2015. As 
we can read from her posts, she was involved in smuggling refugees from 
Hungary to Austria and worked devotedly at the refugee camp Traiskirchen 
near Vienna. During that time, she clearly pushed forward the debate around 
responsibilities for refugees in Austria by critically commenting on Austrian 
politicians being passive and leaving the actual work to volunteers.11 Si-
multaneously, she ironically reflected on the pride and self-righteousness 
that often underlies the altruism of the volunteers: ‘is there a Traiskirchen 
sticker album out there where you can glue in the refugees you snapped 
while bringing them charitable donations?’12 This critique goes naturally 
also against herself, and precisely that is the intention. Sargnagel’s aim is 
to constantly provide the readers with new lines of interpretation and to 
show the complexity, sometimes inconsistence, of the issues she addresses. 
She explicitly claims to not be afraid to provoke harsh reactions, as stated 
in September 2015 ‘I don’t know what everybody has against shitstorms. I 
love shitstorms’13, and a month later: ‘I am my own shitstorm.’14
I argue that her pronounced interest in ‘shitstorms’ comes from her deep 
understanding of the nature of affect in political and social relations that 
becomes most visible in discussions and comments on social media. As 
she correctly assumes, the topic of the refugee crisis in Austria cannot be 
grasped, nor pushed forward, without taking note of the affects that the 
experience triggers in Austrians of all political beliefs and in the refugees. 
Instead of being concerned to create a neutral, unemotional setting of 
11 On 18 August 2015 for instance, Sargnagel writes: ‘It is nice to see how many people just 
naturally provide Traiskirchen with groceries and sanitary products, but it is also totally absurd 
how politics simply rely on that.’ (‘Schön zu sehen wieviele leute selbstverständlich traiskirchen 
mit lebensmitteln und hygieneartikeln versorgen, aber auch vollkommen absurd, wie sich die 
politik darauf verlässt.’), https://www.facebook.com/stefanie.sargnagel/posts/10153141457198037.
12 ‘20.8.2015: Gibt es eigentlich schon ein Traiskirchen-Stickeralbum, in das man seine 
Flüchtlinge einkleben kann, die man beim Spendenbringen knipst?’, Sargnagel, Statusmeldungen, 
p. 30. (This post is not available on Facebook any longer).
13 ‘Ich weiß nicht was alle gegen shitstorms haben ich liebe shitstorms’, Sargnagel, Ste-
fanie, Facebook-Post 23 September 2015, https://www.facebook.com/stefanie.sargnagel/
posts/10153217794643037.
14 ‘Ich bin mein eigener shitstorm’ Sargnagel, Stefanie, Facebook-Post 22 October 2015, https://
www.facebook.com/stefanie.sargnagel/posts/10153263895963037.
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discussion, she intentionally, through provocation and contradiction, creates 
a space that sets free not only opinions but also affects and emotions. This 
strategy has led to several escalations, sometimes to her temporary exclusion 
from Facebook,15 and in the case to be examined here to a name and shame 
on different media that affected Sargnagel seriously.
The case Sargnagel
Stefanie Sargnagel and f ive other emerging authors, among them Lydia 
Haider and Maria Hofer, travelled to Morocco in January 2017. The purpose 
of the trip was to f inish their current book projects. Two of them, Sargnagel 
and Haider, received partial funding from the Austrian Ministry of Culture 
(Bundesministerium für Bildung, Kunst und Kultur). Several weeks later, 
on 25 February 2017, the Austrian newspaper Der Standard published the 
article ‘Three Authors in Morocco: Now We Have a Horse and Hashish’,16 a 
travelogue that the three authors had written collectively. The travelogue, 
a harmless ‘byproduct’ of the trip, as Lydia Haider describes it,17 is split 
into short f ictional diary entries that each of the women wrote every day 
during the stay. Not surprisingly, the text as a whole is marked by satire, 
exaggeration and provocations, as well as by a mixture of facts and f iction. 
Again, Sargnagel and her co-authors address highly explosive topics in a 
provocative manner, and the three most provocative ones, that triggered 
the biggest part of comments, were the following:
1 Violence against animals, especially cats: most unbearable for self-
proclaimed cat-lovers were the f ictional accounts about Lydia Haider 
hating and assaulting animals. On 5 January, Sargnagel writes in the 
travelogue: ‘Lydia is the only vegetarian in the group, but in contrast 
to other vegetarians I know she is a vegetarian not because she loves 
animals but because she deeply hates them. Today she kicked a baby 
kitten aside, claiming it had rabies, after which she complacently took 
a bite from her vegetarian crêpe.’18 Lydia Haider confirms a few days 
15 In April 2016, her f ictional account about Alina Wychera, a politician focusing on identity 
politics, triggered so many hate comments that the author’s account was blocked during a couple 
of days, cf. Der Standard, 2016.
16 Haider et al., ‘Drei Autorinnen’.
17 ‘Wirbel um Marokko-Reisebericht’.
18 ‘Lydia ist die einzige Vegetarierin der Gruppe, aber im Unterschied zu den anderen Veg-
etarierInnen, die ich kenne, ist sie es nicht, weil sie Tiere liebt, sondern weil sie Tiere zutiefst 
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later: ‘I do hate all animals, profoundly, but doves are really nature’s 
worst creation.’19
2 Sexual provocation and challenging ‘the Austrian Angst’ of North 
Africans: Already in the fall 2015, Sargnagel had posted very provocative 
content on tensions that came up when suddenly many refugees came 
to Austria. On the one hand, many left-wing and liberal Austrians 
welcomed the refugees with enthusiasm; on the other, the concerns of 
more conservative voices, namely that many refugees were young single 
men and would try to get in touch with, sometimes to harass, Austrian 
women, were not completely groundless. Multiple debates about the 
role allocation of perpetrators and victims flared up, and Sargnagel’s 
contribution was pinpointing the blind spots:
‘so diff icult to distinguish on Facebook those guys who send you ‘you are 
beautiful’ messages from those who are the refugees you actually met…’20
 For the trip to Morocco, Sargnagel addressed the same topic, this time 
again blurring the roles of perpetrator and victim:
The trip is great. However, as women in our prime, we are slightly disap-
pointed about how people react on us. Miniskirt, going out with no bra 
and red lipstick forces Essaouira’s inhabitants to do nothing more than 
to say an indifferent ‘bon jour’ from time to time. And whenever we, 
willingly, sit down with them at the beach late at night, they want to get 
stoned and play Uno. Cologne Central Station has promised too much.21
3 Arts, idleness and tax money: The use and abuse of tax money for the 
life of emerging artists is one of the most controversial and explosive 
hasst. Heute hat sie eine Babykatze zur Seite getreten mit der Behauptung, sie habe Tollwut, 
danach biss sie selbstzufrieden in eine vegetarische Crêpe’, Haider et al., ‘Drei Autorinnen’.
19 ‘Ich hasse ja Tiere, von Grund auf, aber Möwen sind wirklich das Letzte vom Allerletzten 
in dieser unserer Schöpfung’, ibid.
20 ‘urschwer zu sagen welche auf facebook jetzt diese typen von denen man ‘you are beautiful’ 
messages im ‘others’ ordner hat sind und welche die f lüchtlinge, die man kennengelernt hat….’ 
Sargnagel, Stefanie, Facebook-post 13 September 2015, https://www.facebook.com/stefanie.
sargnagel/posts/10153198958428037.
21 ‘Dieser Urlaub ist toll. Als Frauen in den besten Jahren sind wir aber etwas enttäuscht über 
den Umgang mit uns. Minirock, Rausgehen ohne BH, roter Lippenstift ringen den Bewohnern 
Essaouiras nur hin und wieder ein desinteressiertes ‘Bon jour’ ab, und wenn wir uns spätnachts 
willig zu ihnen an den Strand setzen, wollen sie eingraucht Uno spielen. Der Kölner Hauptbahnhof 
hat echt zu viel versprochen’, Haider et al., ‘Drei Autorinnen’.
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topics Sargnagel often reflects on. On purpose, she often enacts her 
life as an artist as pure leisure paid by the state, as exemplif ied by the 
Morocco trip: ‘From time to time we hire poncy quads and, stoned, 
altogether speed around the idyllic beach with loud engine noises. That 
is what they call freedom. The BMUKK has given me a travel grant for 
that. (For the literature). If the FPÖ only knew.’22
These examples, again, shed a light on Sargnagel’s humour that works 
essentially through the spontaneous transgressions of the boundaries 
between fact and f iction and through sudden turns to irony. The fact that 
the reader must be alert at all time as Sargnagel’s text can turn into f iction 
or irony any moment, makes for an enjoyable yet demanding read that 
forces readers to leave their comfort zone. Moreover, the texts require a 
lot of knowledge on the part of the reader and they even work through the 
pleasurable exclusion of those who do not understand the transgressions 
and the insider jokes. Just take the comment on ‘Cologne Central Station’ 
that actually refers to a series of assaults made by young, mainly north 
African men on a considerable number of women during the night of New 
Year’s Eve in 2015 in front of Cologne central station. The events lead to a 
heated debate about migration, sexism and Western liberal values in which 
the conflicting roles of Muslims as victims of war and expulsion, but also as 
sexual perpetrators were widely discussed. Sargnagel not only nonchalantly 
refers to ‘Cologne Central Station’ without explaining the reference but 
also introduces the provocative point of view of Muslims as the target of 
harassment through sexually frustrated Austrian women.
To be at eye level with the text, Sargnagel’s texts require readers to never 
easily settle in a comfortable line of thought, but to always consider the 
complexity and the unpleasant aspects of the topic in question. Far more than 
to elaborate on her own thoughts about specific topics at length, Sargnagel’s 
activism consists in destabilizing deep-rooted patterns of thought and com-
fortable explanation patterns. The success of her texts results from the reader’s 
satisfaction of being able to understand the references, the irony and the 
provocations and to stay cool vis-à-vis the affective reactions that Sargnagel’s 
provocations might cause in people without the required flexibility of mind.
This is also how the article about the Morocco-journey works. Instead of 
conveying any reliable information on the trip, her travelogue is a Molotov 
22 ‘Immer wieder mieten wir uns prollige Quads und zischen eingraucht mit lauten Mo-
torengeräuschen zu sechst über den idyllischen Strand. Das ist Freiheit. Das Bmukk hat mir 
dafür einen Reisekostenzuschuss gewährt. (Für die Literatur.) Wenn das die FPÖ wüsste’, ibid.
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cocktail of explosive topics that are piled up onto each other. It could not 
be more obvious that combining cats, sex, Muslims and the waste of tax 
money in one article has only one aim: to trigger reactions; the article is a 
trap. Its mechanism is very simple: a person who affectively reacts to the 
content of the article has automatically disqualif ied him- or herself as a 
critical reader who understands satire. On the contrary, he or she belongs 
to those who are excluded by Sargnagel’s sense of irony, to those who are 
led through the Internet by affect instead of reflection. Imagining those 
who seethe with anger at Sargnagel’s provocations then becomes part of the 
pleasure for those readers who consider themselves on equal terms with the 
texts’ requirements. The trap did catch its ‘victims’. Although the satirical 
format was more than obvious and despite the fact that Der Standard had 
published the article in the section Culture/Literature, thereby hinting 
to the possibility of f iction or irony. Nevertheless, many Austrian media 
took everything to be real, fell into the trap, and started one of the biggest 
shitstorms that the Austrian cultural scene had ever seen.
The reactions came in two steps, the f irst being the article ‘Literary Jour-
ney – Drinking and Smoking Weed on the Taxpayers’ Expenses’, published 
by Die Krone on 8 March 2017. Die Krone is Austria’s most popular newspaper, 
a tabloid newspaper that usually supports the course of FPÖ, Austria’s 
right-wing party. The article cites original passages from the Standard 
article, although ripped out of context, and mentions the fact that the 
women in question are authors. However, the responsible journalist Richard 
Schmitt does not account for the context of f iction or satire and takes the 
content of the travelogue for real, at least he pretends to do so. Vis-à-vis the 
very obvious markers of satire in the text and the paratext of the Standard 
article, and considering Schmitt’s experience as a journalist and as the 
Krone’s chief editor, it is not probable that Schmitt missed the satirical and 
f ictional character of the text. It is rather likely that the article was already 
a kind of ‘revenge’ for a coverage on Sargnagel and her so-called ‘fraternity 
hysteria’ that the TV channel ORF had aired the day before.23
The article by Die Krone can be read as a f irst step of the shitstorm be-
cause it was actually the newspaper which made the topic of Sargnagel’s 
travelogue available to an audience and to social networks that would not 
read the article in Der Standard. In that function, the Krone can be seen 
as an intermediary between the Austrian intellectual, left-wing class that 
23 In the coverage, broadcasted within the news format ‘Kulturmontag’, ORF reports how 
the group Hysteria had disturbed the ‘Akademikerball’, a ball traditionally attended by ultra 
conservatives, FPÖ members and by (former) fraternity members, cf. Wienerin.at, 2017.
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reads Der Standard and the right-wing, FPÖ-oriented, conservative, often 
misogynistic and islamophobic readership of Die Krone. As the newspaper 
Der Kurier wrote on 10 March 2017, the effect of that contact is ‘as if two 
worlds collide that should not have touched each other.’24 From there, in 
a second step, the content spread within minutes to readers who would 
not even read Die Krone, but far more conspiracist newspapers or not even 
newspapers but only comments by (online) hate commentators.
Within the next hours and days, a couple of articles in clearly populist 
media went an important step further than the Krone article. Not only did 
these all pretend the details from the travelogue were real, calling the trip 
a ‘drug-journey’ and Sargnagel’s writings ‘the confessions of an animal 
abuser’,25 they also ‘enriched’ the story with details that make the perfect 
enemy and target for hate out of Stefanie Sargnagel. The article ‘Hofer-
Hater Does Drug-Journey on the Taxpayer’s Expenses’,26 published on the 
9 March 2017 by the online platform wochenblick.at, does this already in the 
title, which characterizes Sargnagel mainly through her activism against 
Norbert Hofer, the president of FPÖ. A second but even more important 
strategy of the same article is the creation of the cover image: it is a montage 
of the prototypical picture of a joint, a photograph of Stefanie Sargnagel 
wearing her ‘against nazis’ pullover and a screenshot from a post by Sargnagel 
that she made as a cynical reaction to the beginning of the shitstorm: ‘If 
the Krone knew that we did not only kick kittens’ asses but that we also 
fucked puppies to death…’
The online platform unzensuriert.at, again an FPÖ-friendly conspiracist 
organ, published a similar article on 11 March 2017: ‘Kicking baby kittens, 
smoking weed and drinking: ‘Literary journey’ on the tax payer’s expenses’.27 
The article not only presumes the ‘Literary journey’ to be only a pretext for 
a scandalous trip, but also characterizes Sargnagel as ‘a left-wing extrem-
ist’ and as ‘essentially an FPÖ-hater’. From Sargnagel and the €1.500 that 
were taken from the taxpayers, the article moreover quickly moves on to 
the Austrian Ministry of Culture’s ‘abominable and corrupt’ principles of 
attributing stipends to artists. It thus ties a network of emotive terms and 
‘hot topics’ that it knows will make the readers’ blood boil. In the context 
of that hate campaign, it is not only interesting to observe the increasing 
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the comments in newspaper forums and social media that accompanied 
the articles.
If we consult the comment forum of Der Standard in the days after the 
publication of the travelogue, we f ind a rather high amount of comments, 
almost 230 comments in the days before Die Krone publishes its article. It is 
astonishing that almost all comments in the Standard forum are adequate 
reactions to Sargnagels text. Criticism comes only from those who do not 
appreciate that the journey has been funded by a stipend from tax money. 
But no matter if people f ind the text ‘boring, immature, pointless’28 or if 
they appreciate the ‘mix of literary journal and Dschungelcamp-Satire’ as 
‘really funny’,29 no commentator actually doubts the satirical and f ictional 
character of the travelogue. Some even reflect on the mechanisms the text 
wants to trigger and make valid points in their analysis:
I think that’s what they wanted. Just shit-talk as much as possible and 
wait for the reactions. The product is not the text but the discussion after. 
I mean, they didn’t leave out anything: infantile behaviour, sex tourism, 
bohemian life style, tax misspending, drugs, André Heller… they did 
not even stop at kicking kittens. That is what makes me smile about the 
forum discussion.30
Several vitriolic comments like: ‘You f ind kicking kitten is funny?????? Are 
you crazy????’31 that found their way into the Standard forum all came in 
after the publication of the Krone article, supposedly by Krone readers, and 
are rare exceptions.
In comparison to that very homogeneous discussion on the Standard 
forum, things got far more heated on the Twitter prof iles of Stefanie 
28 ‘unglaublich unnötig von denen niemand was zu sagen […] gar nix langweilig, unreif, 
sinnarm_diese worte kommen mir beim Lesen dieses TB in den Sinn.’ Comment at the Standard 
Forum by ‘smily record’, 25 February 2017, 15:26:19, Haider et al., ‘Drei Autorinnen’.
29 ‘Ich fand das wirklich lustig. Offenbar als Einzige hier. Eine Mischung aus literarischem 
Tagebuch und Dschungelcamp-Satire.’ Comment at the Standard Forum by ‘lizboa, don’, 26 Febru-
ary 2017, 08:06:09, ibid.
30 ‘Ich denke das ist so gewollt. Fleißig shit talking betreiben und schauen was zurück kommt. 
Das Produkt ist nicht der Text sondern die Diskussion danach. Sie haben ja wirklich nix ausgelas-
sen: infantil, Sextourismus, Bobotum, Steuerverschwendung, Drogen, Andre Heller […] Ja, 
sogar vor dem Katzentreten haben sie nicht zurückgeschreckt. Deshalb schmunzle ich gerade 
besonders über das Forum. :)’ Comment at the Standard Forum by ‘Ich mag Züge’, 26 February 
2017, 12:31:13, ibid.
31 ‘Also Babykatze treten witzig f inden?????? Geht´s noch????’ Comment at der Standard 
Forum by ‘de-fake-news-gitti’, 9 March 2017, 09:49:46, ibid.
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Sargnagel and Richard Schmitt, the author of the Krone article, after the 
publication of his article. However, although the debates here are much more 
controversial than on the Standard forum, they are still rather equilibrated 
in the sense that both Sargnagel and Schmitt receive support and critique 
and in the sense that actual arguments are exchanged. Schmitt shared his 
article eleven times with different headers, on 8 March at 07:48am with 
the words ‘Drinking, smoking weed, kicking kitten – that deserves a travel 
grant. From our tax money.’32 This post on Twitter and the attached article 
led to different reactions, some of them being defamatory and irrespective 
towards Sargnagel, for example: ‘Sargnagel is the dumbest creature under the 
African sun. The living proof that the left is stupid.’33 But Schmitt received 
also a lot of critique for the post and the article, pointing to his own use 
of tax money (‘how much tax money does the Krone actually get as press 
subsidy?’34) or to his incapacity to detect satire: ‘being a ‘journalist’ you, 
theoretically, earn your money through writing but you don’t recognize 
satire?’35 The same applies for Stefanie Sargnagel’s Twitter profile, where she 
also gains lots of support on the one hand, as well as defamatory comments 
on the other. These ‘virtual’ debates have ‘real’ consequences: in another 
article by Die Kärntner Krone, a local newspaper owned by Die Krone, the 
journalist Fritz Kimeswenger published Sargnagels’s current address in 
Klagenfurt, mentioning in the same sentence that Sargnagel was ‘willing’ 
and thus brought her in actual danger.36 As a countermovement, the Austrian 
press council initiated legal proceedings for issues of media ethics against 
Die Krone.37 In addition, an online petition called for Fritz Kimeswenger’s 
dismissal, and different celebrities from Austria’s media industry spoke 
up for Sargnagel.38
32 ‘Saufen, kiffen, Babykatzen treten – dafür gibt’s ein Reisestipendium. Mit unserem Steuergeld.’ 
Twitter-post by @richardschmitt2, 8 March 2017, 07:48, https://twitter.com/RichardSchmitt2/
status/839551599785582592.
33 ‘@RichardSchmitt2 Die Sargnagl, das dünmste Geschöpf unter der Sonne Afrikas. Der 
lebende Beweis, das Links dumm ist.’ Twitter-post by @Maxx_Heidegger, 8 March 2017, https://
twitter.com/Maxx_Heidegger/status/839514949596692480.
34 ‘@RichardSchmitt2 wieviel steuergeld kriegt die krone eigentlich als presseförderung? @
stefansargnagel @CLangOnline’. Twitter-post by @ChristianMock, 8 March 2017, https://twitter.
com/ChristianMock/status/839595136732524550.
35 ‘@RichardSchmitt2 als ‘journalist’ zumindest theoretisch schreibend sein geld verdienen 
u dann keine satire erkennen.’ Twitter-post by @nopulse, 11 March 2017, https://twitter.com/
nopulse/status/840650400768356352.
36 For a screenshot of the article ‘Ex-LH Dörfler tritt zurück’, cf. Wienerin.at, 2017.
37 Österreichischer Presserat, OTS.at, ‘Presserat’
38 ‘Fall Sargnagel’.
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Still, although these articles and comments entail important conse-
quences, one has to consider that the Twitter and Facebook prof iles of 
Sargnagel and Schmitt were not the actual setting of the ‘core’ hate campaign. 
Although Richard Schmitt with his Krone article clearly initiated the hate 
campaign, and Stefanie Sargnagel even denunciates him (‘Just read the 
comments you trigger with such a misogynist article. Happy women’s Day.’39), 
the pure hate comments are spread on other walls, i.e. in reaction to other 
individuals sharing the articles published at Die Krone, wochenblick.at and 
unzensuriert.at. Mediated and torn through multiple biased intermediaries, 
the content that reaches these Internet communities and their readership 
has nothing to do with the original text anymore. The whole campaign is 
now oriented around Sargnagel as the target of an irrational hate, the details 
of the initial story are not only forgotten but do not matter at all.
As it is pointless to present a plethora of totally disconnected death and 
rape threats here, I will give only some examples, all of which can be found 
as a collection of screenshots that Stefanie Sargnagel compiled into the 
Facebook album ‘Richard Schmitt Wishes you a Happy Women’s Day’ on 
Facebook.40 Whereas some hate comments were ‘at least’ related to facts 
from the Sargnagel case, mainly on the animal abuse topic,41 on the waste 
of taxpayers’ money42 and on Muslim men,43 many others simply insulted 
her as a ‘dirty cunt’ or ‘genetic waste’ and wished her ‘generally speaking’ 
death and rape: ‘she needs the same treatment as what the Americans 
did to those bitches in Vietnam’ or ‘frustrated old women’s libber. They 
should be pushed in a hole with rapists in it.’44 What we can see from these 
extremely hateful and disrespectful comments is that vitriolic comments on 
the Internet are only rarely the result of the study of arguments. Instead of 
engaging with the actual content a person provides, vitriolic comments react 
39 ‘lesen sie mal die kommentare die sie mit so einem frauenhasser-artikel produzieren. 
fröhlichen frauentag.’ Twitter-post by @stefansargnagel, 8 March 2017. https://twitter.com/
stefansargnagel/status/839570421762637826.
40 A compilation of 32 comments has been collected as screenshots by Stefanie Sargnagel 
and can be found in the Facebook-album ‘Richard Schmitt wishes you a Happy Women’s Day’, 
9 March 2017, https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10154578674413037.1073741857.7112
48036&type=3.
41 ‘that monstrosity is a shame for every animal lover, vegetarian, vegan…’, ‘that animal torturer 
should be in a psychiatric institution’, ibid.
42 ‘put her into a labour camp’, ‘why would these betrayers of the nation not be put up against 
a wall? I could make a good job as an executioner’, ibid.
43 ‘I hope one of her beloved nafris (my apologies if that term is forbidden by now) does her 
really hard against her will in the staircase’, ibid.
44 All comments: ibid.
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in a generally refusing manner in order to unload frustration, strengthen 
their own position, or the one of their group, and humiliate the victim.45 
The level of debate and argument then gets completely out of sight.
As I have explained before, Stefanie Sargnagel is not afraid of ‘shitstorms’ 
and even harsh reactions for they illustrate the affects that she wants to show. 
The f irst reaction of Die Krone was thus more or less what she intended. In 
order to stoke the flames, immediately after the publication of the Krone 
article, she writes on Facebook: ‘If Die Krone knew that we did not only kick 
kittens’ asses but that we also fucked puppies to death…’46 That comment 
was again included in the wochenblick.at article as ‘the confessions of an 
animal abuser’,47 which pushed Sargnagel to write the following post:
Now that another right-wing medium has picked up on the point that 
we fucked puppies to death, I surrender and tell you the whole truth: […] 
we also whipped baby camels, while we, laughing, ate little patés from 
baby dolphins.48
For many readers of the debate, that comment was the drop that caused 
the barrel to overf low. After people complained about the author, her 
Facebook account was closed for a month. The events f inally led to a point 
where Sargnagel herself changed the tone back to argument. For instance, 
she had a very serious discussion with Richard Schmitt on Twitter.49 On 
12 March 2017, she even wrote a two-page statement where she mentions 
45 In her analysis of online hate speech from a psychological perspective, Josephine B. Schmitt 
names four motives pertaining to hate comments: exclusion of the other in order to reach a 
positive understanding of the self; intimidation of those who threaten the self; demonstration 
of dominance and power; fun and thrill, Schmitt, ‘Online Hate Speech’.
46 ‘wenn die krone wüsste, dass wir nicht nur babykatzen getreten, sondern, dass wir auch 
welpen zerf ickt haben…’ Sargnagel, Stefanie, Facebook-post 8 March 2015, https://www.facebook.
com/stefanie.sargnagel/posts/10154574558763037.
47 ‘Hofer-Hasserin’.
48 ‘nachdem ein weiteres rechtes medium nun auch aufgegriffen hat, dass wir welpen zerf ickt 
haben, gebe ich mich geschlagen und rücke mit der ganzen wahrheit raus: wir haben in marokko 
nicht nur babykatzen getreten und welpen zerf ickt. wir haben auch kleine babykamele ausge-
peitscht, während wir lachend faschierte laberl aus babydelf inen gegessen haben. dabei saßen 
wir auf baby schildkröten und dekoriert war das ganze szenario mit baby hamstern die wir auf 
palmen aufgehängt haben, nachdem wir sie mit unseren haschsspritzen betäubt haben. beim 
rückflug haben wir menschenbabys aus dem fenster geworfen auf eine babyinsel auf der nur 
babys leben, die von den andern babys erschlagen wurden.’ Sargnagel, Stefanie, Facebook-post 
9 March 2015, https://www.facebook.com/stefanie.sargnagel/posts/10154577761988037.
49 Cf. the discussion under a twitter post by Richard Schmitt on the 8 March 2017, https://
twitter.com/RichardSchmitt2/status/839551599785582592.
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that she was usually not easily intimidated but that, after the publication 
of her address, she felt uneasy at Klagenfurt.50
To sum up, it can be said that the hate campaign Sargnagel experienced 
consists of two phases: the f irst is the act of translation of provocative 
content from Sargnagel’s text into realms of a right-wing readership through 
Die Krone. As I have argued, it is very unlikely that journalists like Richard 
Schmitt do not understand the satirical frame of Sargnagel’s text. But he 
knew what some of her quotations would trigger in the Krone’s readership: 
affects like hate and anger, which means attention, clicks and money. In 
the second step, the content starts to circulate in total disconnection from 
its source and becomes the plaything of very aggressive online networks 
centred around the collective celebration of hate. Although these sorts of 
reaction were initially intended by Sargnagel, Hofer and Haider, the reach 
and the intensity of the hate comments and threats transgressed by far their 
expectations – while also affecting their personal resilience.
Affect and hate online
As I have said in the beginning of this case study, I argue that hate on the 
Internet is not a phenomenon of single actors sitting frustrated in front of 
their screens. Instead, it is a powerful dynamics of affect of a whole network 
of people. Affects like hate (be it against strangers, Muslims, women, etc.) is 
a constant affection that accompanies and pushes people through the online 
and the offline world, while they are at work, at home, in their couple or 
family, in private gatherings or on social media.51 Hate is constantly there, as 
a ‘movement of emotions and feelings in and out of the cyberspace, through 
bodies, psyches, texts and machines’,52 but cannot always be expressed as it 
is not tolerated in all contexts. The affect outbursts in protected realms and 
in exchange with like-minded people. That is why the network of hate and 
the network of the Internet largely overlap, as people f ind their platform 
of exchange and agency online, act out their hate, affect and offend each 
other, and also f ind new targets for their hatred, as the case Sargnagel 
shows: delivered in an already biased way by Die Krone, the Molotov cocktail 
that Stefanie Sargnagel, Lydia Haider and Maria Hofer prepared with their 
50 Twitter-post by @stefansargnagel, 12 March 2017, https://twitter.com/stefansargnagel/
status/840884161518960640.
51 See, for example, Bargetz and Sauer, ‘Der Affective Turn’.
52 Karatzogianni and Kuntsman, Digital Cultures, p. 2.
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travelogue is only one of many contents that make their way into a network 
of hate consisting of right-wing Austrians who strongly react to anything 
loosely connected to Islam, women, feminism, left-wing ideology, intel-
lectualism, certain elements of social injustice and other adjacent topics. 
Through intermediaries like Richard Schmitt, Fritz Kimeswenger and Die 
Krone, and even more through conspiracist organs like wochenblick.at and 
unzensuriert.at, the content is f iltered and arranged in the most effective 
way to appeal to people’s hate. These articles are orchestrated in a way that 
aims not at intellectual persuasion through argument but at the provocation 
of affects,53 that is ‘potential bodily responses, often autonomic responses, in 
excess of consciousness’.54 The software that is needed for these techniques 
to function is so easily accessible that even absolute beginners can create 
web content which at f irst glance (and often that is quite enough) looks 
conf idential. Often, the exponential logic of algorithms is on the side of 
those who express hate because the posts with the highest number of clicks 
are the most visible ones.
Thus the Internet and social media can be seen as an important play-
ground for people whose life is entangled with networks of hate. Hate posts 
and conspiracist articles play an important role because ‘the movement of 
violent words in online domains can intensify hatred and hostility’.55 For 
those who are members of online communities centred around hate, media 
technologies allow them ‘both to ‘see’ affect’, through the behaviour of other 
users, ‘and to produce affective bodily capacities beyond the body’s organic 
and physiological constraints’56, that is to extend the (felt) realm of agency. 
As the Internet and social media thus become a space for self-empowerment, 
they ‘insert the technical into the felt vitality, the felt aliveness given in 
the pre-individual bodily capacities to act, engage, and connect – to affect 
and be affected.’57
Still, the case of Sargnagel shows exactly that the Internet and social 
media alone cannot be blamed for the mechanisms of hate. Instead, the case 
shows that different communities create their own networks within the 
same medium and within the same social media platforms. Furthermore, 
53 By reframing content and taking it out of its context, by using collage techniques as we 
have seen it on wochenblick.at, content is moulded into the shape that affects the most. Claire 
Wardle explains these techniques in a very insightful article on the construction of Fake News: 
Wardle, ‘Fake News’.
54 Clough, ‘Introduction’, p. 2.
55 Karatzogianni and Kuntsman, Digital Cultures, p. 2.
56 Clough, ‘Introduction’, p. 2.
57 Karatzogianni and Kuntsman, Digital Cultures, p. 2.
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the clash of these networks as demonstrated in this case, the integration of 
information from the intellectual, left-wing network around Der Standard 
into the right-wing network of hate, leads to escalation. Hence, f ilter bub-
bles and echo chambers create the effect that different networks, almost 
different ‘Internets’, coexist, making the Internet for some users a space 
of hate, for others a space of tolerant exchange (and even support against 
such attacks).
Conclusion
The merit of Sargnagel’s text is to show what happens when the border 
between mutually exclusive networks and virtually closed communities 
is crossed. Her text is thus transgressive for several reasons. First, it is a 
transgression of the limits of ‘good taste’ but also a transgression of the 
discourse limits of the realms of different networks that rarely touch each 
other. Second, the text functions as a boycott in the sense that it wants to 
go beyond the borders of closed communities and reach out to a broader 
readership in order to affect people and push the debates further. Although 
it entailed a disaster for Sargnagel including death and rape threats, she 
did not change her provocative writing style – perhaps the best proof of 
her persistency is that a year after the whole scandal, she went to Morocco 
again and published another travelogue ‘Morocco Travel Journal II: ‘Steff i 
Got Married to Hassan’’ again in Der Standard.58 The article already counts 
more than 1,000 comments in the Standard forum.
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9 Ethical Implications of Onlife Vitriol
Katleen Gabriels and Marjolein Lanzing
Abstract
This chapter explores onlife vitriol from an ethical perspective. Traditional 
off line/online dualisms hinder in-depth understanding because online 
and offline violence are deeply interconnected, hence onlife. We discuss 
three cases of onlife vitriol: revenge rape and slut shaming, body shaming, 
and cyberbullying. Onlife vitriol opens up unprecedented forms of harm 
enabled, and often amplif ied, by the technology. We argue that this form 
of violence is currently inadequately addressed. Existing legal measures 
are not (yet) effective for preventing or ensuring suff icient reparation 
in cases of onlife vitriol. Societal debates about how to handle onlife 
vitriol lag behind despite implicit acknowledgement of its harmful effects. 
Greater media literacy and more research concerning the boundaries 
of monitoring are needed now that it has become increasingly easy to 
surveil, coveil, and sousveil.
Keywords: online vitriol, onlife vitriol, surveillance, coveillance, sousveil-
lance, violence
This chapter explores ethical concerns related to onlife vitriol. Online vitriol can 
be narrowly conceived. The Cambridge Dictionary for instance, defines vitriol 
as ‘violent hate and anger expressed through severe criticism.’1 We, however, 
take a broader approach by suggesting that instances of online vitriol can be 
conceptualized as onlife violence: violence that transgresses and affects both 
the offline and online world. While there is not a clear-cut, all-encompassing 
definition of violence,2 we conceptualize violence as the intentional physical 
or psychological, including reputational, harm inflicted on a person and/or 
1 See https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/vitriol.
2 See Vorobej, The Concept.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
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their property. In this conception, specific instances of hate speech can be 
understood as onlife violence because of their actual impacts, such as causing 
psychological harm. We discuss a number of cases that we consider as violent 
forms of onlife vitriol. Cases we zoom in on include revenge rape and slut 
shaming (cf. the 187 exposed snitches & bitches case), body shaming (cf. the 
Dani Mathers case), and cyberbullying (cf. the Amanda Todd case).
Our chapter draws upon the claim that traditional offline/online dualisms 
hinder our understanding of online violence exactly because online and 
offline violence are deeply interconnected, hence onlife. Modern informa-
tion and communication technologies tether actions committed in the 
off line world to the online and vice versa. Both online and off line acts 
of violence are part of one experienced and ongoing reality. The acts of 
violence at stake in our cases of vitriol cannot be reduced to virtual harm 
or regarded as separate from the offline realm. We argue that online vitriol 
is a new dimension of real violence that is ethically problematic because it 
opens up unprecedented forms of harm enabled, and often amplif ied, by 
the technology. Moreover, we argue that this form of violence is currently 
not adequately addressed in our society. As we will illustrate, existing 
legal measures are not (yet) effective for preventing or ensuring suff icient 
reparation in cases of onlife vitriol. At the same time, we argue that the 
societal debate about how to handle onlife vitriol lags behind even though 
there is implicit acknowledgement of its harmful effects.
Nowadays, the technological features of mobile computing facilitate 
new manifestations of surveillance, such as coveillance (peer monitoring), 
through new technological possibilities for immediate, cheap, and long-term 
recording.3 One of the f irst cases and an example of how peer monitoring 
can become a pernicious form of visibility and Internet vigilantism is the 
infamous Dog Poop Girl case from 2005. Photographs – taken with camera 
phones – of a young woman who refused to clean up after her dog had 
defecated on the subway train, were shared online after which the woman 
was harassed and threatened relentlessly.4 A second interesting case of the 
perniciousness of an online memory is the one of the late Ilse Uyttersprot, 
former mayor of the Belgian city Aalst, who was secretly recorded while 
having sex in a public space. Four years later, she was confronted with the 
material, which had spread like wildfire across various social network sites 
and websites, compromizing her position as mayor.5 New technological 
3 See, for example, Allen, ‘Dredging Up’.
4 Henig, ‘The Tale of Dog Poop Girl’.
5 Gabriels, Onlife.
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features problematize acts of violence in a worrying way. Technologies allow 
victims to be haunted and (repeatedly) harmed by violence in perpetuity, 
which affects their off and online lives.6
We will unfold our arguments in the following way. First, we elaborate 
on our basic conceptual assumption that offline/online dualisms hinder 
our understanding of online violence (and vitriol) by drawing from the 
literature.7 Second, we propose that modern ICTs provide a new, ethically 
problematic dimension to violence because their features allow ongoing 
repetitive violence. Users carry their camera-equipped smartphones with 
access to online platforms with them and can instantly upload photos, 
f ilms, and other data to millions of users.8 In so doing, we introduce and 
discuss three specif ic cases of onlife vitriol. First, the case Amanda Todd 
(2012), a Canadian girl who was severely cyberbullied and bullied at school, 
and eventually committed suicide. Second, the case Dani Mathers (2016) on 
body shaming: Mathers posted a nude picture of a woman showering at her 
local gym online, which subsequently went viral. Finally, the case on 187 
exposed snitches & bitches (2017-2018) on slut shaming and revenge rape.
All cases have female victims, which is not to say that men cannot suffer 
from onlife vitriol. In fact, awful cases of onlife vitriol, including the suicide 
of Tyler Clementi in 2010, who was f ilmed with a webcam, installed by his 
roommate, while exploring his gay sexuality, happen to men as well. While 
onlife vitriol affects many different user groups – becoming a victim of 
onlife vitriol can happen to anyone – we recognize that some user groups 
are more vulnerable because of their gender, ethnicity, and sexuality. One 
such user group consists of (young) women, who are particularly vulnerable 
because of their gender and (sometimes) intersecting ethnicity.9
We conclude that new ICTs have given rise to onlife vitriol: a form of 
violence that transgresses and affects both the offline and online world. We 
advocate for greater media literacy among users but also for more research 
into questioning and regulating the boundaries of monitoring now that it 
has become increasingly easy to surveil, coveil, and sousveil through our 
smartphones and connected online platforms.10 Not only can companies 
and governments track and watch consumer or citizens behaviour from 
6 Fox et al., ‘Perpetuating Online Sexism’.
7 Dibbell, ‘A Rape’; Dibbell, My Tiny Life; Gabriels, ‘Ethics and Morality’; Henry and Powell, 
‘Embodied Harms’.
8 Blanchette and Johnson, ‘Data Rentention’.
9 Fraser, ‘Sex, Lies’; Dugan, ‘Online Harrassment’.
10 Citron and Franks, ‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’; Huff et al., ‘Virtual Harms’; Marwick and 
Miller, ‘Online Harassment’.
200 k aTleen gabrielS and Mar Jolein lanzing 
above, or surveil, but new technologies enable coveillance, that is, the 
multidirectional type of peer monitoring found on social network sites. 
They allow users to watch each other’s posts and re-share or copy them. 
Moreover, new technologies enable users to sousveil: to track and watch those 
in power from below, for instance, by using mobile or wearable devices to 
record protests or police action.11 When we discuss monitoring throughout 
this chapter, we mainly focus on coveillance since this form of monitoring 
is particularly interesting from the perspective of vigilantism.
Onlife vitriol: Coveillance and pernicious memory
In this first part, we address the conceptual underpinnings of the notion onlife 
and its specific repercussions for online vitriol and harm. Because online acts 
of vitriol are likely to have actual-world impacts, such as psychological harm, 
we emphasize the reality status of online settings, which fall within the scope 
of ethical consideration. It is important to underscore the hybridization of 
online and offline, among others in terms of identity and sociality.
In the early days of the World Wide Web, the f irst-generation theorists of 
the 1990s approached the online-offline relation in terms of an ontological 
dualism rather like a mind-body split, hereby emphasizing how the virtual 
is radically divorced from the real.12 The Internet was looked upon as a 
walled-off space where actual-world rules did not apply and where people 
could leave behind their emotional embodied selves. A dualism was at play 
between ‘“virtuality”, which is associated with information, the mind, and 
fantasy, and “reality”, which is associated with materiality and the body’.13
At the end of the 1990s this ontological dualism was gradually disproven 
by empirical research and phenomenological approaches, showing more of 
a merging between online and offline identities. An interesting example is 
Markham (1998) who started from a clear-cut dichotomy in her empirical 
study. She eventually destabilized the dichotomy when her findings revealed 
that users conceive virtual experiences as real ones and do not operationalize 
a dualism.14 People do not start their online lives from a blank slate, as they are 
always rooted in autobiographical, social, moral, and cultural contexts. Both 
online and offline experiences are part of one continuous everyday reality.
11 Mann et al., ‘Sousveillance’.
12 Ess, ‘Self, Community’.
13 Schultze and Rennecker, ‘Reframing’, p. 337.
14 Markham, ‘Life Online’, pp. 119-120.
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It also became clear that crossing moral boundaries in online settings 
could have actual-life impacts. A seminal text, based on a true event, in 
this context, is ‘A rape in cyberspace’.15 Julian Dibbell chronologically 
reports on how Mr. Bungle raped Legba and Starsinger in the text-based 
social virtual world LambdaMOO. The victims reported to be distressed by 
the events, such as crying behind their computer screen. Many residents 
supported the victims and condemned Mr. Bungle’s actions. They argued to 
decide on what would be a proper punishment for the wrongdoer. As there 
were no explicit rules against rape, the community gathered for a public 
meeting in the online environment of LambdaMOO. Although community 
members had deviating views on the severity of the incident, many of 
them believed that the harm-doer could not escape sanctioning. This 
event revealed that LambdaMOO was a meaningful environment for its 
residents, and that online practices are enacted within a moral framework. 
This way, they fall within the consideration of ethics. Online harm should 
not be easily dismissed with arguments such as: ‘it only took place online’ 
or ‘just go off line, shut down your computer’. Dibbell’s depiction of the 
online rape also forced Internet researchers to acknowledge the reality 
status of online experiences. In Buchanan’s phrase, ‘this incident was 
seminal in pushing the boundaries of online experiences into human 
subjects research.’16
Virtual space has to be understood as an embodied space in which 
actual-life selves, practices, and norms continue to exist. Subsequently, 
dualist views in terms of virtual versus actual selves were deconstructed 
and brought about a view on virtual selfhood in terms of an extension, 
rather than a disruption of actual self. This turn in conceptual thought led 
to new notions of the self as an onlife self,17 to highlight the hybridization of 
both selves, and a smeared-out self to emphasize that the self is distributed 
across multiple communication networks.18 The self stretches out over the 
online and offline world: these worlds are interwoven, instead of distinct. 
Online and offline forms of social, moral, and cultural life mutually influ-
ence each other and are deeply interwoven. Therefore, dualisms hinder 
our understanding of online vitriol. In the next section we discuss three 
cases of onlife vitriol that we subsequently build on to further develop our 
theoretical perspectives.
15 Dibbell, ‘A Rape’.
16 Buchanan, ‘Internet Research Ethics’, p. 89.
17 Floridi, ‘The Informational Nature’.
18 Ess, ‘The Embodied Self ’.
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Cases of onlife vitriol
Vitriol in online settings is a new dimension of real violence that opens up 
unprecedented forms of harm that are enabled, and often amplif ied, by the 
technology. Technological features play an important role in mediating and 
shaping the violence and its impact. The immediacy, speed of dissemination, 
the scope (scale), the easiness to share and copy the information inherent to 
many new ICTs give rise to new feature-related practices such as coveillance, 
which can turn into social policing or even vigilantism.
A good example of onlife vitriol is bullying. Classical bullying was con-
f ined to face-to-face settings. Nowadays, bullying moves between online 
and offline contexts. The impact has worsened because, among other things, 
an anonymous (invisible) audience can witness the bullying. Even though 
more research is needed on the effects and impacts of cyberbullying versus 
in-person bullying, there is evidence that technology has amplif ied the 
effects of classical bullying in the case of cyberbullying.19
An example of bullying that shows the onlife impact on victims’ lives is the 
case of the Canadian teenager Amanda Todd. Between 2009-2010, a picture 
of her breasts was circulated online after she was blackmailed. As a result, 
Todd was bullied at school and online. Despite the decision of her family 
to move several times, Todd could not escape the onlife vitriol because the 
information that harmed her was disseminated online. Eventually, in 2012, 
Amanda posted a YouTube video in which she disclosed the harassment 
and how this harmed her. A week after, she committed suicide.
The second case of onlife vitriol we discuss is the Dani Mathers case. In 
2016, Dani Mathers, a former Playboy model, publicly posted a picture that 
she made with her smartphone of a 70-year-old naked woman showering at 
her gym in Los Angeles on Snapchat, with the words ‘If I can’t unsee this, 
then you can’t either.’ Mathers also posted a self ie with her hand before her 
mouth, depicting herself in mock shock. The picture subsequently went viral 
and several newspapers and (news) websites published it (although partly 
blurred) as well. People worldwide criticized Mathers for body shaming. 
Mathers was charged with invasion of privacy and eventually sentenced 
in 2017 to thirty days of community service and a probation period of three 
years.20 This case is a good illustration of onlife vitriol, though there was, 
just like in the aforementioned example of LambdaMOO, no actual physical 
harm. The victim’s privacy was violated and she was humiliated in front of 
19 See among others, Campbell, ‘Cyber Bullying’; Kowalski et al., ‘Bullying’; Yar, ‘The Novelty’.
20 See Hauser, ‘Dani Mathers’.
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the world’s eye. Although it is debatable that Mathers could foresee that her 
picture went viral, she intentionally uploaded it on Snapchat, together with 
harsh words, and subsequently caused psychological harm to the victim.21
Our f inal case is ‘187 exposed snitches & bitches’. The Dutch Broadcast 
Organization (NOS) uncovered and researched slut shaming app-groups on 
Telegram, a smartphone communication application that is the equivalent 
of the more popular WhatsApp. These app-groups aim to expose and shame 
women of Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds who are perceived to have 
transgressed cultural behavioural norms of sexuality. This ranges from 
pictures in which a girl is not wearing a headscarf to explicit nudes. One 
way of proof includes sharing names and phone numbers along with nude 
photos or videos, including photos of minors. These app-groups are titled 
‘187 exposed snitches & bitches’ or ‘headscarfs 18+’ and include thousands of 
users. The app-groups intentionally aim to harm the reputations of women 
by exposing their (sexual) behaviour.22 The social consequences of being 
mentioned in these app-groups are extreme, including rejection (of the girls’ 
family) by the community. Young women whose pictures are shared on these 
apps are often oblivious and will only later suffer from the consequences 
of a destroyed reputation and honour. This example of online shaming has 
been referred to as a form of honour killing.23
New features of ICTs afford new forms of problematic violence, because 
they allow and facilitate repetitive violence. In the next section we continue 
our analysis about how these features problematize and amplify acts of 
violence in a worrying way from the perspectives of pernicious memory 
and coveillance.
Dustbin to freezer: The importance of forgetting in a world of 
increasing surveillance
The problem of onlife vitriol stems from a more general problem regarding 
the continuous visibility of users and the coveillance and pernicious memory 
that new technological features afford. Until f ifteen years ago it would have 
been a reasonable expectation that one’s history was a personal and private 
matter. Dredging up and displaying your past behaviour would have cost a 
great deal of effort and, therefore, would have been highly unlikely. Formerly, 
21 Schladebeck, ‘Woman Body-Shamed’.
22 See, for example, Pruis et al., ’Vrouwen online’.
23 El Abdouni, ‘Er is een seksualiteitsoorlog’.
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when teenagers would transfer schools they experienced something that 
most teenagers today perhaps no longer experience: a fresh start. New 
technologies, such as social network sites, enable the constant recording of 
one’s personal information, including self ies, YouTube clips, live-streams, 
Facebook posts, and Instagram posts and tweets. Starting with a clean slate 
and building a new life can become diff icult, because past and current 
actions are now equally easy to access: ‘Electronic accessibility renders past 
and current events equally knowable. The very ideas of ‘past’ and ‘present’ 
in relation to personal information are in danger of evaporating’.24
Following new possibilities of technology, our expectations regarding the 
privacy of our past have changed accordingly. New technologies mediate our 
expectations from different social contexts. Information about a person that 
was once contained to the classroom can now end up at one’s workplace. It 
has become increasingly diff icult to separate social contexts and to control 
the information that spills over into different social contexts through the use 
of ICTs. Not reviewing what turns up on Google when you enter your name 
before going to a job interview or not expecting your employer to review 
your online presence is now considered to be naïve and even negligent. 
Yet, distancing ourselves, at the very least from the mistakes, diversions 
from, or transgressions of the social norm, we wish to put behind us seems 
a reasonable demand from a psychological, social, and ethical perspective. 
We f irst discuss the f irst two reasons, before raising the underlying ethical 
rationale.
The psychological function of forgetting
Forgetting has a psychological function. Memories can terrorize one’s life 
and chill one’s actions. Imagine suffering from hyperthymesia; a condition 
of perfect autobiographical memory. People who suffer from hyperthymesia 
are incapable of reconstructing or reinterpreting personal narratives 
because the memories are unusually accurate and complete.25 One can 
imagine several mental health hazards that accompany the impossibility 
of forgetting past experiences such as the inability to process traumatic 
experiences. Many psychological strategies are aimed at distancing the 
subject from her experiences in order to move on, to make room for new 
24 Allen, ‘Dredging up’, p. 62.
25 Burkell, ‘Remembering Me’, p. 2.
eTHical iMPlicaTionS of onlife ViTriol 205
experiences, or to forgive themselves or others for past actions.26 In the case 
of Amanda Todd, she was unable to distance herself from her traumatic 
experiences. This was largely due to the pernicious online memory, but 
also because her harasser, a (suspected) Dutch man who controlled her 
information, continued to monitor her actively at a distance. New ICTs 
enabled him to repeatedly harm her reputation at every new school by 
posting her nude pictures online and distributing them among her new 
social contacts.
The fading, reinterpretation, or blocking of memories with the passing 
of time or specif ic therapy is necessary for placing distance between the 
past and the present, for being able to look upon an experience from a 
more detached perspective. Imagine having to relive the emotions one 
felt after a past break-up with the same intensity ten years later or imagine 
re-experiencing the psychological effects of being humiliated, bullied, or 
shamed on a daily basis.
The victim of the Dani Mathers case experienced severe loss of control 
when she was humiliated before an international audience. The wide dis-
semination of the picture is still obvious today, as it can still be found online. 
Also, people can easily save it to their computer, so it is impossible to estimate 
how widely the picture was actually disseminated. Going to the gym was 
a trivial event that nonetheless put the victim before the public eye and 
made her a news topic. While she expressed that she would like to move 
on, this has been made impossible. The ability to move past victimhood or 
trauma largely depends on the ability to forget.
The social function of forgetting
The socio-legal perspective on the importance of forgetting is tightly wound 
up with the psychological value of forgetting and, as we will see, the ethical 
considerations with regard to the value of privacy and forgetting. The right 
to be forgotten received special attention. In 2014, Google Spain lost a case 
against Mario Costeja González, a Spanish citizen who requested the removal 
of an Internet link. The link led to a newspaper article from 1998 in which 
the foreclosure of his house was announced, as well as its auction, which 
was related to a debt he owed at the time. He had since paid off his debt and 
reasoned that he had the right to have this information removed since all 
26 An example is eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) treatment: a 
therapeutic method for severely traumatized patients basically enables an accelerated process.
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matters had been resolved.27 The European Court of Justice ruled in favour of 
Costeja González and asked Google to comply with the right to be forgotten 
and remove the link. Costeja Gonzálezs claim set a precedent for 12.000 
requests for the removal of personal data on the f irst day of compliance only.
While the recent court decision regarding the right to be forgotten has 
sparked international debate, the concept of social forgetfulness is far from 
controversial. It has been institutionalized in our society as an important 
value. Examples are policies and legislation including bankruptcy law, 
juvenile crime records, and credit reporting that protect social forgetful-
ness and, relatedly, the chance to start over.28 After all, forgiveness and 
forgetting are very closely related. Social forgetting may allow people to try 
again without the constant burden of their past. To be freed from ones past 
behaviour and to be granted a clean slate may cause people to feel trusted 
and to trust themselves again.
While these socially institutionalized forms of forgetfulness are oriented 
towards perpetrators, the right to be forgotten is interesting also from the 
perspective of victims of onlife vitriol. For instance, Google has commit-
ted to this forgetfulness by removing links to pictures and videos that 
include revenge rape or revenge porn.29 Nevertheless, the Dani Mathers 
case clearly shows how challenging it is to grasp, act on, and control acts 
of onlife vitriol in order to mitigate its impact on victims. The impact of 
the viral picture taken by Mathers was amplif ied because of present-day 
ICTs. Twenty-f ive years ago, using a ref lex camera, it would have been 
more diff icult to secretly take a picture. Also, the speed to disseminate 
it online was signif icantly slower in the early days of the World Wide 
Web. Mathers’s behaviour was mediated and co-shaped by technology: a 
smartphone camera, a mobile Internet connection, an account on a social 
network site, and so forth. All of these were immediately within reach by 
merely pressing some buttons.
Moreover, Mathers’s behaviour was shaped by shifting norms on sharing 
information online and coveillance: making and uploading pictures and 
videos without obtaining consent has become a daily habit. In the past 
years there have been shocking cases, such as the real-time streaming of 
murder on Facebook Live and rape on Periscope.30 While we often discuss 
27 ‘Google Spain SL’.
28 Blanchette and Johnson, ‘Data Retention’.
29 See for example Edwards, ‘Revenge Porn’. Hartzog and Selinger, ‘Google’s Action’.
30 McPhate, ‘Teenager is Accused’.
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the meaning of privacy in a digital age, there is too little public discussion 
regarding the consequences of coveillance as a form of vigilantism.
Even though in the Mathers case the perpetrator was legally prosecuted 
and sanctioned, the human costs remain high. The victim only spoke 
through her attorney, expressing her wish to leave the case behind her.31 
But, as we discussed in the previous section, the psychological harm that 
the victim suffered from and continues to suffer from due to the fact that 
her pictures can still be found online today and cannot be removed, is 
done. From a legal point of view, it is not easy to compensate for all these 
consequences.
Finally, legal steps against perpetrators generally are incredibly diff icult 
to take. In the Amanda Todd case, the perpetrator was only investigated, 
identif ied as a Dutch man and sentenced to prison in March 2017, long after 
her death. In the ‘187 exposed snitches & bitches’ case, the harassers are 
anonymous groups of men that are diff icult to investigate. The Telegram 
app-groups that they use are not publicly accessible. One can join only when 
one is invited and these app groups are exclusive to men. Also, Telegram 
allows for anonymous participation. This makes it more diff icult to do 
research. Moreover, online revenge rape is a murky legal terrain.32 The 
police expresses that it experiences diff iculty in classifying the victims of 
onlife vitriol. In the Netherlands, Minister Grapperhaus (Justice and Safety) 
is working on a modernization of the law regarding revenge rape as a form 
of onlife vitriol.33
The ethical perspective on forgetting
Granting people the opportunity to start over and not to be burdened by the 
past is something that we intuitively seem to f ind the right or kind thing to 
do, because this opens up space to develop oneself.34 Without forgetfulness, 
society would become a suffocating place. Allen (2008) argues that new ICTs 
raise concerns with regard to an everlasting, objective memory and the 
effect of the continuous possibility of dredging up the past. Burkell (2016) 
reiterates these concerns, claiming that digital systems that remember 
everything threaten our personal, narrative identity and human flourishing. 
31 See Schladebeck, ‘Woman Body-Shamed’.
32 Pruis et al., ‘Vrouwen online exposed’.
33 ‘Grapperhaus’.
34 Blanchette and Johnson, ‘Data Retention’, p. 37.
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Along with Dodge & Kitchin (2007) and Mayer-Schönberger (2009), Burkell 
argues that forgetting is a psychological necessity and that, therefore, we 
are in need of an ethics of forgetting.
The ethical importance of forgetting lies in the right to change. The 
underlying value is autonomy and, more specif ically, the ability to express 
and thus develop the self freely. Self-expression and self-development are 
inhibited when one worries about being confronted with one’s expres-
sions, through image and text, in the future and when one adapts one’s 
behaviour according to a perceived social norm. Often this is referred to 
as the chilling effect.35 The chilling effect resonates nicely with Anita 
Allen’s dustbin-freezer analogy (2008). Posting information through new 
ICTs, Allen argues, should be compared to storing something in a freezer, 
rather than throwing it out into the dustbin. In the past our behaviour and 
actions would have been forgotten for the most part; they would have ended 
up in the proverbial dustbin. Today, however, all information, however 
briefly present on the web, is instantly and automatically copied, shared, 
and stored on multiple servers, either by users or by corporations. Whether 
your actions are offline or online, your behaviour is more likely to be frozen 
and kept fresh in the digital freezer, ready to be defrosted sometime in 
the future. The problem that has been exacerbated and, therefore, has 
become more harmful with new ICTs, is that one can be confronted with 
a copy of her past or a combination of copies of her past at any given time. 
While the bits and chunks of information or data posted and stored on the 
Internet of course do not instantly constitute a memory, we agree with 
Burkell that a digital record ‘constitutes an array of potential memories, 
the very existence of which may compromise our ability to forget, or move 
on’.36 One’s digital(ized) behaviour may become an eternal reminder of 
and potential confrontation with the (bad) choices and actions one once 
made or became the victim of. This may result in a form of repetitive and 
ongoing violence.
The possibility of being confronted with one’s past behaviour alone 
has a chilling effect on one’s behaviour. Moreover, who is monitored and, 
consequently, whose information is shared and stored, is susceptible to 
biases, including gender.37 For instance, young women express that they 
should be more careful than their male counterparts about how they present 
35 Schneier, Data and Goliath.
36 Burkell, ‘Remembering Me’, p. 16.
37 Monahan, ‘Dreams of Control’.
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themselves online.38 They report that they are judged more harshly. Moreo-
ver, as exemplif ied in the 187 exposed snitches & bitches case, they are not 
only vulnerable to social control and onlife vitriol from the perspective of 
gender but also from the perspective of their ethnicity and corresponding 
cultural backgrounds.
Coveillance, which has become a normalized practice across social 
network sites, and pernicious memory enable and increase the impact of 
behavioural policing or vigilantism. The ‘187 exposed snitches & bitches 
case’ illustrates this as well. Pictures and videos from the Telegram-apps 
were also shared on other social network sites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube, creating a collective memory with which the victims are 
confronted every day. One victim, Ouahiba, stated in a video on YouTube 
that pictures and videos she shared three years ago with a trusted partner, 
that do not represent her now, were circulated across multiple forms of 
social network sites every day for three years after and destroyed her life.39
Onlife vitriol impacts career opportunities and personal relationships. 
Ouahiba stated that her employer was informed about her pictures, which 
affected her work. She also stated that she lost her friends because of her 
tainted reputation. Clearly, the fact that this all plays out on social network 
sites does not mean that the wishes or the trauma and suffering of the victims 
are less real. One mother posted a heart-breaking message on the NOS 
news webpage in which she pleads the app groups to delete her daughter’s 
pictures.40 Ouahiba also asks her audience on YouTube whether, even if she 
deserved social punishment, it is fair and reasonable to punish someone 
every day for three years in a row.41
The combination of coveillance and pernicious memory enables social 
policing and vigilantism, which has a detrimental effect on experimentation, 
creativity, and invention. Taking risks or deviating from the (perceived) 
social norm may have dire consequences because one’s actions will be 
saved forever and therefore liable to public scrutiny forever. Importantly, 
this causes a problem for the free and dynamic shaping of one’s identity. In 
sum, modern ICTs afford new, ethically problematic dimensions to violence 
because of their technological characteristics.
38 Steeves and Bailey, ‘Living in the Mirror’.
39 See ‘Mijn verhaal – Ouahiba’, published 17 November 2017 on YouTube, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=EMdcv7kBID0 Accessed 27 August 2020.
40 Pruis et al., ‘Vrouwen online exposed’.
41 For the link, see footnote 39.
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Concluding thoughts
In this chapter, we sought to broaden the notion of (online) vitriol by con-
ceptualizing it as onlife violence: violence that transgresses and affects 
both the off line and online world. In doing so, we elaborated on three 
cases to illustrate how violence has changed with the affordances of new 
technologies. Both greater media literacy among users and more empirical 
and conceptual research are required, amongst others on regulating the 
boundaries of monitoring since it has become increasingly easy to coveil 
with present-day ICTs. We are never cut off from the network: we are in 
fact always and already on, making it impossible to log out. In the past, only 
children born into royal families or children of celebrities grew up in front 
of cameras and in front of the public eye. Yet, nowadays virtually every child 
in the West grows up in front of multiple cameras: a baby monitor with a 
camera at home, surveillance cameras on the street, personal smartphone 
cameras, dashcams, recreational drones, and so on.
It is our contention that onlife vitriol is a form of violence that is inad-
equately addressed at the moment in our society. While intuitively we agree 
that cases of onlife vitriol as presented in this chapter are forms of violence, 
the means society has at her disposal to combat this violence are limited. 
This clearly comes to the fore in the Dani Mathers case, in which the victim 
could not be offered adequate reparation (her photos are still online today); 
the ‘187 exposed snitches & bitches’ case, in which victims reported to the 
police but the police did not know what to do with these reports and which 
only after this case has stirred a debate in the Netherlands about adequate 
legislation; and the Amanda Todd case in which only after her death the 
alleged perpetrator (who harassed many other girls at the same time) was 
arrested42. The law is, of course, not the only tool for combatting onlife 
vitriol. We suggest that a societal debate about the meaning, harm, and 
solutions regarding onlife vitriol is important in order to raise awareness 
and to educate users and citizens. Moreover, we are in need of adequate 
policies regarding onlife vitriol that recognize its dynamic and crossover 
nature, as well as the actual-life impact of it. We are already always on, but in 
a society that is increasingly becoming smart (cf. the Internet of Things and 
smart cities), the ethics of onlife vitriol should be a crucial societal debate.
42 Although it has been argued that the US and Canada have adequate laws to combat this 
type of harassment, it has also been argued that the cultural mores prevented the law from 
being successfully invoked. See also: https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/
the-story-of-amanda-todd.
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10 ‘I Wasn’t Chastised Properly’
On Trolls and Misogyny
Sophie Schwarz
Abstract
The following chapter provides an insight into feminist activism by pre-
senting reactions to a poster campaign conducted in 2017. The campaign 
aimed at f inding out whether and why feminism is still needed in today’s 
society by asking people to share their reasons for why they need feminism 
on the poster printouts that were put up at a university campus. It docu-
ments and critically reflects on serious reasons people wrote down on 
the posters by means of semantic and statistical analysis. Furthermore, 
it discusses the offline vitriol the campaign received, such as the hateful 
treatment of the poster printouts and the misogynist comments on them, 
and thus demonstrates that trolling is a phenomenon that is not only 
limited to online social media platforms.
Keywords: feminism, feminist activism, vitriol, misogyny, trolls
Aranya Johar’s wake-up call ‘A Brown Girls’ Guide to Gender’ (2017), in 
which she publicly shares her personal experiences with the discrimination 
of Indian women, went viral on the Internet. A year before, during the 
United States presidential election, not only Donald Trump’s slogan ‘Make 
America Great Again’ was promoted by the media but also his discriminating 
statement from 2005 ‘Grab ’em by the pussy’ that accompanied the rest of his 
campaign. Aside from the by now old-fashioned argument that ‘feminism 
has reached its goals’, these contrasting examples show that there are new 
waves of misogyny as well as new radical intersectional forms of feminism 
arising. As a reaction to this polarized status quo, I conducted a poster 
campaign in 2017. It aimed at f inding out whether and why feminism is still 
needed in today’s society by asking people to share their reasons for why 
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
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they need feminism on the poster printouts. This chapter provides insight 
into one form of feminist activism and focuses on the vitriolic reactions 
that the campaign received. These reactions demonstrate that trolling is a 
phenomenon that is not only limited to online social media platforms. In 
addition to categorizing and evaluating people’s reactions to the campaign 
by means of semantic and statistical analysis, the chapter furthermore 
focuses on the interrelation between trolling and misogyny1.
Background
The 2017 campaign was inspired by a social media photo campaign con-
ducted in 2012 by students at Duke University, Durham, NC called ‘Who 
Needs Feminism?’. With this campaign, 16 female students ‘decided to f ight 
back against […] popular misconceptions surrounding the feminist move-
ment’, such as the ‘man-hating, bra-burning, whiny liberal’, the ‘Feminazi 
or slut’.2 They state that
[o]ur class was disturbed by what we perceive to be an overwhelmingly 
widespread belief that today’s society no longer needs feminism. In order 
to change this perception, we have launched a PR campaign for feminism. 
We aim to challenge existing stereotypes surrounding feminists and 
assert the importance of feminism today.3
It is important to say that the initiators did not provide any def initions of 
feminism. On the contrary, they wanted to f ind out what people perceive 
feminism to be with their campaign. The students asked people to write 
down reasons for why they need feminism. A picture of each participant 
was taken while holding up a sign with their personal reason on it and 
then posted on the off icial campaign’s blog.4 The campaign itself was a 
huge success and quickly went viral on the Internet. The people taking 
part in the campaign gave a variety of different reasons for why they need 
feminism, including body shaming, inequality concerning their profession, 
1 Sophie Schwarz is a pseudonym. I would like to thank Sara Polak and Greta Olson for inviting 
me to contribute my experiences to the discussion on which this book is based. Also, I would 
like to thank Maren Walinski for her helpful thoughts and comments on the campaign as well 
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discrimination, misogyny as well as social, political or cultural reasons. 
The campaign conducted in 2017, however, differs in some ways from the 
original campaign, as is explained in the following section.
The campaign
Unlike the original online campaign, the campaign in 2017 was designed to be 
an offline campaign.5 This was for two reasons: First, the intention was to limit 
the campaign to an academic context, namely a university, since the students’ 
opinions on feminism should be focused on. The underlying assumption was 
that students at the Humanities, in Cultural Studies in particular, are familiar 
with Gender Studies and Feminism, since a variety of lectures and seminars are 
offered in these fields and popular among students. Thus, it can be assumed that 
many students are reflective on issues such as discrimination or misogyny. An 
online campaign, on the other hand, would not have prevented the campaign 
from spreading throughout the Internet and, thus, would have left the academic 
context. Second, the campaign should be protected from trolls, as trolling is 
a common phenomenon that can mainly be seen on social media platforms 
on the Internet, which means sowing discord on the internet by starting 
quarrels or upsetting people, by posting inflammatory, extraneous, or off-topic 
messages in an online community with the intent of provoking readers into 
an emotional response or of otherwise disrupting normal, on-topic discussion.
For this reason, the 2017 campaign differs from the original campaign with 
regard to anonymity. While in the original campaign, people could decide 
whether or not to send in a picture of themselves holding up a sign with their 
reason on it, the students in the offline campaign were completely anonymous 
when filling out the poster printouts. Since trolling can be motivated by the 
opportunity to stay anonymous on the Internet in the sense of using fake 
accounts that do not reveal the troll’s real life identity, it nonetheless cannot be 
ruled out that a similar type of behaviour can occur in the offline campaign 
as well. This assumption is represented by Gabriels and Lanzing and will 
be focused on in more detail in the analysis of the reactions to the offline 
campaign (see section 4). As the initiator of the campaign, I too decided to stay 
anonymous. In fact, several people had warned me of revealing my identity, 
as feminists and feminist activists are still being confronted with threats 
and insults, especially on the Internet, as the possibility of anonymity has 
5 The campaign was initiated and conducted solely by Sophie Schwarz but was promoted by 
Greta Olson.
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probably given more leeway to such expressions than there existed before. 
This is why I put the posters up secretly before the university had closed one 
evening before the summer semester started. As is shown in the analysis of 
the reactions, it was a wise decision to stay anonymous.
People who wanted to take part in the poster campaign had to complete 
the sentence ‘I need Feminism because…’. Following the example of the 
original campaign, I did not provide any def initions of feminism on the 
posters. There were both English and German versions of the posters to 
make sure that both native speakers of German as well as students from 
abroad could take part in the campaign. The English version was printed on 
white paper, the German version on pink paper as a reference to the pink 
pussy hats worn at the Women’s March on Washington in 2017 and also 
in the hope that the colour would raise more attention to the campaign. 
The posters contained links and QR codes to the original website of the 
campaign for further information. In addition, it also contained an e-mail 
address, created for the campaign, that could be used to send in reasons in 
case someone did not want to write down a reason on the poster in public.
In total, 60 posters were put up at the Humanities department’s building 
of the University of Giessen in the beginning of the summer semester 2017. 
The campaign lasted for one month. Another reason for this very limited 
space and time was the opportunity to control what was happening to the 
posters. It would have been impossible for me alone to supervise a campaign 
that was widely spread to different parts of campus, some of which are across 
town. However, it would have been interesting to see reactions from students 
of other departments such as sciences, business or law. What happened to 
the posters was regularly documented with a camera with the intention 
to analyze the comments by means of statistical and semantic analysis 
after the campaign had ended. The f irst poster that was put up had my 
very personal reason on it: ‘[I need feminism] because men keep telling me 
that feminism is not needed anymore in today’s society! ‘What else do you 
want?’ is a question I have to hear too frequently when the topic switches to 
feminism’. After one month, the reactions to the campaign, the comments on 
the posters as well as the e-mails were analyzed in a data-driven, survey-like 
approach to collect opinions on feminism.
The reactions
Although the poster campaign did not confirm any leading hypothesis or 
theory, it was rather motivated by current political events as described in 
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section 1; the reactions to the campaign were illuminating and shocking. 
They were illuminating because people’s comments show the necessity 
of feminism in today’s society and also provide insight into what people 
perceive feminism to be, and shocking because the campaign received a lot of 
aggressive and vitriolic reactions as well. Due to the complete anonymity that 
people were given when taking part in the offline campaign, the intention 
to protect the campaign from trolls failed.
Adding up the comments on the poster printouts that were documented 
(38 comments) and the comments received via e-mail (four e-mails), the 
campaign received 42 comments in total after one month. Out of the 60 
posters that were put up in the beginning of the semester, only 12 posters 
were still hanging at the end of the month. All posters were checked on a 
daily basis. However, it was not possible to document each comment on the 
posters, as many of them were simply ripped off the wall. Some of them 
were pasted over by other posters, as is exemplif ied by Figures 8 and 9.
While it is common that posters are posted over during the course of a 
semester due to a lack of space in the humanities building, it is not common 
that posters are ripped down. Quite obviously, this was due to the topic of 
feminism that some people felt the need to physically ‘delete’ it. In fact, the 
posters with the troll comments on them were not the ones being ripped off, 
but rather the ones with serious reasons on them. For example, the poster in 
Figure 8 dealt with the pay gap between men and women. However, since 
the poster was ripped off, the comment could not be documented in its full 
length. The vitriolic reactions to the posters resulted not only in a physical 
attack on the posters; the hatred of feminism was also verbalized in many of 
the comments as is shown in the semantic analysis. What happened to the 
posters is not the default case and does not represent the attitude of every 
Figure 8 Reactions to the posters (a) Figure 9 Reactions to the posters (b)
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student at the humanities department. Neither does it represent the attitude 
of the humanities department and the university in general. Seminars and 
lectures on gender studies and feminism are being attended with a high 
frequency and lots of interest. The University of Giessen promotes equality 
and stands up against any kind of discrimination, which is protected by an 
off icial university law.6
In a f irst step, all comments were categorized into three types (see Fig-
ure 10). All upcoming comments are presented as they were originally written 
down on the posters, meaning that the original spelling (capitals, crossed out 
parts, etc.) will be maintained. German comments are translated into English:
(a) generalizing statements (‘FEMINISM IS INTERNATIONAL!’)
(b) troll comments (‘I am fat and need to blame it on someone other than me’)
(c) serious comments (‘genital mutilation is still being practiced’)
Generalizing statements as in (a) did not complete the sentence ‘I need 
feminism because…’ but rather stated a general opinion. Hence, they missed 
6 Gleichstellungskonzept der JLU Giessen: https://www.uni-giessen.de/org/admin/stab/bfc/
dat/konzeptgleichstellung/view. Accessed 25 Augustus 2020.
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the purpose of the posters but are still included in the statistics. Troll com-
ments as in (b) did complete the sentence, however, the comments did not 
contain serious reasons for why feminism is needed. On the contrary, the 
trolls intentionally wrote about comments representing clichés surround-
ing the feminist movement, which were articulated in an assaulting and 
misogynist manner. Serious comments as in (c) completed the given sentence 
and also contained a reason for why feminism is needed. As Figure 10 shows, 
57% of all the comments received were serious comments. However, 36% 
were troll comments, which is quite striking when considering the small 
amount of comments that were received in total. Only 7% of the comments 
were generalizing statements.
Having categorized the comments into three types in the f irst step, it was 
then possible to categorize all of them in terms of their specif ic content. 
Since the comments touched on a variety of topics, it seemed necessary 
to come up with rather broad categories to avoid an unnecessary amount 
of categories with less than three comments. Concerning their content, 
the comments were classif ied into f ive subcategories: I. discussion, II. 
culture and religion, III. politics, economy and law, IV. shaming and social 
discrimination, V. misogyny.
There is no clear cut boundary between the categories, as they are con-
nected to each other in certain aspects (except for category I.). However, the 
comments that were sorted into the categories contained specif ic keywords 
(e.g. ‘honour killing’ or ‘pay gap’), which can be seen as misogynist and 
discriminating; still, honour killing is a practice that is mainly performed in 
a religious context, while the pay gap mainly belongs to the f ield of politics 
and economy. The categories are, of course, debatable. Nonetheless, in this 
specif ic analysis, they fulf il their purpose of providing an insight into the 
many f ields that were referred to in the comments.
As can be seen in Figure 11, 10% were replies to the comments on the 
posters, which belong to the category of discussion and were not separately 
analyzed by the means of semantics. Only 10% of all comments named 
cultural and religious reasons for why feminism is needed; comments 
concerning politics, economy and law are represented with 14%. Most 
comments concern the topic of shaming and social discrimination as well 
as misogyny, which are equally represented with 33%.
When compared to the f irst categorization of types of comments in 
Figure 10, it is striking that – except for one comment (‘I don’t need femi-
nism’) – the troll comments match the misogynist comments in Figure 10, 
meaning that 14 out of 15 comments were not only troll comments but also 
insulting and misogynist ones.
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To give examples, a selection of two comments per category are listed below. 
Since I am focusing on the vitriolic aspect in this chapter, this category is 
represented by ten misogynist comments, including e-mails. Due to the 
limited space of this chapter, not every single comment can be mentioned.
Discussion
In four cases, people actively engaged and replied to comments on the 
posters. The comments in Figures 12 and 13 refer to troll comments:
The troll comment in Figure 12 refers to the cliché of feminists being 
over-weight by saying: ‘I am fat and need to blame it on someone other 
than me’. Another person marked the comment that s/he was referring to 
and asked the troll to look up the meaning of feminism on the Internet: 



















Shaming and social discrimination
Politics, economy and law
Culture and religion
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‘ i WaSn’T cHaSTiSed ProPerly’ 225
In Figure 13, the troll claimed that people needed feminism because 
they are insecure. Another person crossed out the troll’s comment (‘I’m 
insecure’) and stated that feminism is needed because ‘of stupid comments 
like this’.
Culture and religion
In this category, participants showed their concern about cultural and 
religious practices that violate a woman’s body. For example, they claimed 
that feminism is needed because ‘it is still acted on a woman’s ‘virtue’ which 
can, if it is violated, in the worst case result in murder (‘honour killing’)’ and 
because ‘genital mutilation is still being practiced’.
Politics, economy and law
Besides mentioning Donald Trump as a reason for why our society needs 
feminism, it was also stated that ‘there is still a huge pay gap in many 
professions although the same work is being done’. Additionally, partici-
pants mentioned the lack of rights for homosexuals: ‘homosexuals still 
don’t have the same rights as heterosexuals.’ When the campaign was 
conducted, same-sex marriage had not yet been legalized. Only later, in 
June 2017, did the German parliament announce that same-sex marriage 
will be legalized.
Figure 12 Reply to a troll comment (a)
Figure 13 Reply to a troll comment (b)
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Shaming and social discrimination
When it comes to shaming and social discrimination, participants mostly 
mentioned that feminism is needed because ‘women are still being discrimi-
nated internationally’ but also claimed to ‘Stop body shaming!’. Furthermore, 
someone stated that feminism is needed because ‘bullying in school is very 
often triggered by sexism (for example slut-shaming) → see the series 13 
reasons why! and’. Apparently, the writer of the comment contemplated an 
additional comment, however, the ‘and’ was crossed out and the comment 
was not f inished.
Misogyny
In addition to the troll comments that were already listed in I. that claimed 
that women need feminism because they are ‘fat’ and ‘insecure’, another 
troll referenced the cliché of the supposedly sexually frustrated feminist 
by saying: ‘I want some dick!’. The comments get even more disturbing on a 
poster that was written by only one person (as can be seen by the handwrit-
ing) who can be named the biggest troll of the campaign (see Figure 14):7
I need feminism because…
– ‘I was hit by the ugly stick’
– ‘because I’m hoping for a forced distribution of men so that I can have 
one too for once’
– ‘I don’t have anything else except for type II diabetes’
– ‘a common concept of the enemy strengthens the society’s solidarity’
– ‘I wasn’t chastised properly’
– ‘because real problems like poverty or war are too complex for my brain.’
This was the only case in which a troll took the time to fill out a whole poster. 
As the comments show, the person came up with nearly every cliché about 
feminism: women are ugly, women desperately seek for a man in their life 
(with the underlying premise that every woman is heterosexual), women are 
fat, women see men as the enemy (while at the same time they want one in 
their life), women need to be chastised, women are stupid (with the premise 
that f ighting for feminism is of no concern, while poverty and war are).
During the time the campaign was conducted, four e-mails were sent in 
on the same day. All of them were troll e-mails and three of them referred to 
7 For further information on online and off line violence, see Gabriels and Lanzing ‘Ethical 
Implications of Onlife Vitriol’.
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the cliché of the sexually frustrated woman, as can be seen on the screenshot 
of the inbox (see Figure 15).
The person abused the off icial campaign’s e-mail address and used it 
to create three accounts on porn websites by using the names ‘ineedfem’ 
and ‘ineedfeminism’. A search on Google showed that one of the websites 
even promotes rape, abuse and child pornography. The information on this 
Figure 14 Misogynist comments
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website was simply taken from Google entries that appear when typing the 
name of the website into the Google search bar. Clicking on any of those 
entries might not have been legal. Thus, no further information on this 
website is provided. Since the person used the off icial campaign’s e-mail 
address to register on the websites and did not send any e-mail by using 
his or her personal e-mail account, there is no personal data to trace the 
person. Additionally, the troll created an Instagram account. Since the 
person who created the account is not the owner of the e-mail address, 
the account could not be verif ied and no pictures could be uploaded. The 
number in the username ‘qweas1679’ does not seem to be chosen randomly 
and might refer to § 1679 of the Civil Code of Germany of 1896 that says: ‘The 
parental violence of the father ends when he is found dead’.8 This possible 
reference – if it really was intended by the troll – f its the comment on the 
poster ‘I wasn’t chastised properly’ perfectly. Since the person already put 
effort into f illing out a whole poster, it might be possible that it is the same 
person who also created the accounts on the porn websites. However, these 
assumptions remain unverif ied. The troll comments listed above are now 
being focused on more closely.
All in all, the trolls portray feminists in a negative and nasty way. To them, 
feminists are fat, ugly, stupid, insecure and sexually frustrated women who 
need to be chastised. Emma A. Jane uses the concept of ‘e-bile’ to describe 
these ‘[…] extravagant invective, the sexualized threats of violence, and 
the recreational nastiness that have come to constitute a dominant tenor 
of Internet discourse’.9 In her analysis of vitriolic communication on the 
Internet, Jane found out that ‘[e]-bile targeting women commonly includes 
charges of unintelligence, hysteria, and ugliness’ and furthermore that 
‘[f]emale targets are dismissed as both unacceptably unattractive man 
haters and hypersexual sluts who are inviting sexual attention or sexual 
8 Civil Code of Germany [my translation].
9 Jane, ‘‘Your a Ugly, Whorish, Slut…’’, p. 2.
Figure 15  Troll e-mails
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attacks’.10 This def inition describes the trolls’ vitriolic behaviour in the 
offline campaign perfectly.11
Instead of staying silent, the trolls were triggered and decided to dem-
onstrate their hatred, although it seems that there was no need for them 
to participate in the campaign because it looks like they apparently do not 
need feminism. With every comment, they completely ignored the fact that 
many women do need feminism as they (still) suffer from discrimination, 
assault or the lack of rights. Thus, the trolls did not show any empathy at all. 
On the contrary, they intentionally ignored the ‘rules’ of the campaign (to 
write down a reason for why feminism is needed) and rather wrote down 
comments with the intention to insult, provoke and upset possible readers. 
They did not give any serious reasons for why feminism is needed; neither 
did they use rational arguments to explain why they think it is not needed. 
Therefore, they did not deem it worthy of consideration. In addition, they 
did not comment on any of the serious comments written down on the 
posters and thus refused to take part in a serious discussion altogether. 
This phenomenon is also mentioned by Jane who is stating that ‘[e]-bile 
episodes may be triggered by disagreements over divisive subjects […] but 
participants rarely engage substantively with each other’s positions’.12
Moreover, the trolls did not only refuse to take part in the discussion but 
also avoided that other people could take part in the campaign by ripping 
off the posters from the walls and, thus, making feminism disappear. This 
is where an offline campaign differs from an online campaign: while it is 
possible to comment on posts on the Internet (e.g. on Twitter), it is not pos-
sible to simply edit or delete an original post from another person (unless the 
account is hacked or the name and password of the account are shared with 
another person), since editing and deleting requires administrative rights. 
Yet, on some platforms it is possible to report or downvote someone else’s 
post, which may also impact their visibility and appearance. Participants of 
the offline campaign, on the other hand, had the chance to edit comments 
and ‘delete’ the posters. Therefore, by conducting an offline campaign, I 
unintentionally provided participants with even more opportunities to 
troll, which they made use of: not only did they insult women on the posters 
but they also silenced those who wrote down a serious comment and made 
sure their voice could not be heard.
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 For further information on how to deal with personal vitriolic attacks, see Kemekenidou, 
‘r/ChokeABitch’.
12 Jane, ‘‘Your a Ugly, Whorish, Slut…’’, p. 3.
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As the results of my offline campaign show, trolling (including vitriolic 
communication and actions) is not only limited to online social media 
platforms; the trolls show a similar behaviour offline as they do online. Thus, 
the trolls’ offline behaviour can furthermore be connected to the concept 
of ‘onlife violence’, which, as Gabriels and Lanzing propose in chapter 9, 
means that ‘online and offline violence are deeply interconnected, hence 
“onlife”. According to this assumption, violence is defined as ‘the intentional 
physical or psychological (including reputational) harm inf licted on a 
person and/or their property’, which describes the troll’s behaviour in the 
offline campaign perfectly, as they intentionally tried to cause psychological 
harm by insulting participants with their hateful comments as well as by 
abusing the off icial e-mail-address; additionally, they physically destroyed 
the poster printouts.
By analyzing the form of the troll comments, it is quite striking that every 
comment begins with ‘I’. Apparently, the trolls adapted to the structure of 
the given sentence on the posters ‘I need feminism because’ and took the 
perspective of a woman to complete the sentence, pretending to give a 
real reason for why they need feminism. What the trolls are really saying 
is: if women were chastised properly, they would not need feminism; if 
women were intelligent enough, they would not need feminism; if women 
had enough sex or a man in their life, they would not need feminism. Ac-
cording to the trolls, feminism is not needed at all and they see feminism 
as an excuse for women to blame their alleged problems or discontent on 
someone else. While the trolls seem to have found the solution for each of 
these alleged problems, they ignore the fact that many women suffer from 
being chastised, assaulted or abused; that many women still have no access 
to education; that not every woman is heterosexual and does not need a 
man in her life. Only one troll spoke for himself or herself by saying ‘I don’t 
need feminism’. In contrast to the trolls, participants who wrote down 
serious comments mainly used the passive or the third person rather than 
the f irst person and thus did not only speak for themselves but spoke in a 
more generalizing societal manner.
It seems that anonymity and affect are important when it comes to 
trolling. It is unlikely that the trolls ripped off the posters or wrote down 
troll comments if the posters were supervised by a video camera and if 
they knew that they were being f ilmed. However, this was not the case and 
the given anonymity made them feel safe, so that they could happily enjoy 
their trolling without it having any consequences. The fact that the trolls 
did not use rational arguments to discuss feminism but rather expressed 
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their feelings (mainly hatred) towards feminism in a vitriolic manner shows 
that they got triggered and acted in the heat of the moment.13
Conclusion
What started out as a simple idea to f ind out whether and why feminism is 
still needed in today’s society resulted in a both illuminating and shocking 
way. It was illuminating because the analysis of the serious comments 
provides an insight into what people believe feminism to be and also what 
kind of topics they associate with it; the participants did not only point out 
the discrimination of women in particular but also the discrimination of 
homosexuals in general that is still being practiced in many f ields, ranging 
from culture and religion to politics, economy and law. It was shocking 
because the vitriolic reactions to the campaign prove that feminism is still 
a divisive topic that raises the attention of trolls. The analysis of the troll 
comments shows that they use existing stereotypes to insult women in a 
misogynist manner while at the same time they avoid dealing with feminism 
in a serious way. By ripping the posters off the walls, they did not only keep 
people from taking part in the campaign but also silenced those who stated 
their opinion. While the given anonymity prevented participants from 
personal confrontations or threats when writing down serious reasons on 
the poster printouts, it also allowed people to troll without it having any 
consequences.
It is naive to think that trolling is a phenomenon that is only limited to 
online social media platforms. Be it online or offline, there is no place that 
is safe from trolls; not even the humanities department of a university, in 
which critical thinking, tolerance and the freedom of speech are highly 
valued. Becoming an activist taught me that even in today’s society it can 
still be dangerous to out yourself as a feminist or to contribute to feminism 
in any way, even if it is only putting up posters to collect opinions. This is 
why I salute every feminist activist who is not afraid of personal confronta-
tions or threats and has the courage to publicly f ight against sexism and 
all sorts of discrimination. In conclusion, the results of the campaign, 
including both the serious comments as well as the troll comments and 
especially the vitriolic reactions, prove that feminism is still needed in 
today’s society.
13 For further information on affect, see Greta Olson, ‘Love and Hate Online’.
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This chapter discusses tactics on how to cope with online hate from 
an activist perspective, based on personal experiences of the author 
as a feminist in Germany. Violence and hate speech are part of online 
culture, its victims sharing very much the same demographic as offline 
victims, for example women and/or minorities. The f irst section focuses 
on online hate, and on how and why it affects us emotionally, followed by 
examples of effective campaigns against it. The second section discusses 
how the f ight of online hate is inextricably linked to the question on what 
platforms it takes place and why. Fighting online hate is ultimately linked 
to the basic f ight against the capitalist, sexist, racist, and classist roots 
of our Western society.
Keywords: activism, feminism, social media, capitalism, misogyny, 
patriarchy
When in 2012 Forbes asked Alexis Ohanian, one of the two founders of 
Reddit, what the Founding Fathers might have thought of his invention, he 
answered: ‘A bastion of free speech on the World Wide Web? I would love 
to imagine that ‘Common Sense’ would have been a self-post on Reddit, by 
Thomas Paine, or actually a redditor named T_Paine.’1
Reddit is an online platform founded by Steve Huffman and Ohania in 2005, 
when they were still roommates at the University of Virginia. It is infamous 
* This essay is written in March/April 2018.
1 Marantz, ‘Reddit and the Struggle’, p. 61.
Polak, Sara, and Daniel Trottier (eds), Violence and Trolling on Social Media. Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam University Press 2020
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for its collection of weird topics, but also for the hate groups that it hosts. 
From sodomy, rape and torture threats, to anti-Semitic and racist content, 
Reddit is well known for its unregulated, extreme and often illegal content.
In 2011, when journalist Anderson Cooper mentioned the subreddit 
‘Jailbait’ on CNN, it was possibly the f irst time some people even heard the 
term ‘subreddit’ at all. The channel ‘Jailbait’, which Cooper mentioned, in 
Reddit language spelled ‘r/Jailbait’, was a channel dedicated to sexualized 
pictures of young women. Although the channel claimed that everyone was 
at least 18, the pictures told a different story. The subreddit was banned, but 
the user u/Violentacrez, who had opened the channel, was not, just like any of 
his other hundreds of channels, among them subreddits called ‘r/Jewmerica 
or r/ChokeABitch. ‘Yes, it gets worse’, as the journalist from the New Yorker 
pointed out. Unlike to what one might expect, Reddit’s reaction to the case 
was not one of portraying shock or a form of disapproval regarding what 
was happening on its platform. On the contrary, Yishan Wong, the then 
CEO of Reddit, stated that r/Jailbait was only banned because it violated 
U.S. law, not because of any moral standards Reddit might have: ‘We stand 
for free speech, [and] it would not do if, in our youth, we decide to censor 
things simply because they were distasteful.2
This chapter primarily discusses tactics on how to cope with online 
hate from an activist perspective, based on my personal experiences as a 
feminist activist in Germany. Violence and hate speech are obviously part 
of our online culture, its victims sharing very much the same demographic 
as offline victims, for example women, children or minorities. The case of 
‘r/Jailbait’ though, showcases how the discourse of tackling violence and 
online hate is not only inextricably linked to the question how to tackle 
the creators of this violent content. It is also raising the question on which 
platforms this hate speech and violence takes place.
A definition of online activism for this chapter will be followed by a brief 
introduction of my activist background, since this chapter is thought as a 
guideline from an activist’s point of view.
The f irst section of this chapter focuses on online hate, and on how and 
why it affects us emotionally, followed by examples of effective campaigns 
against online hate. A f irst set of rules will focus on how to deal with online 
hate on these platforms. The second section discusses how the fight of online 
hate is inextricably linked to the question on what platforms it actually 
takes place. Current social media platforms belong to unregulated private 
companies, and while the technology to gather and sell information about 
2 The New Yorker, 19 March 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/19.
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us is increasing, the networks seem simultaneously overwhelmed, or rather 
indifferent to the rise of violence and hate on their platforms.3 The second set 
of advice therefore concerns itself with aspects of our relationship to social 
media and self-care. As a German feminist activist and student of American 
history, I will mostly use examples from the German and American context. 
Since this chapter focuses on online violence and hate speech on social media 
networks, I chose to focus on Facebook, Twitter and Reddit as the primary 
examples, and the aspect of online hate speech and trolls on a verbal level.
Clicktivism vs. effective online activism
With regard to the Arab Spring, WikiLeaks or the Black Lives Matter move-
ment, it becomes quite clear that online activism has a wide scope, ranging 
from hacking to organizing people online on a greater scale. The form of 
online activism discussed in this chapter, which primarily takes place on 
platforms like Facebook or Twitter, has often been criticized as clicktivism 
or slacktivism. These terms describe the often aimless political gestures 
online, such as ‘likes’ on Facebook or futile online petitions, which only 
aim to gather email addresses rather than effecting actual change. Critics 
regard them as pointless or meaningless moves, which I fully agree with. 
Supporting statements, petitions, or movements online, or liking a sharepic 
with a political message does not make one an activist.
However, effective activism on social media is, since we are concerned with 
communication platforms, mainly based around spreading and sharing in-
formation. Meredith Clark is a professor at the Mayborn School of Journalism 
at the University of North Texas; her research includes the establishment of a 
theoretical framework for exploring Black Twitter. ‘Black Twitter’ is a widely 
used term in the US for the black community on Twitter. The #Ferguson 
#MikeBrown campaign was largely responsible for raising awareness to the 
killing of Mike Brown in Ferguson, Missouri on 9 August 2014. She defines 
three levels of connection on Black Twitter, a concept which I f ind useful for 
defining f ields of activism on social media in general: personal community, 
thematic notes and conversations about the networks themselves:
I break Black Twitter down into three levels of connection: personal com-
munity, and that reflects the people that you are connected with in some 
other dimension other than Twitter. And I take that personal community 
from Barry Wellman’s work. The second level I f ind is thematic notes, and 
3 Denkena, ‘Überwachungskapitalismus’.
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that’s where individuals specif ically tweet together about certain topics, 
so they keep returning to this subject matter. And those thematic notes 
could be anything from television shows, to ideologies, topics of religion. 
They might be centric to where these individuals are in a certain part of 
the country. It just kind of all depends on what topic we’re interested in. 
And then that third level of connection, where we see a lot of conversation 
about these networks and how they’re linked, is when those personal com-
munities and the thematic notes kind of intersect around a specif ic topic. 
And generally you see that, #SolidarityIsForWhiteWomen, #AskRKelly, 
those sort of things. That’s where you see the meta-network at work.4
The effectiveness of social media activism can be made visible by evaluating 
how popular the topic is online, which Clarke def ines as ‘aff irmation’. A 
discussion which enters offline spaces like private conversations or panels, or 
other media like newspapers or talk shows, is a step further, ‘re-aff irmation’: 
#metoo has found its way into our everyday language and culture. Clarke 
identif ies ‘vindication’ as another step in this scenario, which is the process 
of ‘looking for some kind of change in the physical world.’ Examples here are 
people who lose their jobs or have to publicly apologize as a direct effect of 
a Twitter topic. In this way, social media activism can break its limitations 
insofar as it can reach out to communities and groups who do not have 
access to, or the media literacy to engage in, these online discussions.
From a feminist perspective, speaking out is an activist element in itself. 
Feminist history is basically a history of speaking out one’s own truth. Women ś 
realities were mostly seen as second to men ś stories. History is literally his-
story, written by and for white privileged men. Hashtags like #WhyIStayed or 
years later #metoo let women share realities, while pushing forward experi-
ences that otherwise were kept hidden from mainstream society. Social Media 
can, with some restrictions, function as a connection for marginalized groups 
and can thus be a cathartic, liberating experience. In this case it becomes 
important how we are emotionally connected to our digital environment.
Affect and the power of massive-scale emotional contagion on 
Facebook
What happens online affects us offline: people are wired to feel the emotions 
of others. This effect, called emotional contagion, means that we copy the 
4 Ramsey, ‘The Truth about Black Twitter’.
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emotions that we see in others, and it happens regardless of whether we 
want it to. Nicolas A. Christakis, a physician and social scientist, and James 
H. Fowler, a social scientist and researcher in the f ield of social networks, 
discuss online emotional contagion in the context of hyperconnectivity 
in Connected: The Surprising Power of Our Social Networks and How They 
Shape Our Lives. They state that the mirror neuron system in our brains lets 
us copy the mood of another person, through f irst mimicking expressions, 
and then feeling them:
Emotions spread from person to person because of two features of human 
interaction: we are biologically hardwired to mimic others outwardly, 
and in mimicking their outward displays, we come to adopt their inward 
states. If your friend feels happy, she smiles, you smile, and in the act of 
smiling you also become happy.5
Emotional contagion has also been proven to work without two people 
having to face each other. In a sound experiment, subjects had to listen 
to recordings of nonverbal vocal reactions. The subject’s reactions were 
monitored via a magnetic resonance (MRI) machine. There were two positive 
emotions and two negative ones to listen to, and the people were told not 
to react to them. Still the MRI detected that although the subjects did not 
react as told, it stimulated the parts of their brains that are connected to 
commanding the corresponding facial expressions.6
Emotional contagion is possible solely through online communication, 
and one of the most striking f indings may still be a study conducted by 
Facebook itself. Facebook tested emotional contagion on 689,003 of its users, 
notably without their consent. The results were published as an article, 
‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through 
Social Networks’, in the journal Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, on 18 June 2014. While initially 
stating that automated testing ‘was consistent with Facebook’s Data Use 
Policy, to which all users agree prior to creating an account on Facebook, 
constituting informed consent for this research,’ a Forbes article published 
in 28 June 2014, states that ‘Facebook conducted their research four months 
before adding “research” to their data use policy’.7
5 Christakis and Fowler, Connected, p. 37.
6 Ibid., p. 39-40.
7 McNeal, ‘Facebook Manipulated’.
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Facebook’s aim in this research was discovering whether users did have 
an influence on their connected users’ emotions. The procedure was simple: 
a programme identif ied positive and negative words in the users feeds; in 
some cases they then reduced the positive, in some the negative content. 
The people who had a reduced negative content in their feed, started posting 
more positive status updates themselves, and vice versa. The scientists 
concluded that
[t]hese results suggest that the emotions expressed by friends, via online 
social networks, influence our own moods, constituting, to our knowledge, 
the f irst experimental evidence for massive-scale emotional contagion 
via social networks and providing support for previously contested claims 
that emotions spread via contagion through a network.8
Greta Olson elaborates in her chapter ‘Love and Hate Online’ how affect, 
described as ‘pre-verbal experiences of feeling rather than emotions’ 
are a predecessor to emotions, which are ‘experiences that have already 
been translated into and thus already explained through words.’ Affec-
tive experiences include for example bodily reactions to feelings that are 
‘deeply embodied and have little to do with rational arguments’, like getting 
goosebumps when feeling scared or aroused, reactions which can also 
result from reading tweets or messages online.9 The f ight against online 
hate takes place on two levels, and although often neglected, the f ight 
against the negative emotional effects are just as relevant as the f ight against 
misinformation, when it comes to f ighting hate speech and trolls. Olson 
concludes that ultimately, we will have to say goodbye to our belief that 
rational arguments are the answer to online hate.10
A redditor named T_Paine – free speech and online hate
When it comes to defending violent or hateful content, as an activist I often 
encounter the argument that we all have the right to state our opinion. 
Online social media communication often blurs the line between political 
and personal statements, we rather engage in conversations when it affects 
us personally. When we talk about online vitriol or online hate, we primarily 
8 Ibid.
9 Olson, ‘Love and Hate’, p. 153.
10 Olson, ‘Love and Hate’, p. 174.
r/cHokeabiTcH 239
mean toxic or otherwise socially harmful speech acts. The definition of hate 
speech agreed upon for this publication is (online) speech that intentionally 
or effectively harms, diminishes, or upsets others (usually on categorical 
grounds). I would additionally define attacks in private messages, per email 
or per phone as cyber-harassment, which should be dealt with in another way 
than publicly posted hate speech. The question when we defend our rules 
as a society, and when we are silencing voices, is often the main argument 
when we are talking about regulating hate speech online. Since social 
media platforms are unable or unwilling to make this distinction, and as 
hate speech has become more organized online, various initiatives have 
formed to combat online vitriol collectively.
In 2017, a German group began to f ight online vitriol on Facebook through 
counter speech. Facebook had failed to act quickly and effectively to the 
racist comments that started to add up under German news concerning 
what commenters called the ‘refugee-crisis’. Organized hate groups and 
trolls had started to comment under news articles which were connected 
to refugees, and news about crimes was linked to refugees or immigrants 
without any proof or clue. #ichbinhier, translated as ‘I am here’, started to 
organize people in a Facebook group, where they started posting links to 
posts that were attacked by trolls, or contained hate speech. The group 
members simply have to follow the link to the original article, and either 
react by writing comments that correct the misinformation, or simply 
directly react to troll comments, telling them they are lying. The #ichbinhier 
responses are then linked back to the news post in the group channel, 
where a bigger amount of members can simply like the posts. The idea is 
simple, but effective. In 2017 the group received the Online Grimme Award, 
a German award for journalistic quality online. At this time, the group had 
over 35,000 active members.11
‘Hass hilft’, ‘hate helps’, is an ‘involuntary fundraising campaign’, and another 
creative strategy against online hate. The project turns every hate speech 
comment into a one-euro donation for the refugee programmes of ‘Aktion 
Deutschland Hilft’ and ‘EXIT-Deutschland’, an initiative against the far right. 
The concept originated in the ‘Rechts gegen Rechts’ [right-wing against right-
wing] campaign, which was founded by the Zentrum Demokratische Kultur 
(ZDK) gGmbH, against neo-Nazi marches. Without the consent or knowledge 
of the neo-Nazis that attended a march on 15 November 2014, sponsors donated 
10 euros for every walked metre. In this way they collected 10,000 Euros to fight 
right-wing extremism. With the support of Facebook, ‘Hass Hilft’ started in 
11 ‘Grimme Online Award 2017’; Schade, ‘#ichbinhier’.
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2015 and is still active today. In this initiative, people call attention to certain 
hate posts or comment. ‘Hass Hilft’ then responds to the according post with a 
congratulation message, if the post fits the criteria: the post was chosen as an 
example of hate speech, and will therefore be used to donate one Euro to the 
group, the post attacked. For the moment the hate expressed on social media 
networks is very real, and I would not argue against the importance of systems 
and groups who are trying to f ight, or at least contain it. From a feminist 
perspective, cyberspace has often been disputed as a second battleground, 
where the fights of our social realities are just extended to another platform. 
If we take a look at current events, this theory is hard to dismiss.
My personal advice is mainly shaped by the context of feminist activism 
in Germany. I began with campaigns against ‘date coaches’ or ‘pick up artists’ 
like Julian Blanc, who make a fortune with publishing videos, books, or giving 
seminars to men who would nowadays be called ‘involuntary celibates’ 
(incels). Men like Julien Blanc and his group Real Social Dynamics or Roosh V, 
give misogynist advice on how to intimidate women to make them submissive, 
or treat them badly to crush their self-esteem. During his tour in 2014, Blanc 
was forced to leave Australia, after his visa had been revoked due to his 
misogynist content, which could also be plainly called advice for rape.12 His 
tour in Germany had not been cancelled, since, oddly enough, the German 
government, unlike the Australian government, did not see a way to intervene 
in this matter. Social Media helped us to organize protest very quickly, and was 
our main connection to our supporters. During the demonstration, some guys 
started filming us, and after a while my picture could be found online on incel 
websites in the ‘rape’ section, together with some basic information such as 
my email address, Facebook name and residential area. After that, I continued 
my work in the campaign StopBildSexism, which was founded by Kristina 
Lunz and started off as a sister campaign of NoMorePage3. StopBildSexism 
is a campaign against the daily sexism of Germany’s (still) biggest selling 
tabloid newspaper, the Bild Zeitung. The campaign became larger, and in 
October 2015 Kristina Lunz, Sophia Becker, and I founded Gender Equality 
Media e.V., our own organization against media sexism in Germany. GEM 
is currently working on studies on media sexism, creating feminist media, 
organizing feminist events and targeting sexism in German media on a daily 
basis, by contacting the journalists and responsible decision makers directly.13 
12 Davey, ‘US ‘pick-up artist’’.
13 Politicians and media personalities who directly support the patriarchy in Germany, and/
or are unwilling to change sexist behavior, are collected on our page unfollowpatriarchy.com 
to make patriarchy visible and thus combatable.
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During this time, my team and me experienced various forms of personal 
harassment as feminists online, since our work at SBS/GEM is mainly based 
online. We learned a great deal about online hate speech and trolls, but also 
about the role social media platforms themselves play in this scenario. These 
f ive rules are our basic procedure to counteract online hate.
Our rules for counteracting violence and trolls online
Always take screenshots
Either for further investigation or to show it to other people: Always take 
screenshots of the harassing messages or pictures you received in private or 
public threads, ideally before answering to them. Never delete anything, as 
embarrassing as the content might be. Just because you do not see it, does 
not mean that its existence is erased, after all.
Know your rights
For serious cases of cyber harassment, doxing and bullying, check the law in 
your country. Screenshot incidents, and report the perpetrator’s behaviour 
to legal authorities. Taking things into your own hands is seldom a good 
idea when it comes to personal threats. Seeking revenge or f ighting back in 
form of posting personal information of the harasser online, is a crime in 
itself almost in every country. If you want to do that as a political statement 
though, seek legal advice f irst.
Make your fights visible
Trolls seldom make the smartest decisions. More often than not, it suff ices 
to look back into their accounts and just offer to send their (publicly posted) 
comments to their friends, family or workplace. I once experienced a case 
in which I sent the screenshot back to the troll, who had a real picture and 
his workplace listed. I told him that his boss would surely be very happy to 
see what he was up to at the weekend. The post was very quickly erased.
Seek allies – and the media
If it is not personal harassment but online vitriol you want to f ight, it is smart 
to form alliances. To combat hate in the long run, I would recommend joining 
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an existing group, rather than to f ight isolated on your own. If someone 
attacks you in a greater political context, seek public support. When you 
think it is newsworthy, contact the according groups or organizations who 
are active on this matter in the social media platforms. Journalists are the 
f inal option, when what happened is really outstanding and/or newsworthy.
If nothing helps: block, mute, report, repeat
Ultimately, if you cannot use the online hate for a political debate, or if 
the troll simply will not let go, the smartest move might just be to delete 
this account from your timeline. Blocking or muting certain accounts is 
sometimes the healthiest and most sustainable way to react to online hate. 
The only reason I would not block a harassing account, would be needing 
more evidence or screenshots for my case.
This set of rules is vital if you want to engage in social media activism, and 
function similarly to concepts like #ichbinhier, mainly through counter speech 
and forming alliances, which can sometimes even be fun. Concepts like Hass 
Hilft are also very popular, since it gives those involved a sense of control and 
empowerment. From a quick glance we seem to win the fight against trolls, 
ridiculing them and feeling good in our formed alliances. What we often fail to 
address is that projects like Hass Hilft are dependent on potent sponsors, and 
thus, ultimately, are playing into the hands of the system they so desperately 
are trying to change, as will be explained in the following section.14 If we do 
not address the issue where these forms of online hate take place, we will 
always stay defensive, which will ultimately change nothing at all.
Facebook is not your friend – online hate and capitalist interests
In 2012, Ohanian was sure that the Founding Fathers would see Reddit 
as the defendant of free speech in America. However, in a post from 2015, 
co-founder Huffman saw things quite differently. He stated, contrary to 
Ohanian, that ‘neither Ohanian nor he had created Reddit to be a bastion of 
free speech.’15 When the CEOs of Reddit announced, in August 2017, close to 
the date that the University of Virginia was overrun by white nationalists, 
that Reddit would expand its rules concerning the definition of hate speech, 
14 hasshilft.de/; rechts-gegen-rechts.de/.
15 Marantz, ‘Reddit and the Struggle’, p.65.
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the outcry was enormous. Reddit had erased channels before, when they 
violated American law, or when the media attention became too big. Whereas 
before most channels operated in an undefined grey area concerning morals, 
for some the newly set rules declared the off icial death of free speech on 
Reddit. The opinion regarding free speech had changed; disenchantment 
seemed to set in for both the users and the founders. The New Yorker quotes 
a user, who argued that the only reason for the new bans was to attract 
advertisers: ‘They don’t actually want to change anything. It was, in fact, 
never about free speech, it was about money.’16 Social media networks seem 
to be quite inconsistent when it comes to speaking out for free speech or 
simply deleting unwanted content on their own terms.
Free speech and existence: Nontransparent algorithms
In January 2018 Twitter banned the then Green politician Jörg Rupp, after a 
tweet that – taken out of context – seemed racist. It was clear that this ban 
was a mistake, likely executed by a machine, since the tweet was followed 
by an explanation, and Rupp’s account was in itself proof that the tweet was 
meant as a joke. Although he tried contacting Twitter repeatedly, nothing 
happened. He was astonished at how impossible it was to contact Twitter, 
he stated in an article on netzpolitik.org.17 While Rupp’s account was never 
restored, it seems that the same rules do not apply to everyone. When Trump 
threatened North Korea in a tweet in September 2017, Twitter did not react 
at all. The algorithms of social media platforms are not transparent: Why a 
user is banned or deleted, why a tweet is erased or why a post is blocked, is 
sometimes hard to trace back. Julia Krüger, social scientist and journalist at 
netzpolitik.org, suggests that we need an extension of fundamental rights 
regarding social media platforms. She argues that if it is private companies 
that provide public spaces in which we exchange political views, they also 
have to be taken into accountability when it comes to who they let in. How-
ever, most people are already using these networks, and private companies 
will always be more likely to create more attractive platforms and apps for 
the user. We rely on platforms of private companies to communicate, leaving 
the power of who can speak, and when, in the hands of private investors.18
16 The New Yorker, 19 March 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/19.
17 Reuter, ‘Moderation nach Gutsherrenart’.
18 Ibid.; Krüger, ‘Das Recht’.
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Boys clubs/the value of hate
Social media networks are mainly media platforms which do not generate 
media, but use peoples´ content for prof it. Social Media networks are thus 
mainly looking for traff ic, which equals prof it. What is trending is good, 
initially regardless of its content. That is why sexist or racist comments or 
groups on Facebook, when kept at a (for Facebook) moderate level, spread 
as easily as fake news, and why Twitter ś algorithm is apparently having 
such a hard time to detect and erase misogynist slurs,19 or anti-Muslim 
videos retweeted by Trump,20 while deliberately erasing accounts of less 
famous people. Sexism and racism do indeed sell, not only to people, but 
to advertisers as well.
In the case of Facebook, a New York Times article states that ‘a report 
from ProPublica, a non-prof it news site, revealed that Facebook enabled 
advertisers to seek out self-described ‘Jew haters’ and other anti-Semitic 
topics.’21 Facebook is not only making money off hate from users, but is also 
helping advertisers to make profit from the active hate community. To gain 
more profit, Facebook is promoting hateful content, or helping advertisers 
to f ind the right hate group.
However, material that is too extreme has still to be taken out of the 
mainstream feed. Facebook and Twitter are interested in our well-being 
insofar as this means making us spending more time on their platforms. 
The reason extreme rape or violence are sometimes erased from these 
platforms is not out of goodwill, but because it would repel most people 
to stay online longer. For the task of erasing this content, Facebook, like 
many others, uses low wage workers. In 2014 Facebook outsourced a lot of 
its moderators to the Philippines who often quit after some months, due 
to the traumatizing material they have to deal with. After some time, the 
workers exhibited symptoms of PTSD, as a Wired article mentions.22 In 2017 
Facebook opened its f irst content moderation off ice in Berlin, from where 
most of the moderation of the European traff ic takes place. The location 
might have changed, the problem remains the same; one woman stated: ‘I 
personally did not have much faith in humankind beforehand, and now I 
virtually do not have any.’23
19 Lomas, ‘UK Study’.
20 Larson, ‘Twitter’.
21 Maheshwari and Stevenson, ‘Google’.
22 Ibid.; Chen, ‘The Laborers’; Kemp, ‘Facebook’.
23 Sokolow, ‘No More Faith in Humanity’.
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Apart from the f inancial aspect mentioned above, the origins of social 
media platforms need to be discussed as well. The online sexism and racism 
minority groups and women face today, has a lot to do with the corpora-
tions within which the harassment takes place. Facebook’s now infamous 
origin cannot be repeated enough: it was a frat boys’ rating system of female 
students on campus, not a campus page to connect with one’s friends. Reddit 
had subreddit channels named r/ChokeABitch, and Twitter favoured far 
right tweets on many occasions, bending the rules for Trump, while deleting 
politically critical voices. Ultimately, social media platforms are from their 
origin, to the way they function, a culmination of our white, patriarchal, 
racist and sexist elite, which dominates the online market.
The f irst section of advice concerned itself with the defence; how to cope 
with hate speech and violence when we are using these platforms. The second 
section is not so much advice on how to cope with hate as it discusses how 
we at Gender Equality Media view our relation to social media networks. 
Ultimately, the question is not whether to pick a f ight as a private person 
or as an activist online, but in which relation you view yourself and your 
activist work in this context. What we try, although we are primarily an 
online based campaign, is to not let social media networks become too 
dominant in our everyday lives.
Self-care and perspective
Pick your fights wisely
Be aware of what you want to achieve: The most you will obtain from a 
public f ight is informing other people who will read the thread. It will 
seldom be the case that you will convince a troll. We are not saying that it 
is not important or not worth it to express your opinion. However, consider 
in which context it happens, and if it is worth it to f ight on your own, or if 
you can outsource it to programmes f ighting hate speech. As we have seen, 
online emotions affect you whether you want them to or not, and you should 
learn to save your energy when a f ight is not necessary.
Tell your own story
Studies show that lies spread fast and that it is almost impossible to cor-
rect them. Most political trolls know that, and far right extremists don’t 
care if you correct fake news afterwards. It has been proven to circulate 
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uninhibited in their bubble, and that is all what they wanted to achieve in 
the f irst place.24 Instead of spending all our energy on trying to correct this 
misinformation, we would rather focus on creating content and campaigns 
which tell our own story, and inform the public on the things we consider 
to be important, rather than staying the commentators on the narrative 
the enemy has chosen to tell.
Have a squad!
Even if it seems hard because of the (assumed) humiliating content, or the 
hurtful words, always confide in someone when a bad feeling won’t let go. 
In cases where you are being threatened, I have already mentioned that you 
should tell another person and go together to the police. When it comes to 
hate speech and criticism though, people still feel hesitant to conf ide in 
others. Acknowledge your feelings, regardless of what caused them. We 
often screenshot the situation and share it in our group chats. We assure 
you that in many cases this takes half the weight of it.
Some anti-capitalist feminist perspectives
Facebook and Twitter are a necessary (though often fun) evil for online 
activism. Even so, you should distance yourself from these platforms as much 
as possible. These platforms are based on capitalist, white patriarchal, sexist, 
and racist ideas. In the end there is no way to ‘correct’ them, other than by 
supporting fair alternatives. As a group, but also regarding our interaction 
with followers, we try to outsource our communication to alternatives like 
Signal or Threema and not feed these platforms with more content than 
necessary.
Define your own value
Whether as an individual or as a group – we rely way too much on self-
assurance through acknowledgment on forms of likes or retweets in these 
networks. In activism we have seen people losing track of what is important: 
yes, your speech was not that popular online, your riot did not resonate as 
expected. So what? If you do not free yourself of this social media evaluation 
system, emotionally and strategically, your work and relevance will suffer.
24 Vosoughi et al., ‘The Spread’.
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Be critical of criticism
In our experience, most hate and unconstructive criticism we encountered 
came from people who did not have any alternative to offer themselves. 
Your ideas, your actions, your position will never be enough for some. 
Constructive criticism, on the other hand, always contributes something 
to the movement or the idea, instead of just boycotting and hurting what is 
already there. Someone who wants change as well, will not want to break 
you. Most unconstructive criticism or hate speech however, does not offer 
any better solution, and is mostly trying to discourage already existing 
initiatives. People feel better when they can say that something is not (good) 
enough, because in their minds it shifts the conversation away from them, 
and their guilt of doing nothing at all. There are people who want to change 
something, and people who want to be always right. If you belong to the 
f irst, accept that making mistakes is part of the deal. Always being right is 
reserved to the ones who do nothing at all.
As a f inal note, if we want to f ight online hate, we will not only need to 
reconsider how we evaluate emotions in comparison to facts. If we do not 
address the root of the problem, that we are talking about racist and sexist 
platforms, based in a white patriarchal, capitalist tech industry, we will 
always stay on the defence, rather than actually changing the narrative. 
Fighting online hate is ultimately linked to the basic f ight against the 
capitalist, sexist, racist, and classist roots of our Western society. In the long 
run we will have to talk about strategies to free our online communication 
from the influence of private companies, while focusing on the issue of 
surveillance capitalism. Until then, we should def initely not lose sight of 
effective strategies to combat online hate strategically.
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